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ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE GULF COAST 
OFFSHORE OIL CONTROVERSY
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The submerged lands controversy has been one of the 
most important legal, political and economic problems to 
come before the American Congress and public in many years.^ 
Foremost among the many facets of the marginal sea issue was 
oil, for the lands immediately involved were called "the 
richest drilling prize in the history of the oil b u s i n e s s .  
Valuable deposits of minerals other than petroleum may also
^A considerable amount of confusion and misunder­
standing has resulted from the misuse of the term "tidelands' 
when applied to the marginal seas. In a technical sense, 
"tidelands" are the relatively narrow strips between the 
mean high and low water marks that are alternately covered 
and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tide. Pollard*s 
Lessee v. Hagen. 3 How. 212 (1S45)• It was agreed by all
parties to the controversy that the "tidelands," thus de­
fined, have always belonged to the adjacent States. Supreme 
Court of the United States, October Term, 1946, Brief for 
the United States in Support of Motion for Judgment, p. 2.
2pil and Gas Journal, October 11, 1954, p. l6?.
This authoritative trade magazine estimated that reserves of 
six billion barrels of oil would be found in the Gulf of 
Mexico submerged lands in the first six years of intensive 
drilling.
be found in the submerged lands. It is not surprising that 
a stake of this magnitude would whet the acquisitive in­
stincts of many different groups.
However, the basic controversy was whether the 
National Government or the coastal States owned the re­
sources in the submerged lands of the Continental Shelf and 
which of these public bodies should administer and control 
the resource development in these offshore areas. Stemming 
directly from the basic issue is the larger question of the 
proper position of the Federal Government as a proprietary 
and regulatory agency for the American people. The sub­
merged lands problem is but a phase of a conflict between 
the centrifugal and centripetal forces in society, in whose 
vortex the oil industry, and all industry, has become in­
creasingly involved.
The relationship between State and National Govern­
ment has undergone many changes since 17#9. Changing 
philosophies of government and changing economic circum­
stances have cast new roles for governmental units. The 
rise of a national economy, the growth of the modern inter­
national corporation, and the creation of powerful economic 
pressure groups have created new problems to be solved and 
new responsibilities for the governments to discharge. 
Whether these problems and responsibilities should be solved 
and discharged by the State or Federal governmental bodies 
is a matter to be decided by democratic processes.__________
While fundamentally a dispute between the States and 
the Federal Government, the issue has been of major concern 
to many groups and organizations not normally associated 
with either level of government. Among these have been con­
servation groups, real estate boards, port authorities, 
educational organizations and oil companies. The States* 
officials and congressional sponsors of legislation to gain 
clear title for the States attempted to play down oil as the 
principal consideration in the controversy. Governor Cald­
well of Florida said that the issue was simply that of 
property rights and that the question of oil lands had been 
"unhappily" brought into the dispute.3
In spite of this disclaimer, for over sixteen years 
the controversy raged in and out of Congress, the courts, 
the newspapers, and the public mind. To the normal romance 
and monetary glitter of oil operations was added the glamour 
of the sea, a new combination that challenged the public 
imagination. Few issues in recent times have drawn forth so 
many words. Since 1937, when the matter first came before 
Congress, there have been seventeen formal hearings, lasting 
a total of eighty-eight days and recorded in more than eight 
thousand printed pages of testimony and exhibits. In the
^New York Times. July 20, 1946, Sec. 26, P. 1. 
Senator Douglas noted that some of the quitclaim sponsors 
were as squeamish about mentioning the words "oil and gas" 
in their discussions as Victorians were in ever mentioning 
the lower limbs of women. Congressional Record. April 9. 
i953T-p^-29êé-.---------------- — - ~ ---------
1953 debate on the Senate floor over a million words were 
expended. The Supreme Court of the United States has handed 
down four separate decisions on the matter but even so, the 
issue is not definitely settled.
The traditional positions of the major political 
parties have been completely reversed since World War I and 
the reversal is most clearly shown in this controversy. The 
Republican Party, historically the party favoring strong 
central authority, has backed the States* claims against the 
Federal Government, while the Democratic Party, the tradi­
tional party of States* rights, has opposed the claims of 
the States.
The roots of the traditional stands of the major 
political parties go back many generations. The Republican 
Party wanted the real power of government to be removed 
from the local political arena, where it might be subject to 
hasty and ill-advised local pressures; the Democrats wanted 
the power close to the people. Paradoxically the Democratic 
Party has completely taken over the former Republican posi­
tion of fearing local political pressures, albeit modernized 
to apply to the pressure of powerful national and inter­
national corporations on local governments, while the 
Republicans now sing the praises of Thomas Jefferson*s 
states* rights.
It must be noted that in the submerged lands issue, 
the sectionalinterests often outweighed the party interests
Many Congressional Democrats, especially those from the one- 
party States of Louisiana and Texas, left the fold to back 
the claims of the coastal oil States. Many of the Republi­
cans in Congress, feeling that the best interests of their 
particular constituency would not be served by quit-claiming 
the offshore oil lands to the coastal States, supported the 
Federal ownership position.
In a large sense, the offshore oil controversy has 
been a clash of the Harding-Coolidge philosophy of limited 
Federal power and activity against the New Deal-Fair Deal 
philosophy of greater Federal responsibility and authority. 
It is impossible otherwise to account for the support given 
by the Congressional representatives of the inland States to 
the claims of the littoral States.
Some persons believe that the individual States, 
being closer to the problems, could administer the sub­
merged lands with greater efficiency and less expense than a 
distant government in Washington. Others believe that the 
lands which lie along the Nation's shore could be more 
efficiently and economically administered by one government 
in Washington than by several in Tallahassee, Florida; Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana; Austin, Texas; Sacramento, California; and 
the capital cities of the other seventeen coastal States. 
Senator 0'Mahoney, a supporter of the later idea, maintained 
that the greatest present day problem of political economy 
■XS-Jtrying. to_gear government to the modern world ; that it ia
6uneconomic, if not impossible, to govern a national or in­
ternational economy on local levels; and that chaos would 
result if modern America attempted to return to the govern­
mental authorities of Thomas Jefferson's day.^
The 1953 legislation by Congress, confirming and 
establishing in the several States titles to the submerged 
lands within their "historic" boundaries^ and providing for 
Federal ownership, control and jurisdiction of the submerged 
lands beyond the State boundaries and out to the edge of the 
Continental Shelf,° climaxed the controversy. Until this 
legislation brought some degree of order out of a chaotic 
situation, offshore oil drilling had been virtually sus­
pended. A legal vacuum had prevented the orderly develop­
ment of the offshore resources after 1948, the year of the 
Supreme Court decision in the submerged lands suit against 
California. Regardless of its merit, the legislation served
^Personal conversation of author with Senator 0'Ma­
honey, May 28, 1953. Senator 0'Mahoney, then out of office, 
noted that, at the time Senator Daniels was fighting for 
local rule in the submerged lands, he was asking the Civil 
Aeronautics Board for a large subsidy for a Texas airline. 
The author has noted another similar inconsistency. Repre­
sentative Poague (Texas) introduced a bill providing for an 
upstream flood control program to be administered by the 
United States Department of Agriculture at the same time 
that he was trying to prevent Federal administration of the 
offshore lands. Dallas Morning News. January 2, 1953»
^Public Law 31, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., approved May 
22, 1953.
^Public Law 212, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., approved 
Augus±_2 ,_1953.j._____________________________________________________
to fill this legal void and open up the entire Continental 
Shelf for development.
The issue was settled largely on a political basis. 
For the most part, economists were not called into the 
discussion. This was to be expected as, in the words of 
Frank H. Knight:
The more vital problems are not problems of economy, 
but of maintaining social unity in the face of economic 
interests. 'And the foundations of unity lie not in 
intelligence, but in habit, emotion, and ideals of 
value.7
This is not to say that there were no economic con­
siderations in the issue, for the economic ramifications of 
such a precedent setting action were many, but only that the 
economic considerations were little used among the bases for 
the settlement.
The submerged lands issue is complex, having many 
and varied aspects in the fields of international law,. 
American constitutional law, politics, government, history 
and economics. The elements of tradition, prejudice and 
chauvinism have been introduced into the picture by the 
partisans of both sides and these have not contributed to a 
temperate discussion and solution.& During the heat of the
TPrank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 
(Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), Introduction, p.
X X X .
g
Texas Land Commissioner Bascom Giles declared that 
he favored secession from the United States before surrender 
of the submerged lands. "Muddy Waters," Time. July 7, 1947, 
f_._&4_.________________________________________________________________
a
controversy, it was difficult for the lay public to separate 
fact from fiction, so great was the propensity to add false 
and irrelevant charges.
In the interests of temperate discussion this study 
will attempt to sketch the background of the controversy, to 
separate the economic from the primarily political and legal 
issues, and then to proceed with consideration of the eco­
nomic factors affecting development of the oil resources of 
the submerged lands area. The first requisite to understand­
ing the problem is a clear grasp of the area involved in the 
controversy.
Geographical Description of the Gulf 
Coast Continental Shelf
The term "Continental Shelf" is applied to that por­
tion of the sea bottom and subsoil surrounding a continent 
that is covered by water up to a depth of 600 feet; that is, 
the area that would become dry if the sea level were lowered 
by 600 feet.9 It extends seaward from the mean low water 
line or from the mouths of rivers and bays to the point 
where the continental land mass descends steeply into the 
ocean depths.^0 While the actual drop off, or geologic edge,
% .  W. Mouton, The Continental Shelf (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), p. 45*
L. Shalowitz, "Cartography in the Submerged. 
Lands Oil Cases," The Journal of the Coast and Geodetic Sur­
vey. December, 1951, P* 6^.
varies over the world from 360 feet to 1200 feet, cartogra­
phers have accepted 600 feet as a convenient definition of 
the edge.
The continental shelves of the world extend out 
under about one-twelfth of the oceanic areas and comprise 
the equivalent of one-quarter of the land areas of the world 
Approximately one-tenth of the world's continental shelf 
area lies adjacent to the United States and Alaska.1%
The area of that portion of the Continental Shelf 
contiguous to the United States proper is estimated at 
277,500 square miles, which is equal to the area of the 
States of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, 
Illinois, and Kentucky combined, or slightly more than the 
State of Texas (Figure 1). In addition, the Shelf adjoining 
Alaska is roughly 600,000 square miles in extent, almost as 
large as Alaska itself.^3 Altogether, the Continental 
Shelves of the United States and Alaska exceed the area con­
tained in the Louisiana Purchase.
The Gulf Coast Continental Shelf, extending from the 
Florida Keys to the Rio Grande River, covers 132,000 square
^Statement by A. L. Shalowitz, Director of Technical 
Services, United States Coast and Geodetic Survey, personal 
interview. May 22, 1953»
l^Ibid.
13J, Ben Carsey, ”Geology of the Gulf Coast Area and 
Continental Shelf," Bulletin of the American Association of 
Petroleum Geologists. Vol. 34. No. 3. March. 195Ô. p. 371.
FIGURE I
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m i l e s . T h a t  portion seaward of Louisiana and Texas, the 
most promising for oil, gas, and sulphur production, amounts 
to 60,000 square miles, an area about one-fifth as large as 
the combined land areas of these two States. Approximately 
thirty thousand square miles of Continental Shelf lie sea­
ward of each State.
The area of primary concern is the ten and one-half 
mile strip immediately seaward of Texas and the three mile 
strip adjoining L o u i s i a n a . A  total of 5,46S square miles 
lies within these two strips. This is one-tenth of the 
total Continental Shelf seaward of Texas and Louisiana. 
Fifty-four thousand square miles lie in the area between the 
"historic State boundaries" and the edge of the Continental 
Shelf (Table 1).
The Gulf of Mexico Continental Shelf is a continua­
tion of the great coastal plain that slopes down gradually 
at approximately five feet per mile to the coast. In large 
areas of the Continental Shelf, this gradient continues far 
out into the Gulf, resulting in relatively shallow waters
^^National Petroleum Council, Submerged Land Produc­
tive Capacity (Washington: National Petroleum Council,
1953), Exhibit C, Part 1, p. 1. Hereafter cited as Sub­
merged Lands.
^^The boundary claims of Louisiana vary from three 
to fifty miles from dry land. Until the matter is settled, 
the development of the submerged lands beyond three miles 
will be retarded. In the absence of a definite boundary, 
the three mile belt will be used in this discussion.
TABLE 1
ESTIMATES OF THE AREA IN THE CONTINENTAL SHELF SEAWARD OF TEXAS AND LOUISIANA
Within Alleged 
"Historic State 
Boundaries"!
Outside Alleged 
"Historic State 
Boundaries" Total
Seaward of Texas
Seaward of Louisiana
4062
1406
(Estimate in square miles)
2 5 ,4 7 0 2 9 ,5 3 2
28,906 30,312
Total 5468 54,376 59,844
Source: Testimony of Walter S, Halliman, Chairman, National Petroleum
Council, before the Senate Interior and Insular affairs 
Committee, Hearings on S. J. Res. 20. 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p » 86.
Ten and one-half statute miles for Texas and three nautical miles for 
Louisiana.
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many miles from shorè.lG Off Texas the average depth at one 
mile from shore is eighteen feet; at nine miles, forty-two 
feet; at twenty-seven miles, fifty-two feet; and at seventy 
miles, one hundred feet.^?
The Shelf width varies along the Gulf from five 
miles off parts of the Mississippi River Delta to one hun­
dred and seventy-five miles off Florida. The average width 
is fifty-nine miles. The maximum width of the Shelf seaward 
of Texas and Louisiana is one hundred and forty miles off 
the mouth of the Sabine River, the dividing line between the 
States. In short, the real estate with which this study is 
concerned is the subsoil of the vast plain that stretches 
out under a relatively thin veneer of water along the Gulf 
of Mexico Coast.
Issues
The submerged lands controversy has been fought on 
many issues, some real and some that appear to be far afield, 
In order to grasp the real issue, the false ones must first 
be disclosed.
False Issues
An extraneous issue used mainly for propaganda pur-
l&Carsey, op. cit.. p. 398.
17Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 
1949, No. 13, Original. Brief for the State of Texas in op­
position to Motion for Judgment, p. 4._____________________
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poses may best be seen in quotations. For instance, one 
Texas newspaper commented;
Federal ownership of the tidelands fits exactly 
into the scene of creeping socialism. Success of the 
efforts to grab the tidelands for the Federal Government 
would give the trend towards socialism its biggest for­
ward "creep” in American history.18
There are no grounds to this claim that the issue is 
one of "socialization" or "nationalization" of the offshore 
section of the petroleum industry on the one hand, as agains^ 
free private enterprise in the oil industry on the other. 
There is no question about public or private ownership of 
these offshore land and resources. All parties to the con­
troversy agree that they are publicly owned, either by the 
adjacent States or by the Federal Government. Whatever the 
governmental authority involved, under every plan of developj 
ment thus far considered private oil companies would produce, 
refine, and distribute the offshore oil.
Solicitor General Philip B. Perlman said that this
1 d
The Dallas Morning News. April 19, 1953» A month 
later (May 20, 1953) the same paper went even farther:
"There has been no issue in recent years that has divided 
the public between left and right as precisely as has the 
tidelands issue. Beginning with the Daily Worker in New 
York, staunch federal ownership advocate, and coming all the 
way from deep red to light pink, one finds editorial opinion, 
congressional opinion and public opinion on the side of 
federal ownership almost unanimously. The right has been 
solidly for state ownership. So has the majority of the 
middle ground. Apply the tidelands issue to political ide­
ologies throughout the world today or to political ideologies 
historically through the years and you will get the same 
result. Today Malenkov and Peron would be on the side of 
federal ownership. Yesterday, Jefferson would have sided 
‘w-i-th—the-elaim-of the states»"------------- ----------------
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argument boiled down to calling Federal ownership and leas­
ing nationalization, socialization, or other objectionable 
names, while State ownership and leasing would be an enter­
prise more private than public in character.19 Senator Paul 
H. Douglas pointed out that the followers of this line of 
reasoning would be forced to call State ownership "state 
socialism," if they insist that National ownership is 
"national socialism," as there is no difference in theory on 
this point between one level of government and another.20
Equally there are no valid grounds for the charge by 
the less temperate Federal ownership advocates that the oil 
companies are trying to "steal" the offshore oil deposits. 
The implication is made that State title would amount to oil 
company title to these resources. Former Secretary of the 
Interior Harold L. Ickes voiced this charge in rather blunt 
language:
The Walters Bill (H.R. 44&4) would surrender to the 
oil interests, without compensation, rich offshore lands 
that the Supreme Court has said belong to all of the 
people. A more descriptive name would be "The Big Steal 
Bill."21
Another statement serving to point out the degree of
^9u,S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, The Submerged Lands Controversy, Committee 
Print, S2d Cong., èd Sess. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1951), p. 1Ô.
*^^ Congressional Record, April 10, 1953, p. 3036.
^^Harold L. Ickes, "The Big Steal in Oil," New 
Republic. August 27, 1951, p# 17.________________
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emotion that was reached, was made by Representative John D* 
Dingell (Dem) of Michigan:
This move on the part of the allied forces of the 
pltmderbund and the administration to rob the people 
of the United States of the wealth of submerged minerals 
. . • is the dirtiest and most sinful move ever un­
covered in this land*
The plunderbund, the arch conspirators which are 
connected with a rapacious group within the oil industry 
will reap the prime benefits and through them a political 
party supported by excessive outlays of ill-gotten gains 
will attempt to advance further over the prostrate body 
politic of the American p e o p l e .22
Answer to such charges is best summed up in the 
words of the president of Sun Oil Company:
/This controversy/ bas been between the Federal 
Government and various state governments over title to 
the tidelands areas. Regardless of the outcome, the oil 
industry expects to lease and develop the underwater 
lands there and to pay for the privilege of doing so. .
• . Oil companies are concerned that the authority of 
the landlord, whether Federal or State government 
agencies, be clearly established so that the tremendous 
investments required to develop these areas will not be 
jeopardized by future legislation and court decisions.23
As this statement makes clear, the position of the 
oil companies, under any suggested settlement, would be as 
lessees of State or Federal offshore lands. The bonuses, 
rentals, and royalties involved would be paid either to the 
Treasury of the State concerned or to the United States 
Treasury. As the record has shown, the States have extracted
^^Congressional Record, May 13, 1953, pp. 5067-5060.
^^Robert G. Dunlap, The Challenge of Free Markets. 
address before the Petroleum Club of the Cleveland Chamber o 
Commerce, Cleveland, Ohio, October 15, 1953* Printed as 
pamphlet, November, 1953, pp. 3-4.
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leasing and royalty payments from their lessees that appear 
to be in line with similar payments made to private land­
lords. The companies participating in the Gulf Coast off­
shore development have secured their leases by effective 
competitive bidding.
These charges and countercharges, in which each side 
accused the other of trying to "steal" the offshore re­
sources served only to embitter the controversy and to con­
ceal the real issues. In this as in any controversy, each 
side had valid claims supported by honest differences of 
opinion.
Stripped of all charges of moral turpitude, there 
were three views that could be taken by reasonable, sincere 
and intelligent men. The submerged lands of the Continental 
Shelf were owned wholly by the Federal Government, or by the 
adjacent States, or they were owned jointly by both levels 
of government. In a more reasonable atmosphere, it would 
have been seen that there was nothing immoral or dishonest 
about any of these views.
Claims of the Participants 
The States of Texas, Louisiana, and California, 
backed by officials of many other States, have for many years 
claimed ownership for all coastal States of the strip of sub­
merged lands contiguous to their seacoasts out to the 
alleged "historic boundaries" of the various States. At the
lé
minimum this limit was held to be three nautical miles from 
the mean low-water mark for all coastal areas except for the 
Gulf Coast of Florida and Texas, where the minimum was held 
to be three leagues#^4
In addition to the minimum claims, further claims to 
additional areas of the Continental Shelf have been made 
from time to time by the States. In 193#, the State of 
Louisiana unilaterally asserted ownership of the maritime 
belt to a distance of twenty-seven nautical miles or thirty- 
one and one-half statute miles from shore.^5 Texas followed 
suit in 1941 and fixed the boundary of the State at twenty- 
seven nautical miles from s h o r e . i n  1947 the Texas Legis­
lature extended the State boundaries to the edge of the 
Continental S h e l f .^7
The "cartographic chauvinism” practiced by the 
Legislatures of Louisiana and Texas furnished much ammunitioiji 
for the opposition claim that this was a land "grab.” It is 
apparent that the Texas claim to the lands clearly beyond 
its "historic boundary" was made for bargaining purposes.
^One nautical (marine) mile, representing a one 
minute arc on the great circle of the earth, is equal to 
6OÔO.27 feet. One league is three nautical miles. Three 
leagues would approximate ten and one-half statute (land) 
miles.
^^Louisiana General Statutes. 193#, No. 55»
Z^General Laws of Texas. 47th Legis., 454*
^^General Laws of Texas, 50th Legis., 451*
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This claim was not pressed by the State officials, who made 
serious demand only for the ten and one-half mile belt.
The situation was somewhat different in Louisiana. 
There the State officials were never content to limit their 
claim to three miles from dry land, especially when most of 
the major offshore petroleum discoveries were located beyond 
the three mile strip. As late as the 1953 Senate Hearings 
on the Submerged Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf 
Act, the Louisiana Governor, the Attorney General, the 
Secretary of the State Mineral Board, and one of the United 
States Senators from Louisiana denied knowing how many miles 
the Louisiana boundary extended into the G u l f T h e  Sub­
merged Lands Act of 1953, confirming and establishing the 
title of Louisiana to the submerged lands within State 
boundaries, was passed with no clear idea of what Louisiana 
claim would be.
Early in 1954 the Louisiana Legislature officially 
established the boundary of the State at ten and one-half 
miles from the "coast line," which in turn was defined as 
the point in the Gulf of Mexico where the Coast Guard said 
that high sea navigation began.2? In some cases this
2&U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, S3d Cong., 1st Sess. Hearings on S. J. Res. 
13, p. 264, and Hearings on S. 1901. pp. 250, 293, 315, and 
451» Hereafter referred to as Hearings on S. J. Res. 13 and 
Hearings on S. 1901. respectively.
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Oil and Gas Journal. August 2, 1954, p. 54»
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legislatively devised boundary would be up to fifty miles 
from dry land,^^ It is agreed by all that the dividing line 
between land and water is difficult to draw for the greater 
part of the Louisiana tidelands, the term "tidelands" here 
being correctly used. From the Sabine River on, the 
Louisiana shore is a series of shoals, reefs, marshes, bays, 
inlets, peninsulas, and islands. Mud islands are known to 
rise or disappear from time to time along the coast• This 
confusing coastal configuration lends support to the quest 
of Louisiana for à definite line of demarcation, though not 
necessarily the generous one the State has selected.
Since 1945 the Federal Government has contested the 
claims of the States to the Continental Shelf lands seaward 
of the mean low-water line.^^ It was acknowledged that the 
States, and not the Federal Government, owned the true 
"tidelands," submerged lands beneath inland navigable waters 
and certain "historic bays," of which Chesapeake Bay is an 
example.
*^^Houston Post. November 21, 1954.
^^The Federal Government was not the only body con­
testing State title to the marginal seas. In an interesting 
and amusing side suit, twenty-one bands of California 
Indians asked the United States Supreme Court to return the 
submerged lands to them, the rightful heirs of the 
"aboriginal occupants." The petition of these Campo Mission 
Indians claimed title to vast stretches of the California 
coastline by virtue of original occupancy and ownership for 
over 500 years. New York Times. April 20, 194&« The 
Supreme Court did not see fit to give the land back to the 
Indians. United States of America v. the State of Califor- 
-nla-r  -344-UyS r-82 5 , Qctober--T^rmTr-194?^
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There is no need to go into the exhaustive legal 
arguments, pro and con, that were presented by the States 
and the Federal Government to back their claims. These 
matters are well documented in the various briefs presented 
in the three Supreme Court cases dealing with the submerged 
lands. However, a brief summary of the various claims will 
show that each side had strong points in its favor.
The Louisiana Claim
Louisiana and all other littoral States except Texas 
had roughly the same bases for claiming ownership of the 
marginal sea areas contiguous to their respective shores.
The simplest claim was that they had controlled and ^ 
utilized these areas for up to 150 years without objection ; 
from the Federal Government. The States had regulated the 
taking of sponges, oysters, shrimp and kelp from the floor 
of the marginal seas and on many occasions had leased or 
granted portions of the marginal sea, including the sea-bed, 
to individuals and organizations, including the Federal 
Government. During this long period the States and all 
Federal officials concerned with such matters thought that 
the States did own the marginal seas out to three miles from 
shore. Hence, the legal rules of adverse possession, 
estoppel, laches or ratification should bar the Federal 
claim to these areas.
The States claimed a proper and legal chain of title
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by virtue of a number of historical events. With the 
Declaration of Independence in 177&, the thirteen original 
States succeeded to all rights theretofore held by the 
British Crown, Following the successful revolution, the 
British Crown relinquished all proprietary and territorial 
rights to the original Colonies which were named separately 
in the peace treaty.
Under the Articles of Confederation the central gov­
ernment owned no land except that ceded by the respective 
States, The Federal Constitution made provision for the 
national government to acquire land but, in itself, did not 
transfer any land to the Federal Government,
The States admitted into the Union at a later date 
came in on an equal footing with the thirteen original 
States, The new States automatically acceded to and became
vested with the lands out to three miles from shore. Or so
12was the reasoning of the Louisiana claim,^
The Texas Claim
The title claims of Texas to the marginal seas 
adjacent to the State are generally conceded by all parties 
familiar with the ownership controversy to be stronger than 
those of the other States, including the original thirteen,
^^Fred S. LeBlanc, Plain Facts and Fundamental Prin­
ciples in Regard to the Tidelands Controversy (State of 
Louisiana, Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney 
General, n,d,J,
23
Texas alone existed as an independent nation, reqognized by 
the United States and many major powers. The Texas Boundary 
Act of December 19, IÔ36, described the seaward boundary of 
the new nation as: "Beginning at the mouth of the Sabine
River, and running west along the Gulf of Mexico three 
leagues from land, to the mouth of the Rio Grande. . . . "
In 1Ô45 Texas worked out an annexation agreement 
with the United States, Texas had offered to cede all of 
its public lands to the Union if the United States would 
take over the $10,000,000 Texas debt. The United States 
Congress refused to assume the debt in exchange for the 
"worthless land." An acceptable agreement was finally made 
whereby Texas would cede to the Union all property pertain­
ing to the public defense, but would retain the public debt 
and all vacant and unappropriated land lying within its 
limits. A careful listing of all defense property to be 
transferred was prepared, checked and signed for by the re­
ceiving officers. Although many properties were transferred 
including decks and naval yards, the three league strip of 
marginal seas and the lands beneath were not included. The 
State of Texas has steadfastly maintained that, since the 
United States refused to assume the liabilities of the Re­
public, it should have no claim to the assets of the Republic 
excepting only the properties expressly ceded.33
3 0
^^Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 
19A9, No. 13, Original. Brief for the State of Texas in
Opposition to Motion for Judgment.
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The Federal Claim
The Federal Government maintained that after the 
American Revolution the thirteen original colonies never 
acquired ownership of the three mile marginal seas belt as 
the three mile concept was not established in international 
custom and understanding at that time. The acquisition was 
accomplished later by the national government as a function 
of national external sovereignty. The exercise of protecti^i 
and control of the three mile belt gave the Federal Govern­
ment paramount rights in and power over the area.
Furthermore, these paramount rights in the marginal 
sea were not lost by reason of any errors of omission or 
commission made by the agents of the United States, Laches, 
estoppel or adverse possession do not hold against the 
Federal Government
The special claim of Texas was contested with the 
argument that, when Texas came into the Union, it was under 
the equal footing clause, Texas had to relinquish the 
marginal seas in order to be on an equal footing with the 
other States, The assumption of the national responsibili­
ties of defense and regulation in the marginal sea off Texas 
gave the Federal Government paramount rights in this area.3^
3A-United States v, California. 332 U.S. 19, and 
United States v, Louisiana. 339 U.S. 699.
^^United States v, Texas. 339 U,S,_ 7&7.
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Method of Approach
Scope of Study 
Since a complete investigation of all the competing 
claims would have necessitated compiling an unwieldy mass of 
data, certain limitations on the study seemed advisable.
Only that portion of the controversy relating to the Gulf 
Coast Continental Shelf was undertaken. References to the 
California offshore dispute occur only where there is a 
relevant tie-in with the Gulf Coast controversy.
The sea, the earth*s greatest storehouse of minerals^ 
has been called man*s newest frontier,Oceanographers 
predict that the human race will become increasingly de­
pendent on the sea as a source of foodstuffs, light metals, 
and chemical elements. Many of these resources can be ex­
cluded from the Continental Shelf issue. Both the Federal 
and State advocates have limited the scope of the controversé 
to the resources on or in the sub-surface and sub-soil of 
the shelf. The free swimming fishes and crustaceans, the 
drifting organisms, and the chemically suspended elements 
in the waters above the ocean floor have not been a signifi­
cant part in the controversy.
Certain organic and inorganic resources resting on 
or attached to the sub-surface of the ocean may also be
^^Rachel L, Carson, The Sea Around Us (New York; 
Oxford University Press, 1951), p, 190,
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excluded from the discussion. The Federal government dis­
claimed any interest in the kelp, sponges, oysters, and 
clams of the marginal seas.3? The position of sand, gravel, 
and mudshell in the controversy is not clear. In the ab­
sence of any disclaimer on the part of the Federal govern­
ment, it must be assumed that these resources are considered! 
a part of the sub-surface and sub-soil. As such, they would: 
be subject to lease by the fee-owner of the underwater lands-. 
Whatever the position of the sand, gravel, and mudshell in 
the dispute, the emphasis has been small because of the 
relatively insignificant value of these resources as compared 
:to the oil, gas, and sulphur.
I Sources of Information
■ i
; During the preparation of the dissertation the
; author spent six weeks in Washington, D. C., while the
I Senate was debating the Holland Bill, later to become the
: Submerged Lands Act . As a result the author was able to 
!  ■ i
Ihear several days of the debate, to attend hearings on the
I Outer Continental Shelf Act, and to talk with many of the |
: principals on the submerged lands issue— notably Senators ;
(Paul Douglas, Joseph P. O'Mahoney, Price Daniel, Earl Long, i
I ' :
Î and Guy Condon, The author spent the remainder of the
i !
I --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ;------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ I
; 37s,107 (03d Cong,, 1st Sess,) proposed to allow j
! State regulation, management and administration of the tak- |
i ing, conservation and development of these oceanic resources,
               !
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Iperiod in Washington gathering data from the pertinent gov­
ernmental documents in the Library of Congress and in col­
lecting available bulletins from various interested bureaus 
and departments.
Several days were spent in Austin, Texas, in the 
I libraries of the Attorney General and the Land Commissioner,
I
I gathering information on the Texas claim, and the method of 
j  offshore leasing, A complete file from the Dallas Morning 
! News on the subject of the submerged lands happenings was 
I kept, starting from the early spring of 1952.
Technical information on cost of geophysical and 
drilling operations was obtained in personal talks with Otis 
Danielson, Chief Drilling Engineer of the Kerr-McGee Oil 
Industries, Incorporated, in their Oklahoma City office and 
with Jim Savage, Vice-President of Kerr-McGee in their 
Houston office. Conservation data were furnished by 
iLawrence R. Alley, Assistant Executive Secretary of the 
I Interstate Oil Coup act Commission, headquarters, Oklahoma 
iCity. An inspection of an offshore mobile drilling platform 
I("Mr. Gus") was arranged through the courtesy of the manager 
I  of Bethlehem Steel Corporation's Beaumont yards,
I Overview of Contents
I  After a summary of the political and legal history
!
I  of the submerged lands controversy, an analysis of the 
Î estimates of offshore resources is made to establish the
2è
probable values that may occur to the governmental owner. 
Next a study is made of the cost of recovering offshore oil 
and gas. This is followed by a discussion of the physical 
and market risks that might retard offshore oil developments 
and of the factors which offset these risks. Comparison of 
the State and Federal leasing methods and practices is de­
tailed in order to show the income actually received by the 
owner under each system since the passage of the Submerged 
Lands Act.
Because of the germinal importance of this act, a 
careful review of the precedents it sets is made, for these 
precedents might well be assumed to control future inter­
pretation on disposal of public lands and of Federal pro­
prietary activities.
CHAPTER II I
POLITICAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CONTROVERSY I
Although development of offshore oil resources began;
i at the close of the 19th Century, the real contest over
j
; which governmental unit should be the controlling agency did
i  '  I
inot become politically important until 1945. From that date|
j  ^ I
Iuntil 1952 the scene is one of a stand-off between legis- |
llative proponents of quit-claim measures and executive oppo-l 
I I
isition to such. After the Republican victory of 1952, |
I however. Congress passed two acts which were sustained by
! Supreme Court decision the following year. Yet, obvious
i  :
; areas of disagreement may cause future controversy.
Î . ■ I
Chronology of Events Prior to the 1952 Election
The first offshore oil deposits were discovered near 
Santa Barbara, California, in 1894 when it was determined 
that the Summerland Field extended out under the Pacific 
Ocean,^ Between 1921 and 1936, five other offshore pools 
were discovered in the narrow strip of the Continental Shelfi
I
adjoining the California Coast. The latter developments
^Buel W. Patch, "Offshore Oil," Editorial Research 
Reports... V0I.. I, January—22^_1946^_P-.—63 ._____  .
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were made under lease from California, for in 1921 that
State had enacted a general leasing statute that applied to
2
the marginal sea.
With the development of oil production under State 
leases, a number of persons began to file applications with 
the Department of the Interior for Federal oil and gas 
leases on submerged lands situated in or near the California 
offshore producing areas. Several hundred such applications 
were made between 1924 and 1937. The Department of the In­
terior consistently rejected all such applications on the 
grounds that the lands applied for belonged to the State of 
California.3 Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, in one 
letter of rejection, wrote: "Title to the soil under the
ocean within the three mile limit is in the State of Cali­
fornia, and the land may not be appropriated except by 
authority of the Sta t e . L a t e r ,  Secretary Ickes began to
This statute was amended in 1929, at the instiga­
tion of groups disturbed by the tendency of escaping oil to 
gum up the beaches, to prohibit the drilling through the 
water. It was still possible to reach a portion of the 
underwater deposits by directional drilling from well loca­
tions on land. Congressional Digest. October, 194#, p . 233.
^United States Department of the Interior, Years of 
Progress 1945-1952 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1953), p. 192.
^Letter of Harold L. Ickes to Olin S. Proctor, dated 
December 22, 1933. Complete text in Senate Committee on In­
terior and Insular Affairs, Jurisdiction over Submerged 
Lands of the Open Sea. Committee Print, S2d Cong,, 1st Sess. 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 7.
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doubt his decision in this matter, largely as a result of 
the persistence of several of the Federal lease applicants, 
and discontinued the rejection of applications received 
after April 19, 1937.^
About this time the Congress became interested in 
the offshore lands. On August 14, 1937 Senator Gerald Nye 
(Rep.) of North Dakota introduced a resolution declaring all 
lands below low water to be the property of the United 
States and directing the Attorney General to take the neces­
sary action to establish possession.^ The resolution passed 
the Senate five days later without debate or recorded dis­
sent. The House Judiciary Committee held hearings on the 
Nye bill in February, 1938, and favorably reported the reso­
lution to the House, but Congress adjourned before further 
action was taken. Similar resolutions asserting Federal 
title and directing the creation of an offshore Naval 
Petroleum Reserve were offered in 1939 and hearings were 
held, but none passed.?
^Department of the Interior, o p . cit.. pp. 192-193. 
In 1940 and again in 1944, certain Federal lease applicants 
filed suit to compel Secretary Ickes to act on the applica­
tions that were being held in suspense. The suits were not 
successful. Dun v. Ickes. 115 Fed. (2nd) 36 (1940) and 
Jordan v. Ickes. 143 Fed. (2nd) 152 (1944J,
^S. J. Res. 20&, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
?H. J. Res. 176 was introduced by Congressman Hobbs; 
H. J. Res. 181, by Congressman O'Connor; and S, J. Res. 83 
and S. J. Res. 92, by Senators Walsh and Nye.
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Meanwhile oil activity was getting under way in the 
Gulf of Mexico. On March 11, 193# the first successful well 
was completed in the open waters of the Gulf under a lease 
from the State of Louisiana.^ In June 193# the Louisiana 
Legislature acted to extend the boundary of that State to
Q
twenty-seven miles from shore.^
In July 1939 at the suggestion of Secretary Ickes, 
President Roosevelt appointed an interdepartmental committee 
to study the submerged land ownership matter. The committee 
recommended that the Attorney General assert a claim to the 
California offshore and this report was approved by Presi­
dent Roosevelt but because of the war situation, no action 
was taken by the Attorney General until 1945.^^
The war caused a virtual suspension of both the 
drilling activities in the offshore and the ownership dis­
pute.However, even before the end of hostilities in the 
Pacific Theater, both sides were prepared to resume the 
domestic battle. The opening blow was struck sixteen days 
after the capitulation of Germany. On May 29, 1945 Attorney
^The Oil Weekly. March 2Ô, 193#, p. 200.
^Louisiana General Statutes. 193#, No. 55. 
l^Department of the Interior, op. cit.. p. 192.
^^Three State ownership bills were introduced during 
, the war by Representative Angell, but these proposals re- 
! ceived no attention by Congress. Patch, op. cit.. p. 65.
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General Biddle filed a test suit in the Federal District 
Court against the Pacific Western Oil Corporation to recover 
a small plot of submerged land seaward of California. 
Retaliation came one month later in the form of a quitclaim 
resolution, introduced by Representative Hatton Sumners 
(Dem.) of Texas, which declared that the United States "re­
nounces and disclaims any right, title, interest or claim” 
to the submerged lands.^3 The Judiciary Committee, of which 
Rep. Sumners was Chairman, reported H. J. Res. 225 to the 
House with what some called tumultuous h a s t e . T h e  House 
passed the measure by a vote of lOS-11 on September 20, 1945 
after a single afternoon of debate. Senate action was de­
ferred until the next Session of Congress.
On September 2S, 1945 President Truman issued Proc­
lamation Humber 266# which asserted that the mineral re­
sources to the edge of the Continental Shelf "appertain to”
^^New York Times. May 30, 1945, I., 1.
^^H. J. Res. 225, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. was intro­
duced on June 2#, 1945. Numerous other quitclaim bills had 
been introduced earlier in the session and hearings had been 
held, but H. J. Res. 225 was the only bill reported out of 
the Judiciary Committee.
^Vrhe Judiciary Committee was criticized for their 
failure to hear a single representative of the Interior, 
Justice, or Navy Departments. Alan Barth, "Oil Beneath the 
Waters,” Nation. November 3, 1945, p. 45#. However, Chair­
man Sumners maintained that these administration departments 
had been invited to contribute anything they desired. U. S. 
Congress, House Judiciary Committee and Special Subcommittee 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Joint Hearings on H. J. 
Res. 11# et al. 1945, p. 121.
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the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and 
control. The Proclamation was most carefully worded so as 
to reaffirm the traditional three mile limit of jurisdiction 
over the sea itself. The freedom of the seas was in no way 
affected by the Proclamation, which dealt only with the sea­
bed and subsoil.Executive Order Number 9633, issued the 
same day, placed such mineral deposits under the administra­
tive custody of the Secretary of the Interior, pending 
legislative or judicial determination of the State vs. Fed­
eral ownership question.
To secure a more expeditious determination of the 
ownership question. Attorney General Clark on October 19, 
1945 brought suit against the State of California in the 
Supreme Court of the United States. The conplaint against 
California alleged that the United States was "owner in fee 
simple of, or possessed of paramount rights in and powers 
over, the lands, minerals and other things of value" under­
lying the marginal seas.^? The suit against the Pacific 
Western Oil Corporation, a lessee of California, was dropped 
by the Justice Department.
While the Supreme Court case was pending. Congress
15lO F.R. 12305. 
l I^bid.
Supreme Court of the United States, No. 12 
i Original, 1945 Term, Motion for Leave to Tide Complaint.
!,_PV 1\______  ____
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went ahead with the processing of H, J. Res. 225, After a
three day hearing, the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably
reported this resolution that had passed the House during
the previous Session. On July 22, 1946 the Senate adopted
the measure with some slight changes by a vote of 44 to 34*
The House quickly approved the Senate version by 1ÔS to 6?
1 Aand sent it to the White House. President Truman vetoed 
H. J. Res. 225 on August 1, 1946 on the grounds that the 
Supreme Court, then considering the case against California, 
was the appropriate tribunal to determine the legal issue of 
ownership. He maintained that if the Supreme Court found no 
Federal title to the land, no quitclaim from Congress would 
be necessary; if the Court found that the submerged lands 
belonged to the United States, "they should not be given
away."^9
On August 2, the House fell seventeen ballots short 
of the two-thirds majority required to enact the measure 
into law over the Presidential objection. The first quit­
claim bill was dead.
iSCommercial and Financial Chronicle. August S,
1946, p. 007. Representative Hobbs proposed an amendment 
that would reserve the mineral rights in the submerged lands 
to the United States, The purpose of the amendment was to 
point out that the controversy was over offshore oil and not 
over inland waters, reclaimed lands, ports and harbors as 
the State participants claimed. Congressional Record. July 
24, 1946, p. 8865.
I ^%ouse Document Number 765. 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 194d ), p. 3.______
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The Supreme Court rendered its decision in the case 
of the United States v. California on June 23, 1947. The 
Court ruled 6 to 2 that the United States had "paramount 
rights in and power over" the marginal seas, "an incident to 
which is full dominion over the resources of the soil under
nr\
that water area, including oil." Although the Supreme
Court held that title rested in the Federal Government, the
Attorney General ruled that the Federal Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920, as amended, was not applicable to the submerged 
21lands. This ruling completed the stalemate. The United 
States was without a law under which it could operate the 
submerged lands and the State ownership supporters had suf­
ficient strength in Congress to prevent the passage of an 
applicable Federal leasing law. Furthermore, as long as a 
President hostile to State ownership remained in the White 
House, they could not pass their quitclaim bill. This im­
passe in Congress continued through 1951.^^
ZOUnited States v. California. 332 U.S, 19. As the 
Court did not undertake to fix the landward boundary of the 
marginal belt, an escrow agreement was made between the 
Attorney Generals involved for continued operation under 
State authority until the matter was definitely decided. 
Congressional Digest. October, 1948, p. 241.
Z^Letter of the Attorney General to the Secretary of 
the Interior, dated August 29, 1947; text found in Senate 
Report Number 1143. 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 30.
22Numerous quitclaim and Federal ownership bills 
were introduced during these years. The quitclaim bills in 
1947 were S. J. Res. 14 and H. J. Res. 51; in 1948, S. 1988, 
■R. R. 5-99-2 and.,thirty-seven identical House bills; in 1949
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Meanwhile geophysical and drilling operations in the 
Gulf of Mexico were virtually at a standstill because of the 
indecision in Congress concerning ownership.^3 In an effort 
to revive offshore activity. Senator O’Mahoney introduced 
S. J. Res. 195 in 1950 and S. J. Res. 20 in 1951, similar 
bills that would vest control in the Interior Department, 
provide for granting new leases, give 37 1/2 per cent of the 
royalties to the adjacent States, and place the remaining 
royalties in escrow until final settlement could be made by 
C o n g r e s s .24 The Federal interim control feature prevented 
passage as the State ownership proponents feared that the 
interim legislation might turn out to be dangerously 
permanent.
On the judicial front Attorney General Clark had 
initiated separate suits in the United States Supreme Court 
against Louisiana and Texas, seeking determination of the 
rights of the United States in the twenty-seven nautical milb 
strip claimed by Louisiana and in the entire Continental
S.1545, S.1700, S.155 and twenty-five House bills; in 1950, 
H.R.5991 and H.R. 8137; and in 1951, S.940, H.R.58 and H.R. 
4484. The Federal ownership bills in 194Ô were S.2222, in­
troduced by Senator Barkley and H.R.5529, by Representative 
Lemke. In 1949, S.923 duplicated S.222 of 1943 and S.2153, 
sponsored by Senator O^Mahoney, was designed to quitclaim 
lands beneath inland navigable waters to the States, leaving 
the way clear for a Federal ownership bill dealing with the 
offshore lands at a later date.
Senate Report Number 1143. 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1952), p. 4.
________ ^^Other interim bills introduced in 1948 and 1949
had received little serious consideration.
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Shelf seaward of Texas claimed by that State. The Federal 
argument in both cases was similar to that presented in 
United States v. California. Texas offered a defense based
upon its unique history as an independent nation prior to 
annexation into the United States.25 The Supreme Court 
handed down its decisions on June 5, 1950, awarding judgment 
in both cases to the United States. The case of United 
States V .  Louisiana was decided by a five to two decision 
and United States v. Texas by four to three.
When the S2d Congress reconvened in 1952, two im­
portant submerged land measures carried over from the First 
Session. One was Representative Walter’s House Bill 44#4, a 
quitclaim bill that had passed the house by a vote of 265 to 
109 on July 30, 1951* The other was S.J. Res. 20, the 
Administration’s interim operation bill that had been intro­
duced by Senators O’Mahoney and Anderson but not acted on in
1951. There was considerable doubt that H.44&4 would get 
out of the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, so 
in January, 1952, S.J. Res. 20 was reported favorably to the 
Senate. On the floor. Senator Hill submitted an amendment 
that would earmark the income from the lands in question for
25Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 
1949, No. 13, original. Brief for the State of Texas in Op­
position to Motion for Judgment.
^^United States v. Louisiana. 339 U.S. 699, and 
United States v. Texas. 339 U.S. 707*
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education throughout the nation, but this was promptly 
tabled.Later, Senator Holland introduced a substitute 
amendment that was substantially House Bill 44&4, a quit­
claim measure. The Holland substitute version of S.J, Res. 
20 was passed on April 2 with a vote of 50 to 35• A con­
ference committee version of S.J. Res, 20 was accepted by a 
vote of 247 to S9 in the House on May 15 and by a voice vote 
in the Senate on May 16.
Two weeks later President Truman vetoed this quit­
claim bill. His reasoning was that the Supreme Court had 
already settled the matter of submerged land ownership and 
that he did not believe that the people of the country 
should "turn over to certain States, as a free gift, very 
valuable lands and mineral resources of the United States as 
a whole . . When the quitclaim advocates did not
attempt a vote to override the veto, the second quitclaim 
measure was dead.
Political Action in 1952 
Supporters on both sides took hope from the fact
'^^ Congressional Record. March 26, 1952, p. 3391. 
Z^lbid.. April 2, 1952, p. 4416.
^^Senate Document Number 139. S2d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1952), p. 1. In the veto message, the President indicated 
that he would be willing to accept the original version of 
S.J. Res. 20 and that he would look favorably on Senator 
Hill's oil-for-education amendment. Ibid.. p. 7.
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that 1952 was a general election year. Each expected that 
the voters would send to Congress and to the Executive 
mansion representatives favoring its side. After the Re­
publican victory at the polls but before the new President 
was inaugurated, the outgoing Executive attempted to fore­
stall any legislative solution of the submerged lands prob­
lem by executive order.
Political Role of the Oil Industry 
The ostensible participants in the offshore lands 
struggle were the Federal Government on the one side and 
several State Governments on the other. The States* offi­
cials denied the charge that the major oil companies were 
allied with them in the controversy.^^ Such belief, however 
was widely held by people with a knowledge of the situation, 
for the testimony of oil company officials and the tenor of 
the editorials in the leading petroleum periodicals indi­
cated that the industry favored State ownership of the sub­
merged lands.3^ For the most part, any help that the oil
30Senator Daniel, in answering such a charge, said:
”I have been in this fight about six years, and I will tell 
you, sir, that everybody I saw helping anybody /further the 
quitclaim legislatior^ was connected with State governments.r 
Hearings on S.J. Res. 13. p. 503. |
^^Testimony of Hines Baker, Walter Hallanan, and 
others, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and In­
sular Affairs, 01st Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings on S.155. et 
al (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), pp.320,
354, 387 and 401. In 1952, when it appeared that President 
Truman would veto any quitclaim bill that was passed by
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industry gave the States* officials in securing the quit­
claim was from behind the stage.^2
The reason the oil companies refrained from open 
political support is obvious. In the early days of the con­
troversy certain California offshore operators made a 
serious mistake in taking an active part in lobbying for the 
first quitclaim bill. In 1945 Edwin W, Pauley, former 
treasurer of the Democratic National Committee and president 
of Petrol Oil Corporation, one of the larger California off­
shore producing companies, and William C, Clary, a special 
Assistant Attorney General of California, part of whose 
salary was paid by private oil interests, had joined with 
California Attorney General Robert ¥, Kenny in gathering 
Congressional support for H, 1, Res, 225,^^ That measure 
passed the House in a single afternoon.
The reaction to this outstanding lobbying job was 
quick and violent. The St, Louis Post Dispatch, uncovering 
the facts concerning Clary’s pay status with the offshore 
operators, raised such a furor of publicity that the next
Congress, the oil companies backed the O’Mahoney-Anderson 
Federal interim operation bill. They thought this bill 
better than no legislation at all, Philip Geyslin, "U,S, vs 
State Struggle for Control Nears Showdown," Wall Street 
Journal. February 14, 1952, p, 4.
^^The American Petroleum Institute never took an 
official stand on the submerged lands question. Letter from 
William B, Harper, American Petroleum Institute, to the 
author, dated June 3, 1953.
33
__________ Alan Barth, "Oil Beneath the Waters." Nation.
November 3, 1945, p. 45&.
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Congressional submerged lands hearing was devoted to check­
ing the extent of the lobbying on this measure by the oil 
companies.3^ The finding of oilmen in coup any with and in 
the ranks of the States* officials aroused the rancor of 
many Congressmen and Federal officials against the oil com­
panies and the quitclaim bill. Senator Tobey (Rep.) of New 
Hampshire said that a "sordid picture had been created by 
the oil conçany lobbyists" who had been "cajoling" votes for 
the measure.35
Mr. Pauley*s connection with the submerged lands 
issue had some far-reaching repercussions. Early in 1946 
Secretary Ickes accused Mr. Pauley, then President Truman*s 
nominee for Under Secretary of the Navy, of offering, in 
April, 1945» a $300,000 gift from California oilmen to the 
Democratic Party if the government could be persuaded to re­
frain from filing suit for title to the submerged lands.3& 
Mr. Pauley enç)hatically denied the charge. When the Presi­
dent stood by his nominee, Mr, Ickes resigned. Opposition 
to Pauley, largely engendered by the Ickes* charge, later 
resulted in the withdrawal of the nomination.37
3^U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Hearings Relating to S.J. Res. 4S and H.J. Res. 225 (Wash- 
ington: ' Government Printing Office. 1946). passimV
35n6W York Times. July 23, 1946, I, 2.
3^New York Times. February 6, 1946, I, 5«
37ibid.. August 2, 1946, XII, 1.
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Following their unfortunate experiences in attempt­
ing to mix politics and offshore oil in 1945 and 1946, the 
oil companies kept in the background during the rest of the 
submerged lands controversy. The offshore oil companies set 
up the Offshore Lessees Committee to speak for the group. 
Individual oil company officials would appear from time to 
time during Congressional hearings, but only as expert 
witnesses.
Inland Support of the Quitclaim Legislation
Althou^ on the surface the position of the inland 
supporters of the quitclaim legislation is difficult to 
understand, a quick glance at the facts will e^glain it.^^ 
The various organizations of States» officials early lined 
up inland support through the contention that the Supreme 
Court decisions in the California, Louisiana and Texas cases 
clouded the titles to the waters and submerged lands of 
every State. In a widely distributed pamphlet entitled 
Every State Has Submerged Lands. the National Association of 
Attorneys General contended that: "/quitclaii^ legislation
is necessary for each of the 4^ States in order to restore 
and confirm their ownership of navigable waters and
30
Secretary of the Interior Ickes took great delight; 
in speaking about the "interest of such seafaring States as 
Tennessee, Nevada, Iowa and Kentucky in preserving their 
tidal lands impinging on the ocean," New York Times.
October 2S, 1945, I, 16,
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submerged lands within their respective b o u n d a r i e s ,"39
The opponents of the quitclaim legislation on 
several occasions sou^t to wean the inland supporters away 
from the legislation to grant the coastal States offshore 
lands by offering to confirm State title to all lands be­
neath navigable inland waters, including the Great L a k e s .
In each of the Federal ownership and interim operation bills 
submitted to Congress, the United States specifically dis­
claimed title to these lands.Senator  Anderson (Dem.) of 
New Mexico, sponsor of several of the Federal bills, 
asserted: "There is no need for those wishing to protect
the legitimate interests of all the States (in the lands 
beneath inland waters and the actual tidelands) to get into 
the offshore oil question. . .
The Federal ownership and interim operation bills 
also attempted to quiet the fears of Coastal States and
^%ational Association of Attorneys General, Every 
State Has Submerged Lands (Washington: National Association
of Attorneys General, n.d'.), p. 1.
^^The Federal Government had never claimed ownership 
of these lands and was willing to put this in writing.
413.222(1948), S.2153(1949), 3.1540(1951), 8.10?
(1953) and numerous other Senate and House bills. S.107, 
Sec. 9, stated: "The United States hereby asserts that it
has no right, title, or interest in or to the lands beneath 
navigable inland waters within the boundaries of the re­
spective States, but that all such right, title, and inter­
est are vested in the several States . . ."
^^New York Times. March Ô, 1953, I, 8.
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municipalities concerning the ownership of wharfs, decks, 
piers, jetties or other structures in the open ocean and the 
ownership of filled in or reclaimed lands in such areas. 
Individuals and local governments have many millions of 
dollars invested in such improvements along the coastal belt 
The various Federal bills recognized and confirmed the, titles 
of any State or political subdivision thereof, municipality, 
agency, or person to existing and future improvements of
this nature.
The quitclaim sponsors, fearing a division of their 
forces, were successful either in blocking such legislation 
in committee or, vâien one Federal interim control bill was 
reported out, in amending it on the floor to resemble the 
offshore quitclaim bill,^^ In most cases, however, they had 
no cause to worry about losing their inland supporters, for 
many inland Congressmen had good reason to back the offshore 
quitclaim, A case in point. Representative Stringfellow 
(Rep,) of Utah gave as one reason for his support:
The settlement of the offshore submerged lands dis­
pute in favor of State ownership is only one phase of 
the revaluation of the entire Federal land ownership 
problem, , , , For the sake of consistency I could not 
argue for Federal ownership of these offshore lands and 
still try to achieve our objective of returning at least 
part of the public domain in Utah to control of the 
State and private citizens thereof,45
^^SolOy, 03d Gong,, 1st Sess,, Sec, 11 (1953). 
44s.J, Res, 20, S2d Gong,, 2d Sess, (1952), 
^^Congressional Record. April 1, 1953, P* Al#45.
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Other inland Congressmen also saw in the offshore 
quitclaim legislation a precedent for later attempts to get 
Federal assets for their constituencies and constituents.
Political Alignment 
When it became evident that no quitclaim measure 
could be passed against the wishes of a Chief Executive 
hostile to such legislation, the State ownership forces 
sou^t a candidate for the 1952 election in sympathy with 
their position. In General Eisenhower they had such a man, 
for the General early had declared his support of the States* 
c l a i m s . I n  New Orleans during the campaign the General 
said: **I favor the recognition of clear title to these
lands (the submerged lands within historic boundaries) in 
each of the forty-eight S t a t e s . T h i s  was in keeping 
with the official Republican platform position on the issue, 
which stated: ‘*We favor restoration to the States of their
rights to all lands and resources beneath navigable inland 
and offshore waters within their historic boundaries
Governor Stevenson, the Democratic candidate for 
President, adopted the stand taken by President Truman and
^^General Eisenhower put himself on record as favor­
ing State title while still in Europe. This was developed 
I in a letter to Jack Porter of Houston, a personal friend and 
a staunch quitclaim supporter. Dallas Morning News. June 4,
1952.
^?New York Times. October 14, 1952, I, 6.
  43lbid.. July 11. 1952. I, 2.______________________
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declared himself against any "blanket cession” of the sub­
merged lands to the States. However, the Governor did ex­
press a desire and willingness to work on a compromise 
solution to break the stalemate. In New Orleans the Demo­
cratic candidate said:
If the submerged lands, by virtue of the ruling of 
the United States Supreme Court, are a national, and 
not a State asset • • , I do not think it a wise policy 
for the Congress to institute the practice of giving 
away such assets to individual Staten.49
In an attempt to keep peace within the Democratic 
family, the offshore question was played down in the party 
platform to appease the Southern State-ownership faction. 
Still, State party leaders like Governor Shivers of Texas 
and Governor Kennon of Louisiana announced they were dis­
pleased with Stevenson*s stand. In fact, Texas voters gave 
Eisenhower a majority.
The 1952 Election— a Mandate?
During the 1952 political campaign, the submerged 
lands issue received sufficient coverage by both candidates 
to acquaint the voters with the different positions. The 
opposing candidates were frank in disclosing their stands on 
the issue.
There is no way to assess the exact influence of the 
submerged lands issue on the outcome of the 1952 election.
^^Ma.ior Campaign Speeches of Adlai E. Stevenson.
1952 (New York: Random House, 1 9 5 3 P« 237. "
4Ô
Bartley believes that the support of the quitclaim by 
General Eisenhower and the opposition to this measure by 
Governor Stevenson had at least a nominal effect in Texas, 
a lesser effect in Louisiana, and little or no effect in 
California,
The press hailed the Republican victory as a mandate 
from the people favoring a quitclaim of the submerged lands.51 
Obviously such a conclusion goes far beyond the facts. To 
this writer, it seems unlikely that the submerged lands 
issue by itself was of sufficient national importance to 
sway the voters in every State, The causes of the Republican 
victory must be sought in a wider complex of political, 
economic, and personal reasons.
Naval Petroleum Reserve Inheritance 
President Truman fired a parting shot at the quit­
claim plans of the incoming Republican Administration on 
January l6, 1953 by issuing an executive order setting aside 
the submerged lands of the Continental Shelf as a naval
50Srnest R, Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversv: 
A Legal and Historical Analvsis (Austin; The University of 
Texas Press, 1953), p. 229. This thorough study of the 
legal and historical aspects of the marginal seas issue was 
published while the present study was in preparation. For 
an interesting and scholarly discussion of the legal intri­
cacies of this complex issue, the reader is recommended to 
consult this work.
1953.
51See, for example, Dallas Morning News. March 6,
49
petroleum r e s e r v e  ,5^ 2 Senator Daniels said that the President 
was acting "in pure and simple personal spite and political 
revenge."53 Representative Lucas (Dem.) of Texas stated 
bitterly that the federal ownership advocates were trying to 
do what they could not get the Congress to do, "like a bunch 
of thieves who have been caught in the act and are trying to 
find a legal hole in which they can hide the s w a g ,54 in a 
statement acconpanying the order. President Truman stated 
that it was of utmost importance that the vast oil deposits 
in the Continental Shelf be conserved and utilized for the 
national security and that it would be "the height of folly 
for the United States to give away . . .  the oil . • .in 
the Continental Shelf, and then buy back this same oil at 
stiff prices" for the armed f o r c e s . ^5
Few doubted the authority of President Truman to 
establish a new naval petroleum reserve and few doubted the 
authority of President Eisenhower to countermand the order 
or of Congress to pass a law nullifying the order, but in 
either of the latter cases the Republicans would have to 
accept the political onus of taking oil out of the Navy's
5^Executive Order 10426, F.R. Doc.53-734. January 
16, 1953.
53pallas Morning News. January 16, 1953•
^^Congressional Record. January 16, 1953, p. 439.
^^Statement bv the President Regarding Executive 
Order 10426. January 16. 1953.
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hands « 5^ This could provide strong ammunition for the Demo­
crats who presumably would not hesitate to remind the voters 
that the Republican Teapot Dome scandals in the 1920*s in­
volved naval oil reserves.
Unfortunately, the objective used as a justification 
for the establishment of a.new naval petroleum reserve, the 
promotion of national security, was hampered by President 
Truman*s order if the experience with naval oil reserves in 
the past is used as a criterion. Oil from the existing 
naval petroleum reserves contributed little during World War 
II, Oil fields must be developed before they contribute to 
national defense. All of the oil resources in the nation 
constitute the petroleum reserve for defense and all are 
available not only for the Navy, but for the entire defense 
establishment, which includes the Army, the Air Force, the 
Merchant Marine, as well as war production plants, the cars 
of defense workers, the railroads, and a host of other re­
lated petroleum users, when needed for national security.
So tremendous are the quantities of petroleum demanded by 
modern war that anything less than the entire production of 
all oil fields within the control of the United States would 
be inadequate. The available petroleum reserve is not aug­
mented when a portion of the potential oil land is set aside 
in an undeveloped state.
^^New York Times. January IS, 1953, IV, 1,
51
The formula for assuring adequate petroleum for 
defense is not found in hoarding oil deposits underground 
but in furthering the development of a dynamic and inventive 
domestic oil industry. Furthermore, in time of war the 
government can and does control the prices which it pays for 
petroleum products as well as other supplies. It would be 
absurd for the government to permit itself to be charged 
"stiff prices" for these necessary war supplies.
The offshore naval oil reserve was not slated for a 
long life as the incoming Administration quickly set about 
nullifying the order of President Truman. Attorney General 
Brownell ruled that Executive Order 10426 did not succeed in 
creating a naval petroleum reserve within the meaning of the 
statute relating to other petroleum reserves (34 U.8.G. 524) 
The general effect of the order was to transfer the authority 
over these lands from the Secretary of the Interior to the 
Secretary of the Navy. The 1953 version of the quitclaim 
bill was altered to include a section revoking President 
Truman*s order.
The 1953 Legislation
Early in 1953 the path to victory for the State 
ownership cause looked clear. General Eisenhower, pledged
57letter of Herbert Brownell, Jr., to the Secretary 
of Defense, dated February 13, 1953, reproduced in Hearings 
on S.J. Res. 13. p. 4.
________ l^s,.J-.-B.e_s. 13, Sec. 10._____________ _____________
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to back the quitclaim, was in the White House, the Republi­
cans had gained control of both houses of Congress, and one 
of the leading enemies of State ownership. Senator O^Mahoney 
(Dem.) of Wyoming, chairman of the Senate committee handling 
submerged lands legislation, had been defeated. Replacing 
Senator 0*Mahoney as head of the Senate Interior and Insular 
Affairs Committee was Senator Hugh Butler (Rep.) of Nebraska 
a strong quitclaim advocate.
In the first two weeks of the S3d Congress, five 
separate Senate and thirty-seven House measures dealing with 
the submerged lands were introduced. The most important of 
these were:
S.J, Res. 13. This was a quitclaim bill, almost 
identical to the 1952 S.J. Res. 13 that was 
vetoed by President Truman. Introduced by 
Senator Holland and thirty-nine others, this 
bill would confirm and establish title of the 
States to the submerged lands within historic 
boundaries.
H.R. AI9&. This was the principal House quitclaim 
bill that, in addition to assigning the sub­
merged lands within historic boundaries to the 
States, made provision for the Federal develop­
ment of the remainder of the Continental Shelf,
S. 294. Senator Daniel introduced this bill that 
would give the States full ownership within 
historic boundaries and a share of the control 
and 37 1/2 per cent of the revenues of the re­
mainder of the Continental Shelf.
S. 107. This bill, introduced by Senator Anderson, 
provided for joint Federal and State control 
within three miles from shore, payment to the | 
States of 37 1/2 per cent of the revenues earned 
within this area. Federal control of the remain-- 
der of the Continental Shelf, and the escrow of
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all other revenues until the matter could be 
decided permanently by Congress, This interim 
operation measure, designed to accomplish re­
sumption of e3q>loration and development activi­
ties offshore, would be binding for five years,
S, 107 Amendment, Under this amendment, fathered by 
Senator Hill, the 6? 1/2 per cent of the revenueè 
from the first three miles offshore and the 100 
per cent of the revenues from the remainder of 
the Continental Shelf going to the Federal Gov­
ernment under the provisions of S, 107, would be 
placed in a special fund in the United States 
Treasury to be used, after the defense emergency 
was over, for grants-in-aid of primary, secondar; 
and higher education,
S,J, Res, IS, This was Senator Kefauver's bill that 
would defer all action on the submerged lands 
pending a complete study of the ownership probloh 
by a commission to be established by the bill.
The Federal Control Bill 
With three United States Supreme Court decisions 
declaring the "paramount rights" of the United States in the 
marginal seas seaward of the low water mark, the title of 
the United States in the submerged lands appeared reasonably 
well grounded. But the legal victory in the matter of owner­
ship was of little value unless Congress would give concur­
rent authority for leasing these lands. So great was the 
power of the State ownership forces that, in 1953, no 
attenpt was made to obtain Congressional approval of a per­
manent Federal leasing statute. It was conceded that no 
such bill could get out of committee, much less receive the 
Congressional blessings.
In an attempt to preserve the interest of the United
54
States in the marginal sea lands and to break the deadlock 
that had been delaying the development of the offshore 
petroleum resources, the Federal ownership supporters, led 
by Senator Anderson, resubmitted the 1952 O'Mahoney-Anderson 
interim operation bill to C o n g r e s s T h e i r  only hope was 
that, should the quitclaim measure fail. Congress in despera­
tion might accept the interim operation bill. This temporary 
measure was far from perfect, even in the eyes of its spon­
sors, but it was the only Federal control bill that appeared 
to have a chance of success in the Eighty-third Congress,
A compromise measure, the Anderson bill would settle 
nothing in the long run. For five years the Secretary of 
the Interior would administer the leasing of the Continental 
Shelf l a n d s , t h e  States would get 37 1/2 per cent of the 
revenues from the submerged lands within State boundaries, 
and the remainder of the revenues from the entire Continenta. 
Shelf would be held in a special Treasury account until Con­
gress decided on a permanent settlement. The question of 
ownership was not raised or solved. Five years later the 
entire matter would have to be settled or the interim working 
arrangement extended for another term. The bill was not 
reported out of committee.
59s. 107, S3d Cong., 1st Sess. |
^^he States would have the power to veto new leases' 
within State boundaries.
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The Oil for Education Amendment
The Hill Amendment to the 1953 Federal control bill^^ 
would use all of the revenues from the Continental Shelf, 
except the 37 1/2 per cent from within three miles scheduled 
to go to the adjoining States, as grants-in-aid of educa­
t i o n . T h e  method to be used for the allocation of the 
educational grants was not covered in the amendment, but 
provision was made to get an accounting from each of the 
States or political subdivisions which had issued any mineral 
leases on the Continental Shelf, with a view to subtracting 
the proceeds previously received from such leases from the 
amounts scheduled to go to the particular State or 
muni cip alit y.
The opponents of Federal control denounced the Hill 
Amendment, Senator Potter (Rep.) of Michigan railed at what 
he called "demagogues who are using education in general and 
teachers in particular, as tools" to get support for Federal 
control of the offshore l a n d s . T h e  Hill Amendment spon­
sors did stress opinions of educational authorities to
^^S. 107 Amendment, 03d Cong., 1st Sess.
! GZOuring the defense emergency, at the discretion of
I Congress, the monies could be used for national defense 
i expenditures.
i ^^Congressional Record. January 16, 1953, p« 407.
: p. 393.
^^Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 1953. Vol. IX,
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outline the crying needs of the nation’s schools.&5 There 
was an implied accusation that anyone opposing the oil for 
education amendment was against improving educational 
standards in the nation, or tantamount to being for poor 
education.
The oil for education amendment was not popular even 
with several of the Federal control advocates. Voicing the 
feeling of this group. Senator Anderson, sponsor of the bill 
to which the oil for education amendment was attached, said 
that the amendment weakened the chances of any Federal 
ownership bill being passed by Congress. He believed that 
the Hill Amendment, which brought the controversial subject 
of Federal aid to education into the offshore oil picture, 
did disservice both to Federal aid to education and to 
Federal ownership of the submerged lands.&6 The Hill Amend­
ment was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 56 to 33 on 
April 27, 1953.67
State Ownership Bills 
For the third time the Congressional quitclaim
594.
^^Hearings on S.J. Res. 13. pp. 3#2, 428, 490, and 
^^Dallas Morning News. March 29, 1953.
67 ! 'In a surprise move, the Senate adopted, 45 to 37, i
I the oil for education amendment to go with the Outer Con-
jtinental Shelf Bill. It was stripped off in conference to |
imake the bill acceptable to the House. Editorial Research |
Reports. 1953. Vol. II, p. 535.
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advocates attempted to secure clear title to the submerged 
lands for the States* The assertion was made that this 
property justly belonged to the States and that the Federal 
claims to these lands, as well as the three Supreme Court 
decisions regarding these lands, constituted clouds upon the 
title. To the opposition argument that, according to the 
Supreme Court, title was never vested in the States, hence 
Congress could not grant a return of title, the quitclaim 
forces pointed out that the Constitution of the United 
States specifically gave Congress the power to dispose of 
the territory and other property belonging to the United 
S t a t e s . I n  any event, a quitclaim would return to or give 
to the States the submerged lands that they thought right­
fully belonged to them.
The leading backers of State ownership decided to 
settle for title out to the historic boundaries lest the 
quitclaim atteiipt meet complete defeat. Senator Ellender 
(Dem.) of Louisiana warned that unless President Eisenhower 
had a bill that he could sign in 1953, the State ownership 
"cause has been perhaps permanently lost
Thirty-one quitclaim bills were introduced in the 
House in 1953, but the House Judiciary Committee could not 
agree on any of them. The Committee drafted a new bill,
I  A A
I Constitution of the United States. Article 17,
i Sec. 3, Cl. 2.
I________^Hew-Y-ork Timea_._MarLch_2Z. X9-53-.— I-.— 5-6.^---- - -----
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known as H.R, 4193, and reported this bill out on March 27, 
1953. Titles I and II of the House bill were almost identi­
cal with the same titles of the Walters bill that had been 
passed in 1952, These sections provided for State ownership 
and development of the lands and resources beneath navigable 
waters within historic boundaries, but protected the Federal 
rights to control the flow of inland waters in the interest 
of flood control, navigation, irrigation, reclamation and 
power generation. Title III of H,R, 4193 provided for 
Federal ownership and development of the areas of the Con­
tinental Shelf beyond the historic boundaries of the States 
The 1953 Senate quitclaim bill, S,J, Res, 13, 
sponsored by Senator Spessard Holland (Dem,) of Florida, was 
similar to Titles I and II of the House bill. However, it 
left the disposition of the outer Continental Shelf to later 
determination by Congress, The Senate bill revoked the 
January 16, 1953 executive order by President Truman, which 
set aside all offshore deposits as naval petroleum reserves. 
The Holland bill was reported out of the Senate Interior and
Insular Affairs Committee, after a long and not entirely
71
favorable hearing, on March 27, 1953.
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Congress, House Report No, 215. 33d Cong,. 
1st Sess, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953).
"^ U^.S, Congress, Senate Report No, 133. 33d Cong,, 
1st Sess,. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953).
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Troubles with the Administration
As it developed, the road to quitclaim victory was 
rocky,. The sponsors of the legislation encountered more 
difficulty on Capitol Hill in 1953 than they had during the 
Truman era. An extremely vocal group in the Senate fought 
the bill with every weapon at their disposal. Also, some 
Eisenhower Administration officials, who would be supposed 
to reflect the views of the President, placed some unexpected 
boulders in the path. An Under Secretary of State and the 
Attorney General of the United States expressed some doubt 
about the wisdom of certain strategic provisions of the 
Holland bill.?^
A spokesman for the State Department warned against 
extending the State boundaries out more than three miles 
because of international complications. In the view of the 
State Department, recognition of State claims beyond this 
point would force abandonment of the international position 
the United States had maintained for 150 years. In no case 
could the claims of the States exceed those of the Nation 
and the Department of State did not believe it in the 
national interest to change this traditional three mile 
position.73
; ^ A. shocked Dallas Morning News editorially ration- j
i  alized that "Brownell and Dulles . , , , popped off without |  
I knowing what they were talking about,” Dallas Morning News J 
I March 14, 1953. I
T^Testimony of Thruston Morton, Under Secretary of 
' State'. "Hearings on STJ, Res, 13. pp, 10"S7^Sl
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This placed the 10 1/2 mile Gulf Coast claims of 
Florida and Texas in considerable danger of not being ac­
ceptable to President Eisenhower, if he believed his State 
Department advisors. Quitclaim opponent Representative 
Celler (Dem.) of New York gleefully proclaimed that "this 
fuzzy duzzy is the result of inprovident and extravagant 
campaign promises that the Eisenhower Administration now 
finds it can't fulfill.
To the great surprise of the State ownership sup­
porters, Attorney General Brownell recommended to the Senate 
Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and the House Com­
mittee on the Judiciary that Congress grant to the coastal 
States only the authority to administer and develop the 
petroleum and other natural resources in the marginal seas 
within their historic boundaries. He was not in favor of 
granting a blanket quitclaim because of the constitutional 
questions that migjht a r i s e .
This proposal for "use without ownership" was not at 
all to the liking of the quitclaim forces. They had ex­
pected better treatment from President Eisenhower's legal 
chief. Senator Long said that the Truman Administration had 
offered a formula more favorable to the coastal States than
'^^Dallas Morning News. March 12, 1953.
^^Hearings on S.J. Res. 13, p. 926, and U.S. Congress, 
House, Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Judiciary Committee, j 
Hearings on H.R. 29A# et al. Ô3d Cong.. 1st Sess. (Washing-! 
Lt.on.:__G.o%ernment_Print%ng_0ffi.c_e.^l9^53J_,— 21_&. _________ !
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the Brownell license without title proposal. Senator Hol­
land told Mr, Brownell that his "statement had little if 
anything to do , , , with the /campaign/ c o m m i t m e n t ."76 
Clearly, the Administration's signals had become crossed.
Shortly after this damaging testimony had been 
registered. President Eisenhower, setting aside the recom­
mendations of his Attorney General and Secretary of State, 
reassured Senator Daniel that the Administration had not 
changed its campaign position. It was still willing to give 
the States clear title to the marginal seas within historic 
boundaries.7?
Congressional Action on the 
Quitclaim Bill
Passage of the House bill took only two and one-half 
days. On April 1, 1953, H.R. 419# passed by a vote of 2B5 
to lOS. In the Senate the quitclaim measure remained 
under almost continuous debate for twenty-seven sittings, 
with one of the sittings extending for over twenty-two hours 
There was never serious doubt about the eventual success of 
S.J. Res. 13, the Senate version of the State ownership bill! 
Similar bills had been passed by substantial margins on two
i p . 394.
7%ewsweek. March 16, 1953, p. 41.
77
Dallas Morning News. March 17, 1953. 
7^Congressional Quarterly Almanac. Vol. IX, 1953,
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earlier occasions.
The backers of the Holland bill, confident of their 
victory in the final vote, were willing to let the opposition 
talk themselves out. They wanted no later criticism that 
the issue had been railroaded through Congress,79 Damning 
the bill as a "giveaway" of Federal lands, twenty-six 
Senators launched an attack to postpone the vote and publi­
cize the measure. The "hardy band of liberals," as they 
styled themselves, knew that they were waging a war for a 
lost cause, but they planned to gain one inç>ortant end in 
their defeat. They hoped that their demonstration against 
the Administration-backed submerged land program would have 
a psychological effect on President Eisenhower, It would 
not cause the President to back down on the quitclaim com­
mitment, but it could make him extremely sensitive to the 
charge of running a "giveaway" Administration, This sensi­
tivity could make the President shy away from later pro­
posals for the disposal of other Federal property to the 
States and to.private i n t e r e s t s . I n  what many termed a 
filibuster^! Senator Douglas talked five hours. Senator
79personal conversation with Dow Heard, Assistant 
Attorney General of Texas, in Washington, D.C., during the 
debate on the Senate floor,
^^Personal interview with Senator Paul Douglas in 
Washington, D,G,, on May IS, 1953.
; ^^New York Times. May 6, 1953, Sec, 1, p. 3.
- Senator Morse had the distinction of beating Senator Huey 
-LongJ-s-non-st op--speak-i-ng—record—in-the-Senate-.— Whatever—the
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Kefauver six hours, Senators Hill, Fulbright, and Humphrey 
seven hours each, and Senator Morse twenty-two hours and 
twenty-six minutes.
In a last minute attençt to hold up the bill and to 
cause embarrassment to the Administration, the opponents 
proposed a series of amendments. Senator Neely offered an 
amendment that would use ten per cent of the offshore income 
for each of the following purposes: reduction of the
national debt, aid to education, research in cancer, re­
search in heart disease, research in muscular dystrophy, 
research in multiple sclerosis, research in infantile paral­
ysis, aid to the blind, aid to disabled veterans, and finan­
cial assistance to the American Red Cross in the alleviation 
of human suffering.Sehator Douglas proposed quitclaiming] 
everything but the moneral rights in the offshore to the 
S t a t e s . I n  another amendment, he suggested that the 
j coastal States, in return for the transfer of the rights of 
ownership in the submerged lands, should be obligated to
motives, the wordfest was not a true filibuster, A fili­
buster usually has but one purpose, the prevention of a vote 
and can only be successful when undertaken with a fixed date 
of adjournment approaching. This necessary condition was 
lacking and the speakers of the quitclaim opposition never 
had any notion that a vote could be prevented,
^^Congressional Record. May 5, 1953, p. 4642,
^^Ibid.. p, 4644. Senator Douglas called this the 
"turpentine and gasoline amendment" because it would help 
the Holland bill sponsors, who resembled Lady Macbeth, get 
ithe oil spots off their hands.
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assume the duties of maintaining the Coast Guard vessels and 
lighthouses in these a r e a s . A l l  these amendments were 
quickly rejected.
The Holland Bill, S.J, Res. 13, was passed by the 
Senate on May 5, 1953, by a vote of 56 to 35.^^ The Senate 
substitute bill was accepted by the House on May 13 by a 27Ô 
to 116 vote,^^ President Eisenhower signed the bill on May 
22, saying that he was pleased to do so because "recognizing 
the states* claims to these lands is in keeping with the 
basic principles of honesty and fair play." He further 
stated that he deplored and would always resist Federal en­
croachment upon the rights and affairs of the States.
Sixteen years after Secretary Ickes had entertained 
doubts about the ownership of the Continental Shelf, the 
coastal States won their victory with the Submerged Lands 
Act, A review of the voting on the three quitclaim bills, 
1946, 1952 and 1953, indicates the degree of party support 
given by the Congressional Republicans on this issue (Table 
2).
Table 2 not only shows the significant increase in
% b i d .
^^Ibid,, p . 4646.
p. 397.
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^^Congressional Quarterly Almanac. Vol. IX, 1953,
Editorial Research Reports-1953. Vol. II, p. 533.
TABLE 2
SENATE AND HOUSE VOTING RECORDS 
BY PARTY AFFILIATION, 1946,
ON QUITCLAIM BILLS, 
1952, AND 1953
Quitclaim Bill
Republicans 
For Against
Democrats 
For Against
Independents 
F or Against
Totals 
For Against
Senate 25 è 19 25 1 44 34
1946
House 123 5 65 61 1 IBS 67
Senate 26 11 24 24 — — 50 35
1952
House 153 16 94 70 1 247 69
Senate 35 9 21 25 1 56 35
1953
House 1S4 17 94 96 1 276 116
Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanac. Vol. II. 1946. d. 579 (H.J. 
225): Ibid.. Vol. VIII. 1952. p. 334 (S.J. Res. 20): and Ibid.. Vol. IX. 
pp. 396 and 458 (S.J. Res. 13).
Res,
1953,
o\
VJl
66
Republican support of the quitclaim measure between 1946 and 
1953, it also indicates that the total vote on each bill 
gave a substantial majority to each one. However, this 
majority was unable to override President Truman*s veto in 
1946, and did not try in 1952. Unless the majority in 1953 
had managed to gain some extra votes other than those 
recorded on the bill, a veto would have once again halted 
passage of a quitclaim measure. Thus the table also shows 
how vital was the need for a Chief Executive favorable to 
the bill.
The Outer Continental Shelf Act 
The Continental Shelf outside of State boundaries, an 
area of approximately 261,000 square miles, or about ten 
times the area within State boundaries, was not affected by 
the Holland Act. The House version of the quitclaim bill 
had contained a section providing for Federal jurisdiction 
over and leasing of the outer shelf, but this portion of the 
bill was stripped off by a conference committee before the
I
I measure received final approval.
I  It was agreed by all that permanent legislation to
I
I provide for the leasing of the outer Continental Shelf 
j should be expedited in order that petroleum developmental 
' activities in this area could proceed. Accordingly, hear- 
’ ings were held by the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs 
; Committee even before the Submerged Lands Act was passed by
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the Senate.
There were few areas of disagreement in the proposed 
legislation. The purposes of S. 1901, as the Outer Contin­
ental Shelf Bill was known, were to assert the exclusive 
jurisdiction and control of the United States Government 
over the seabed and subsoil of the outer shelf, and to pro­
vide for the orderly development of its vast mineral re­
sources. In keeping with the latter purpose and with the 
approval of all interested parties, leases issued in good 
faith by the coastal States in the outer shelf prior to the 
Supreme Court decisions were to be validated and the holders 
authorized to conduct operations under them. The rules, 
regulations, and operating orders of the Secretary of the 
Interior, the Constitution and the laws of the Federal Gov­
ernment, and, in the absence of applicable Federal law or
adequate Secretarial regulations, the civil and criminal
\
laws of the adjacent States, were to be extended to the 
outer shelf area.
The primary policy question facing Congress was not 
one of State versus Federal rights, but whether, and how 
far, and at what price, the Federal Government should make 
I use of the existing State laws and facilities in the admin- 
I istration of the outer Continental Shelf.
The views of the Administration were clear on this 
question. Secretary of the Interior McKay officially ad- 
vised Congress that the Administration favored preserving__
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for "the nation as a whole" revenues derived from the outer 
s h e l f . I n  signing the Submerged Lands Act, President 
Eisenhower was adamant in his insistence that the outer 
shelf lands "should be administered by the Federal Govern­
ment and the income therefrom should go into the Federal 
T r e a s u r y , T h i s  firm stand went far to mollify many in 
Congress who opposed the claims of the States to rights in 
the outer shelf.
The arguments were made that the States already had 
the administrative system to handle the offshore leasing and 
regulation, that it would cause duplication of effort if a 
new Federal system of operation was established, and that, 
in keeping with the historic system under which all of the 
area of the continental United States was geographically a 
part of a State, the State boundaries should be extended to 
the edge of the Continental S h e l f T h e  idea, of course, 
was that, in return for the administration and regulation of 
the Federal lands within State boundaries, the States would 
be permitted to share in the revenues of and extend their 
taxing power over the outer shelf. The Texas School Land 
Board wanted 37 1/2 per cent of the revenues and the power
88New York Times. February 25, 1953> I, 13.
Editorial Research Reports. Vol. II, 1953, p. 534.
90u.s. Congress, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Report ! 
'No. 411 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p.
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to levy taxes in the Federal area.^^ Louisiana wanted to
extend its severance tax, which in recent years has been 10
per cent of the gross production, into the promising area
beyond its boundaries. If the taxing power was withheld.
Senator Long envisioned the State of Louisiana furnishing
without compensation many services, such as roads, schools
and hospitals, for the individuals and companies engaged in
92the development of the outer shelf.
The Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee 
denied the right of taxation to the States in very certain 
terms;
The provisions , , , for adoption of State law as 
the law of the United States shall never be interpreted 
as a basis for claiming any interest in or jurisdiction 
on behalf of any State for any purpose over the seabed 
and subsoil of the outer Continental Shelf, or the 
property and natural resources thereof or the revenues 
therefrom,93
The Hill oil-for-education amendment was not adoptee 
with the bill as reported out of committee, but this amend­
ment was later added on the Senate floor and passed with 
little criticism. Because of the controversial nature of 
the Federal aid-to-education provision, it was removed from 
the bill by a conference committee before final passage in 
the House,
^^Hearines on S, 1901. p » iSS,
Senate Report No, All, p , 66,
93s. 1901, S3d Cong,, 1st Sess,, Sec. 4(3)(a).
70
In the final version of the outer Continental Shelf 
bill, all rentals, royalties and other sums received from 
the outer shelf would be credited to miscellaneous receipts 
in the Treasury of the United States.9^ No part of these 
revenues were to go to any coastal State for any purpose 
whatever nor would these funds be dedicated to any specific 
p u r p o s e . 95 The bill was passed by voice votes in the Senate 
and House and was signed into law by President Eisenhower on 
August 7, 1953.
The Supreme Court Test of the 
Submerged Lands Act
The States of Arkansas, Rhode Island and West 
Virginia announced, even before the Submerged Lands Act was 
passed, that they would challenge the law in the Supreme 
Court. They questioned whether the Federal Government had 
the legal right to give actual ownership of the submerged 
lands, as opposed to developmental rights, to the coastal 
S t a t e s . This point caused Attorney General Brownell to 
entertain doubts concerning the constitutionality of the 
measure when he testified during the hearings on the Hollandj
I
Bill. Mr. Brownell recommended the granting of developmental
. - . _ _ , ■ - . - _ - ■ ■ i
I
9^S. 1901, S3d Cong., 1st Sess., Sec. 9. i
95ibid.. Sec. 4(3)(a).
9Washington Sundav Star. May 10, 1953.
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rights rather than a blanket quitclaim title.^7
Slightly over a month after President Eisenhower 
signed the Submerged Lands Act, Arkansas filed a suit in thé 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
seeking to enjoin the United States Treasury from delivering 
to the coastal States some $70 million in offshore revenues 
being held in escrow. Calling the Submerged Lands Act un­
constitutional, the Arkansas brief said that it was "an 
unwarranted and invalid attempt to abdicate the sovereignty 
of the United States to a few of the States.
Separate suits against Texas, Louisiana, and Cali­
fornia were filed directly with the Supreme Court by Alabama 
and Rhode Island later in the year. The complaining States 
argued that "Congress repudiated the public national inter­
est and violated the principle of equality among the States" 
vdien it relinquished Federal ownership of the offshore oil 
lands to the defendant States.^9
On March 15, 1954, by a decision of 6 to 2, the 
Supreme Court denied Alabama and Rhode Island permission to 
test the validity of the Submerged Lands Act and affirmed 
the right of Congress to dispose of the lands. In the
9?Hearings on S.J. Res. 13, p. 926.
^^Houston Post. September 27, 1953. The Arkansas 
suit was filed on July S, 1953.
99pallas Morning News. February 5, 1954.
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words of the majority opinion; “The powers of Congress to 
dispose of any kind of property belonging to the United 
States is vested in Congress without l i m i t a t i o n . T h e  
Arkansas suit in the Federal District Court became a lost 
cause after this Supreme Court decision, and was dropped. 
Senator Daniels called the decision in the Alabama and Rhode 
Island cases “the end of a long and difficult fight.
Areas of Conflict Still Remaining
The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 established title in
the States to the contiguous belt of marginal seas extending
from the mean low water line to the “boundaries . . .  at the
time such State became a member of the Union, or as hereto-
102fore approved by Congress.“ Congress limited the bound­
aries of the States bordering the Atlantic and Pacific to 
three geographical miles and the States on the Gulf of 
Mexico to “in no event • • • more than three marine leagues** 
from the coast line.^^^ However, the term “coast line“ was
^O^State of Alabama v. State of Texas et al. 347 
U.S. 272, and State of Rhode Island v. State of Louisiana et
al, 74 S.et. 1+817
lO^Houston Post. March 16, 1954. Within a month 
Senator Douglas and fourteen other Senators introduced a 
resolution to repeal the Submerged Lands Act and to make the 
Outer Continental Shelf Act apply to the entire offshore 
area (Oil and Gas Journal. April 12, 1954, p. 52). Though 
this resolution did not pass, its introduction indicated the 
issue was not dead.
102public Law 31, ^3d Cong., 1st Sess., Sec. 2(b). 
________ -2jXbid-.__________________________________________
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defined so vaguely that any number of meanings could be 
assigned. Congress failed to heed the advice of Attorney 
General Brownell who urged that a definite line be drawn 
around the coast of the United States that would show pre­
cisely where the boundaries were being f i x e d . A s  a re­
sult, the territorial claims of the States were left open 
for future determination. The possibility of such additional 
claims is not excluded in the Act, which expressly provides 
that nothing shall be construed as "prejudicing the exist­
ence of any State's seaward boundary beyond three geograph­
ical miles if it is so provided by its constitution or laws 
prior to or at the time such State became a member of the 
Union."105
Because of the failure to establish a definite line 
of demarcation between State and Federal jurisdictions, 
there has been continuing disagreement in at least one in­
stance over where the boundaries lie. At present Texas and 
Florida appear to be satisfied with their rather well 
defined three leagues out into the Gulf of Mexico. The 
Federal leasing authorities have recognized the historic 
claims of these two States and have not objected to State 
leasing activities carried on within the ten and one-half
lO^Testimony of Herbert Brownell, Jr., Hearings on 
S.J. Res. 13. p. 926.
l*^ 5put)lic Law 13, S3d Cong., 1st Sess., Sec. 4.
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mile strips. With one exception, the other States have made 
no claim to more than three miles but there is no assurance 
that further claims will not be made. The discovery of a 
large petroleum pool under the Gulf of Mexico, say, seven 
miles off the coasts of Alabama and Mississippi, could moti­
vate these States into a frenzied search for historical 
"proof" that their boundaries extended three leagues into 
the Gulf, Louisiana alone at the present time (1956) is 
contesting the limitation to three miles implied in the Sub­
merged Lands Act,
In addition to the boundary dispute between Louis­
iana and the Federal Government, there has existed for many 
years a private feud over the seaward boundary between the 
States of Louisiana and Texas, Texas claims that the line 
should extend southeast from the mouth of the Sabine River, 
the direction the river takes in the last few miles before 
it empties into the Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana maintains 
that the line should extend south into the Gulf, the direc­
tion taken by the Sabine along most of its course between 
the two States, Because of the conflicting views, a sizable 
pie-shaped wedge of submerged land is claimed by both
i States I
I  I
! As provided in the Outer Continental Shelf Act, :
I  -  i
title to the areas extending from the "historic State bound-- 
^°^New York Times. June 7, 1953, IV, 12,
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aries” to the edge of the Continental Shelf is clearly in 
the Federal Government. But there is room for the later 
claim that State boundaries are co-extensive with the bound­
aries of the United States. One school of thought believes 
that, with the exception of the District of Columbia, there
can be no Federal land in the continental United States that
107is not included within State boundaries. Further cre­
dence to this belief is found in the provision in the Outer 
Continental Shelf Act that extends the police powers of the 
States to the edge of the Continental Shelf in the absence 
of Federal regulation. This is not an enç)ty provision as 
the States are actually exercising their police powers in 
the Outer Shelf. The extension was made to carry the prora­
tion powers of the Interstate Oil Compact States out into
the ocean.109
While the Outer Continental Shelf Act specifically
states that the exercise of police power in the Outer Shelf
in no way would give the States any ownership rights or
110taxing power over these lands, the act of performing 
these regulatory functions at the behest of the Federal
107Statement of Governor Frank Vennon of Louisiana, 
Hearings on S.J. Res. 13. p . 1097.
lO^Public Law 212, S3d Cong., Sec. 4(2).
109personal letter from E. W. Henderson, Gulf Coast 
Oil and Gas Supervisor, United States Geological Survey, New 
Orleans, Louisiana, dated May 6, 1955»
 ______ _ ^ 9Rubllc_Law-.212_,__S3.d_Jlong._,_.Se.c..__4 (3 )-.____________
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Government gives the States a claim to some interest in the 
income from the lands regulated. Without some shadow of 
interest or title to these lands, the States could not be 
expected to perform the police functions.
What will the future bring? A change of administra­
tion might bring an attempt to regain for the Federal 
Government theownership and control of the three to ten and 
one-half mile strips quit claimed to the littoral States by 
the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. When asked how this could
be done. Senator Douglas offered the ambiguous reply, "What
111the Lord giveth, the Lord taketh away."
The Federal ownership partisans have been mollified 
to a large extent by the unqualified reservation to the Fed­
eral Government of the resources in the Continental Shelf 
beyond the strips quitclaimed to the States. A further 
salve to ease the pain of losing the marginal strip has beer 
found in the great success of the developmental activities 
thus far undertaken in the Outer Continental Shelf. The 
Federal Government has done very well indeed in the leasing 
of the Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf, an area ten 
times larger than the areas awarded to the States.
Summarv
For years the coastal States assumed that they owned. 
--------  L
•^■‘"'■Personal interview with Senator Douglas, Washing­
ton, D. C., February IS, 1953. i
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the seas adjacent to their shores and the resources in and 
under these seas. During those years, most of the States 
had occasion to exercise the perquisites and duties of owner 
ship in the leasing of the submerged lands and the regula­
tion of the resource exploitation. The assumption that the 
States owned the resources of the marginal sea was shared by 
all Federal officials dealing with such matters until 193^» 
when Secretary of the Interior Ickes, at the instigation of 
persons seeking Federal leases on these lands, changed his 
mind on the matter of ownership. An attempt was soon made 
to claim these lands for the Federal Government and create 
from them a naval petroleum reserve, but the Ickes inspired 
measure died in Congress.
After World War II, the Federal Government sued the 
State of California to determine ownership of the lands off 
the coast of that State. California, with the aid of other 
interested States, fought back in Congress and in 1946 se­
cured passage of a bill quitclaiming the disputed lands to 
the coastal States. -President Truman vetoed the measure.
In 1947 the Supreme Court handed down a decision 
that California had no title to or property interest in the 
offshore lands but that the United States Government had 
"paramount rights" in these lands. In 1950 similar cases 
involving Texas and Louisiana were settled in the same way. 
A second quitclaim bill was passed by Congress and promptly 
vetoed by President Truman. Congress refused to pass a
78
leasing law under which the Federal Government could operate 
the submerged lands. In the stalemate that resulted, off­
shore oil developmental operations virtually ceased.
In the 1952 election General Eisenhower and the 
Republican Party favored the quitclaim, while Governor 
Stevenson and the loyal fractions of the Democratic Party 
were opposed to giving title to the States, The victory of 
the Republicans could not be attributed to the party stand 
on the submerged land issue, but the victory opened the road 
for a successful quitclaim bill.
In 1953, after comprehensive hearings and lengthy 
debate. Congress passed a bill giving title to the submerged 
lands within historic State boundaries to the coastal States 
President Eisenhower, true to his canpaign commitment, ap­
proved the bill, A militant minority in the Senate had beer 
unable to secure passage of a compromise Federal control 
bill that would have divided the revenues from the offshore 
lands with the coastal States, An amendment that would have 
devoted the revenues received by the Federal Government to
education also failed.
Soon after the quitclaim of the disputed three mile
and three league strips to the coastal States, Congress
I passed a bill that authorized Federal leasing in the Conti-
I nental Shelf beyond State boundaries. All revenues from
ithis area were reserved for the United States Government,
The quitclaim was unsuccessfully contested in the
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United States Supreme Court by two States. Even so, the 
dispute is not resolved. Several areas of conflict still 
remain. The boundaries between State and Federal submerged 
lands and even between the submerged lands of neighboring 
States have not been definitely established. The special 
three league claims of Texas and Florida continue to cause 
trouble for the Department of State in international negoti­
ations. Most important, a substantial minority-in Congress 
has not become reconciled to the quitclaim. This vociferous 
minority could become a majority and take steps to recover 
the ceded lands.
CHAPTER III 
RESOURCES OF THE MARGINAL SEA
The so-called ’*tidelands” controversy has centered 
mainly around the question of the ownership of the oil, gas, 
and sulphur in the sub-surface and sub-soil of the Continen­
tal Shelf beyond the ordinary low-water mark of the ocean. 
This chapter is concerned with a brief description of the 
geologic nature of the Gulf Continental Shelf and an exam­
ination of four estimates of the petroleum and sulphur re­
sources. The estimates were prepared by e%^ )ert geologists 
and were stated in terms of physical quantities. These 
physical quantity estimates have been converted into dollar 
value estimates by numerous persons and groups, with such 
estimates ranging from zero to $1 trillion, depending mainlyj 
on the assumptions made in the conversion process. Examina-| 
tion of these assumptions makes it possible to discard some |
i
of them as being unrealistic. In the final part of the : 
chapter an effort is made to suggest a more reasonable 
middle ground.
i
Geologic Nature of the Gulf Continental Shelf !
 ______The-great—stor-es—of—p-etroleum in_the__earth_are_ .known
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to be contained in the stratified sedimentary rocks laid 
down in the 550 million years since the beginning of the 
Cambrian time period. In the United States oil is known to 
occur throughout the geologic column in a sequence of re­
markable continuity and universality extending from the 
Cambrian to the Pleistocene periods.^
Oil may occur in commercial quantities only when 
four conditions are present. First, there must be a source 
rock, generally of marine origin, containing carbonaceous 
materials. Second, there must be heat and pressure under 
which hydrocarbons are formed. Third, since most of the 
source rocks are too fine-grained and compact to yield their 
oil freely for commercial production, the oil must migrate 
to and be collected in suitable reservoir rocks, vdiere it 
fills the interspaces in the pores of the rock or fissures 
within the rock. Fourth, the petroleum must be imprisoned
in the reservoir rock by a layer or trap of some impervious 
2
substance.
These necessary conditions are most prevalent in the 
great mediterranean regions of the world, within which lie 
more than half of the eleven million square miles of the
I  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
lEugene Stebinger, "Petroleum in the Ground," The 
i  World Geology of Petroleum, ed. by Wallace Ê. Pratt &
! Dorothy Good (Philadelphia: American Geographical Society,
1950), p. 3.
^Institute of Petroleum, Modern Petroleum Technology 
I(London: Institute of Petroleum, 1946), p. 18.
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total continental area of the world. The bulk of the petro­
leum found in the world to date has been located in the land 
areas fringing these mediterranean basins.^ The,Gulf of 
Mexico and the Caribbean Sea coirprise one such basin.
The oil producing sands located in the land areas of 
the Gulf Coastal Plain of the United States occur within a 
series of sedimentary wedges that incline gradually south­
ward and outward toward the Gulf of Mexico. Usually, as 
these wedges incline toward the coast, they become thicker 
and contain a greater proportion of sand and shale of marine 
origin.4 Geologists believe that the sediments laid down 
along the coast of Louisiana during the two most recent 
geologic eras are at least 30,000 feet thick.^
In general the zones of greatest production in the 
Gulf Coastal areas are found in the younger and stratigraph- 
ically higher wedges of sediment lying seaward of and above 
the older formations. Because of this seaward migration of 
the more prolific zones in the younger strata, there is 
reason to believe that conditions favorable to oil occurrence
^Wallace E. Pratt, "Petroleum in the Continental 
Shelves," Bulletin of the American Association of Petroleum 
Geologists. April. 19^7. p. 66l. ' |
I ' ^United States Geological Survey, Potential Oil and | 
i Gas Reserves of the Continental Shelf Off the Coasts of ! 
i Louisiana. Texas, and California (Washington: Government
: Printing Office, 1946), p. 2.
5j, Ben Carsey, "Geology of the Gulf Coast Area and '
^the Continental Shelf," Bulletin of the American Association 
of Petroleum Geologists._March._ 1950 ._P . 36l.
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continue far out in the continental platform. Experts in 
the United States Geological Survey believe that the oil 
bearing strata extend to the edge of the Continental Shelf 
(100 fathoms), and possibly farther out into the Continental 
Slope,^ The geologic picture is in no way changed by the 
relatively thin sheet of water covering the submerged lands. 
The larger part of the Continental Shelf from the 
Rio Grande to the Mississippi delta is underlain by a wide 
and potentially productive belt of Miocene sands, A large 
number of oil fields have been discovered in this formation 
in Coastal Louisiana, suggesting that the Miocene can be 
quite prolific. In the 9 1/2 million acres of land under­
lain by Miocene, over one hundred "interesting" structures 
have been found, with eleven oil fields that will produce in 
excess of 100 million barrels each in ultimate recovery, 
twenty-nine fields of over 50 million barrels each, and 
sixty-two fields of over 20 million barrels of oil apiece.
In the offshore regions this formation lies at accessible
7
drilling depths, so that the evidence given by land devel­
opment in Miocene sands promises rich reward in offshore 
drilling.
! z  I
: U, 8, Department of the Interior, Geological Survey,
I  Oil and Mineral Possibilities on the Continental Shelves of |
! the United States and Alaska (Washington; Government Print-- 
i  ing Office, 1946), p, 7.
!  i
' 7 i
Oil and Gas Journal. June 21, 1954, p. 10Ô, States
I  ment of Ben C, Belt, Vice-president of Gulf Oil Corporation,
#4
Most of the oil fields in the coastal region of 
Texas and Louisiana are thought to be closely related to and 
controlled by salt domes or plugs. Salt plugs are cylin­
drical masses of rock salt, one to five miles in diameter, 
that have been thrust thousands of feet upward through weak
Q
points in the overlying sedimentary formations. The salt, 
originally lying in stratified beds formed by the evapora­
tion of inland seas in prior geologic times, is plastic 
under sufficient pressure and flows slowly but inexorably 
along the lines of least resistance, usually upward. The 
bullet-shaped salt plugs puncture the covering strata of 
rock or arch them upward into a domal shape. The uparching 
and uptilting of the sedimentary strata create reservoir 
conditions which trap the oil above and on the flanks of the 
dome. Because the salt plug is relatively impervious to oil 
movement, it forms an effective seal,^^ Already more than 
190 salt plugs have been encountered by drilling in the Gulf 
Coast and many more structures thought to have salt cores 
have been located by geophysical methods,Car sey  has 
counted I64 sea mounds on the Continental Shelf and slopes
Wrather, op. cit.. p, #,
9w, A, Van Wiebe, North American Petroleum (Wichita,! 
Kansas: W, A, Van Wiebe, 1952J, p, 2 J + é ,
^^The Institute of Petroleum, op. cit,. pp. 24-25,
llCarsey, op. cit.. p. 363.
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off the coast of Texas and Louisiana,some of which are 
underlain by salt, as recent geophysical survey and drilling 
have proved.
Due to the steep dips of the beds uptilted by salt 
plugs, the salt dome formations offer a very narrow horizon-; 
tal target for the drilling bit. However, the vertical oil ; 
columns are often quite thick and may contain multiple sands 
which yield very large recovery per-acre-foot.^^ For example, 
the Spindletqp field, thou^ only 500 acres in esqjanse, has ! 
produced over fifty-three years a total of 130 million 
barrels of oil and has been estimated to contain an addi- | 
tional 6 million b a r r e l s T e n  miles off the coast of 
Louisiana, three Oklahoma companies found 100 million bar­
rels of oil in a 600 acre plot surrounding a salt dome. The! 
initial flow from the discovery well was 935 barrels per day 
from the very shallow depth of 1700 feet.^^ in another well
IZlbid.. p. 376.
Frederick Shepherd, "Developments in the Louis­
iana Gulf Coast in 1946," Bulletin of the American Associa­
tion of Petroleum Geologists. June, 1947, p. 1054.
IL^Lester C. Uren, Petroleum Production Engineering 
' (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1^50), p. È 7 • the famous lucas
gusher, the first successful salt dome well ever drilled, 
came in for an estimated production of 75,000 to 100,000 
barrels per day.
^^Christian Science Monitor. May 15, 1948. The 
three companies were Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Incorporated, 
Stanolind Oil and Gas, and Phillips Petroleum Conpany.
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eighteen miles offshore from Cameron Parish, Louisiana, oil
sands totaling 700 feet in thickness were discovered in a
domal structure.
While geologists at present believe that most of the
offshore producing zones will be closely related to salt
plug intrusions, this does not preclude the possibility of
finding other types of producing formations. The Houston
Post quoted an undisclosed geophysicist as saying: "Just
name a type of structure and you*11 find it in the Gulf of
Mexico." Another geophysicist was quoted as saying: "In
all probability I have seen more favorable looking oil struc
tures in the Gulf of Mexico than any 100 men have ever seen | 
17on land."
The technicians, geologists and geophysicists, seem | 
in agreement that the submerged lands of the Gulf of Mexico ! 
offer great promise as a new oil province. These specialists 
I feel confident that large areas of the Continental Shelf ard 
underlain by petroleum and sulphur d e p o s i t s . T h e  question 
then becomes one of attempting to estimate how much oil, gag 
'and sulphur lie in the submerged lands.
^^Houston Post. May 17, 1954.
^^Houston Post. May 7, 1954.
^^Of 365 wells drilled in the Gulf of Mexico through 
May of 1954; 230, or 62.8 per cent proved productive. Letter 
from William B. Harper, American Petroleum Institute, July 
19, 1954.
a?
The Meaning of Reserve
Unfortunately the term "reserve" has been subjected 
to a considerable amount of use and abuse in Congress and in 
the public press. Few users of the word have attempted to 
qualify or define exactly what they mean. The same word 
does not always carry a single meaning, and when that im­
precise term is used in a quantitative valuation, only con- ; 
fusion can result. In the welter of meanings for the term, : 
five distinctly different ones emerge: static reserves,
I
ultimate reserves, proved reserves, recoverable reserves,
and basic reserves. I
!
I
"Static reserves," or the common usage of the term, i 
denote a fixed quantity of something that is withheld, kept| 
back and stored for future use. It implies that mineral 
reserves are a fund which can be depleted but not augmentedi 
Apparently this was the meaning President Truman had in mind 
when he attempted to set up the Naval Petroleum Reserve in I 
1953. As a matter of fact, our mineral reserves are dynam­
ically tied in with the state of technological development.I 
They are not a fixed fund but expand and contract in re­
sponse to man's ability to discover, recover and utilize 
them.^^ Thus, this meaning must be discarded.
"Ultimate reserves" carry the meaning of totality.
19This is the thesis of a recent pamphlet, Eugene 
Holman: Our Inexhaustible Resources (New York: Standard
Oil Company, 1952).
èè
That is to say, the term signifies an attenpt to measure the 
last and smallest particle of any mineral. Analogy will 
make clear the absurdity of using such a term for other than 
propaganda purposes. The scientific analysis of sea-water, 
for instance, reveals that each square mile of the ocean 
contains a quantity of gold worth $93,000,000 at the present 
gold price of $35 per fine troy ounce.This is interesting 
to know, but of no practical value to mankind. The computa­
tion of the size and value of a mineral reserve is dependent 
upon the geologic distribution of the material in the I
earth, the engineering techniques of recovery and utiliza­
tion, and the economics of price. The total quantity of 
gold in the ocean, or any part of it, fails to be a mineral | 
reserve at the present time on three counts: it is minutely
distributed throu^ the sea-water; the techniques of effi­
cient recovery are lacking; and the economic cost of recovery 
would far exceed the value of the gold recovered. By the 
same tokens, it is of little practical value to compute the 
ultimate reserves in the deepest, least accessible, least 
productive of the geologically inferred offshore oil fields. 
Such use of the term "reserve" precludes its acceptance.
i
"Proved reserves" is a term developed by the Ameri­
can Petroleum Institute and the American Gas Association to 
indicate only those quantities of oil and gas recoverable
20carson, o p . cit.. p. 191.
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21under existing economic and operating conditions.
The proved reserves of the American Petroleum Insti­
tute specifically exclude oil under untested portions of 
partially developed fields, oil that may be present in un­
known prospects in regions believed to be generally favor­
able, oil that may become recoverable through new secondary ; 
recovery methods not yet applied, and, in brief, any oil 
that has not been proved to be physically present in the 
reservoir.Proved reserves thus represent the minimum
I  i
expected recoveries. Certainly in a dynamic economy such a 
concept undervalues enterprise, perseverance, and technology.
"Recoverable reserves" is a term of fundamental 
economic importance for with it an attenpt is made to con- | 
sider the incentives and the efficiencies that govern pro­
duction. What the term actually does is to describe the 
state of any mineral at any particular time in a certain 
economy. In short, the recoverable reserve is the total 
quantity of any mineral estimated originally to have been 
present multiplied by the percentage of recovery that can 
be acconiplished at the existing price levels with known
American Petroleum Institute and American Gas 
Association, Proved Reserves of Crude Oil. Natural Gas 
Liquids and Natural Gas (New York; American Petroleum In­
stitute and American Gas Association, 1954), Vol. 8, pp.
5, 15.
I b i d . .  p .  6 .
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methods of extraction,Certainly this term is far more 
realistic than the highly conservative "proved reserves" and 
the visionary "ultimate reserves," Yet, because the concept 
implies description under particular circumstances, and be­
cause the circumstances of resources in the submerged lands 
are often hypothetical, the term recoverable reserves is not 
adequate,
"Basic reserves" in the words of the United States 
Geological Survey denote: "Those quantities of a substance ;
for which some evidence is available to indicate concentra-; 
tions of potential economic value, at depths in the earth * sI 
crust believed to be accessible for exploration, , • ,"24 ;
On the surface there would appear to be no difference be­
tween "basic reserves" and "recoverable reserves," However> 
certain key words in the above definition indicate the 
i nature of the difference. Note "some evidence," "potential 
economic value," and "believed to be accessible," It is 
these words which show that the concept of "basic reserves" 
tends to be functionally predictive instead of merely 
I  descriptive. The quantity of a "basic reserve" differs 
: from the quantity assigned under the idea of "recoverable
Z^Frederick H , Lahee, "Our Oil and Gas Reserves, 
Their Meaning and Limitations," Bulletin of the American 
Association of Petroleum Geologists. Vol, 34. No, 6 (June. 
1950J, p. 1283. ,
24united States Geological Survey, Fuel Reserves of 
the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1 9 5 1 ) ,  p .  2 ,  :
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reserves” because the former figure is arrived at on the 
basis of all known geologic, engineering and economic data 
plus certain assumptions about the size and thickness of 
the deposits and their grade. •
The mathematical estimates of the oil resources in 
the marginal sea lands are based upon many assumptions, 
since the amount of pertinent data on such areas is rela­
tively meager. . Probably the best guide under such circum­
stances is the projection into the future of what has been
!
done in the past under somewhat similar conditions. Because
!
estimates of "basic reserves” are usually arrived at on the | 
basis of such projection, this use of the concept would 
appear to be most useful in discussing valuation of the off-i 
shore oil, gas, and sulphur resources. Here is a concept 
that, unlike the other four, does not assume a fixed fund 
which can only be depleted, that does not envision that all 
traces of a mineral can be classed as usable, that does not : 
reject any but current proved developments, that does not 
tend to be primarily descriptive. Here is a concept that is 
based on intelligent conjecture and thus constitutes a mean 
between over-caution and fantasy.
"Political Valuation” of Offshore Resources 
In the heat of the political controversy over Con­
tinental Shelf ownership, the lay public received a barrage 
of estimates on the value of the offshore resources. Ten
92
of these estimates are shown below:
1) $1,000 billion. Stated by F. M, McCormick,
secretary-treasurer of the 0,1,0, Oil Workers 
Union. As this estimate stands so far above all 
others, it may be that Mr, McCormick was re­
ferring to the precedents set by the "tidelands” 
legislation rather than placing a value on the 
offshore resources alone. His statement was
unqualified,25
2) $50 billion to $300 billion. Used by Senators 
Douglas and Morse, Includes oil, gas and sul­
phur in the entire Continental Shelf, including
Alaska,26
3) $250 billion. Used by President Truman, In­
cludes only oil in the entire Continental Shelf, 
including Alaska,27
4) $1S6 billion. Used by Senator Murray, Includes! 
oil, gas and sulphur in the entire Continental
Shelf, including’Alaska,28
5) $S0 billion. Findings of eighteen Texas geolo­
gists and engineers. Includes oil, gas and 
sulphur in Texas Continental Shelf only,29
6) $67,5 billion. Used by the Public Affairs In­
stitute, Includes oil and gas in the entire 
Continental Shelf, excluding A l a s k a ,30
7) $1,5 billion. Used by Senator Long, Includes 
royalty interest to accrue over fifty years from 
oil and gas within 3 mile and 10 1/2 mile belts
^^The Dallas Morning News. September 30, 1953•
^^Congressional Record. April 9, 1953, p . 2990, and 
May 1, 1953, p, 4439.
Z/Wew York Times. January 17, 1953, I, 8,
2&Congressional Record. April 8, 1953, p. 2946.
ouston Post. October 26, 1952, p, 1,
3Qwashington Window. February 20, 1953, p. 2,
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immediately offshore
Ô) IO.92 billion. Used by Senator Holland. In­
cludes royalty interest for all time from oil 
and gas within 3 mile and 10 l/2 mile b e l t s , 32
9) $0.-2 to IO.25 billion. Estimate of Texas Land
Commissioner Bascom Giles, Includes lease and 
bonus payments on oil, gas and sulphur leases, 
excluding all royalty from production, from the 
Texas Continental S h e l f ,33
10) $0,00 billion. This figure is inferred from a
statement made by H, R, Cullen, prominent oil 
operator of Houston, Texas, in a telegram to 
President Eisenhower, Mr, Cullen actually said; 
”, , .Oil cannot be produced under the tidelands 
economically at the present prices of oil , . , 
,”34 A logical inference is that the net value 
of the offshore resources at the time may be 
zero.
In general the Federal ownership advocates favored 
the higher valuations, while the State ownership advocates - 
favored the lower ones. With the exception of the two ex- | 
treme estimates, each of the political valuations of the 
wealth to be found in the submerged lands used one or 
another of the four principal geological estimates as a 
point of departure,These technical estimates of physical 
quantities of petroleum and sulphur, independently prepared
^^Congressional Record. May 5, 1953, p . 4617» 
3^Congressional Record. May 4, 1953, P» 4513» 
33pallas Morning News, August 29, 1952, p. 1*
34rhe Dallas Morning News. April S, 1953»
35To be discussed in the next section of this
chapter.
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by conpetent geologists, would hardly be recognized by their 
creators in the form offered for political debate.
The reasons for the great differences in the various 
estimates of value and the cause of the difficulty in recon­
ciling the estimates can be attributed to five principal 
factors:
1. The geographical areas described in the esti­
mates are not uniform. Some of the estimates 
include only the area out to 3 and 10 1/2 miles;’ 
others include the entire Continental Shelf of 
the United States proper; still others include
:  I
the Continental Shelf of Alaska along with the 
Shelf of the United States proper. |
2. The resources included in the estimates are not ■ 
consistent. Some include only oil, others oil 
and gas, and still others oil, gas, and sulphury
3. The basis of value means different things to 
different people. In some cases the value con­
sidered is the "net" value of the resources 
after the deduction of the costs of production. 
In other cases only the royalty interest of the 
landowner is considered. In other estimates all 
receipts of the landowner, including royalties, 
lease bonuses, delay rentals, and severance 
taxes, are included. In still other estimates 
the value sought has been the gross value of the
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resources in place.
4. Different meanings for the physical volume of 
the resources have been employed. Many of the 
estimates are of the maximum ultimate resources, 
while others have been of the minimum expected i 
resources inputed to the offshore areas by com-i
I
paring them to the proved reserves of comparable
!
onshore areas.
5. Uniform monetary values have not been assigned i 
to the resources. Present prices have been 
assigned to the resources in some of the esti- | 
mates, while increased prices have been assigned 
in others.
Numerous values can be derived from the use of dif-i 
ferent combinations of the factors listed above. Certainly 
; an estimate of the royalty eighth of the oil within 
:"historic State boundaries” should differ greatly from an 
estimate of the gross value of all of the oil, gas, and 
sulphur existing in place in the entire Continental Shelf 
of the United States and Alaska.
If order is to be made out of this chaotic set of 
valuations, it is necessary that comparable areas, quanti­
ties, and measurements be used. There is no reason to 
believe that the price of oil will remain at $2.50 per bar­
rel, or $2.75, or whatever prices were used in the various 
estimates; or that natural gas will remain at $0.09 per
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thousand cubic feet, or $0,15; or that sulphur will remain 
at $25 per long ton. Hence, to be consistent, all measure­
ments should be in physical quantities, such as barrels of 
oil, thousands of cubic feet of natural gas, and long tons 
of sulphur, rather than in d o l l a r s T h i s  procedure will 
be followed wherever possible in this discussion. Whenever 
the physical quantities of the resources must be valued, 
constant prices of $2,50 per barrel of oil, $0,10 per thou­
sand cubic feet of natural gas, and $25 per long ton of 
sulphur will be used in order to maintain consistency.
The relationship of the cost of production and the 
current valuation (price) of the product will determine 
whether production will be effected at a particular time. 
Thus, it will be economical for the operators to engage in 
production only as long as price promises to cover cost.
The royalty owner, however, receives a fixed payment as a 
fixed percentage of the gross physical production,3? regardf 
less of the cost-price relationship. Since the owning 
governmental unit will receive royalty payments based on 
the gross production, the gross physical reserve is the
3^As petroleum and sulphur royalties may be demanded 
either in kind or in money, the royalty payments may be 
stated in physical units of oil, gas, or sulphur as easily 
as they may be stated in money. Such is not the case in the 
matter of lease bonus and delay rental payments, where pay­
ment is based on fixed dollars per acre rather than a por­
tion of the physical production,
37in the absence of production the landlord re­
ceives an annual delay rental payment.
97
significant and meaningful measure for determining the 
amounts to accrue to the landlord.
Technical Estimates of the 
Offshore Resources
At present there is no certain way to measure the 
gross physical reserves of the Continental Shelf. In the 
absence of a method of taking a direct reading on the quan-: 
tities of resources the "best" estimates of trained tech­
nicians are usually used. Since the technicians do not 
agree even within wide limits, conclusions based on these
I
estimates must allow for. wide margins of error and must per? 
mit later revision as additional information becomes avail-! 
able. Even the best "basic reserves" estimate must ulti­
mately meet the test of "recoverable reserves," for one 
hundred per cent recovery of oil, gas, or sulphur from a 
reservoir is at present an impossible goal.3^
The four most frequently quoted geological estimates 
of the offshore resources are the independently prepared 
studies made by Wallace E. Pratt, L. G. Weeks, ei^teen 
Texas geologists and engineers, and the United States 
Geological Survey.
3 SLahee, "Our Oil and Gas Reserves: Their Meaning
and Limitations," pp. 1204-05.
98
Pratt Estimate39
In 1947 Wallace E, Pratt, vice-president of the 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, attempted to approximate 
the oil content of the submerged lands. In doing so he 
began with one assunption: that the sedimentary rocks of
the continental shelves and slopes of the world contained 
approximately the same amount of oil as the sedimentary 
rocks in the land areas of the United States, By comparing 
the relatively well-proven land area with the area of un­
proven oceanic sedimentary basins, Pratt hoped to achieve a : 
conservative, reasonable estimate.
About ten per cent of the estimated 2,5 to 3,0 
million cubic miles of sedimentary rock in the United States 
had been explored at that date. That partial search dis­
covered 53 billion barrels of oil^^ and little doubt exists 
that large volumes of oil await future discovery in unex­
plored areas.
As the continental shelves of the world are thought ^ 
to contain 50 to 60 million cubic miles of sediments, or 
twenty times the total sedimentary area of the United States, 
Pratt reasoned that they should contain about twenty times
^%allace E, Pratt, "Petroleum in the Continental 
Shelves," Bulletin of the American Association of Petroleum 
Geologists. Vol. 31. No, 4 (April. 1947J. pp, 669-670,
^^This includes both oil produced (32 billion bar­
rels) and oil remaining as proved reserves (21 billion 
barrels) at the end of 1945,
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the total sedimentary area of the United States, Pratt rea­
soned that they should contain about twenty times as much 
oil. On the basis of past discoveries in the United States, 
with only ten per cent of the sedimentary rocks explored, 
the continental shelves and slopes of the world should con­
tain more than 1,000 billion barrels of oil, Pratt pointed 
out that this was a minimum estimate and that if additional, 
oil is discovered in the United States land areas or if the 
offshore areas turn out to be better suited for petroleum 
occurrence than the land areas used for comparison, the 
estimates for the oil in the continental shelves and slopes ! 
should be correspondingly greater. Since the continental 
shelves and slopes contiguous to the United States and 
Alaska are believed to constitute approximately one-tenth of 
the total underwater sedimentary basin of the world, it can 
be inferred from the Pratt estimate of underwater oil in the 
world that the continental shelves and slopes adjacent to 
the United States and Alaska may be expected to contain a 
minimum of 100 billion barrels of oil.
At this point many followers of the Pratt estimate 
seem to go astray. The $270 billion valuation placed on the 
"give away" to or "theft" by the States of California, Texas, 
and Louisiana by some opponents of the various quitclaim 
bills was derived from this 100 billion barrel estimate.
4^100 billion barrels of oil @ $2.?0/bbl = 
billion............
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Two serious errors in the use of Pratt * s estimate were made { 
by Federal ownership partisans. First, Pratt included the 
continental slopes in his calculations and one-half of the |
I
itotal offshore sediments on which Pratt based his estimate
i  i
iare thought to be in the area classified as continental 
slope. Many authorities at present believe that the edge of 
the Continental Shelf (600 feet) will be the limit of possin 
ble development.^^ If this is correct, the oil in the 
I  shelves alone bordering the United States and Alaska would 
I amount to 50 billion barrels.
The second error arises from the application of
i
Pratt * s estimate, which refers to the entire Continental 
Shelf of the United States proper and Alaska, to the shelf 
area of the three States of California, Texas, and Louisiana
I
jIn all fairness to both the estimate and the States, it is
I
I improper to say that Pratt was speaking of the sedimentary 
I formations in just these three States. If Pratt*s estimate
f
i
is to be used to value the oil offshore from these states, 
the oil credited to California, Texas, and Louisiana should 
be on a ratio of the quantity of sedimentary rock found in 
the entire Continental Shelf of the United States and 
Alaska. Unfortunately, measurements of the cubic volume of 
sediments in these areas are not available.
^^United States Geological Survey, Fuel Reserves of 
the United States, p. 32.
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Weeks Estimated] j
L, G, Weeks, chief geologist for the Standard Oil 
I  Company of New Jersey, using almost the same method as Pratt,I '
I  arrived at a somewhat smaller estimate for the oil in the |
I  Continental Shelves. Weeks predicted from the limited ex- !
!  Î
ploration thus far accomplished in the sedimentary land '
I basin of the world that a total production of 610 billion |
barrels of oil could be expected from the land areas. If 
j so, the ten million square miles of offshore sedimentary 
' basins, which are approximately two-thirds as large as the 
sedimentary areas on land, should contain some 400 billion
; barrels of oil. Hence, the submerged lands of the United
I
States and Alaska, should contain 40 billion barrels.
Of the 880,000 square miles in the Continental
I
I Shelves of the United States and Alaska, approximately 
I  590,000 square miles lie seaward of Alaska and 290,000
I  square miles seaward of the United States proper. With
I
j uniform distribution of the 40 billion barrels of oil, 26.8 
! billion barrels should lie off of Alaska, and the continen­
tal shelves of the United States should contain approxi­
mately 13.2 billion barrels.
4^1. G. Weeks, "Concerning Estimates of Potential 
Petroleum Reserves," Bulletin of the American Association 
of Petroleum Geologists. Vol. 34. No. 10 (October. 1950J. 
pp. 1947-1953.
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Estimate of Eighteen Texas Geologists 
and Engineers^^
One of the most controversial estimates appeared
I I
I during the presidential election campaign of 1952. This 
; report, signed by eighteen prominent oil technicians, and 
I admittedly released to point out to the voting citizens of 
I Texas the true values at stake in the offshore controversy, 
was limited to the submerged lands seaward of Texas only, 
i Althou^ the report was designed to sway the voters of 
Texas into the canp of the candidate supporting State owner-- 
ship of the submerged lands and can clearly be labeled as | 
political in nature, the scientific data on which the 
report is based does not appear to be biased.
The Texas group assumed the submerged lands to have 
potentialities at least equivalent to the unsubmerged lands 
I adjacent to the Texas Coast. Geologically the areas were 
I found similar in faulting, in folding and in uplift through 
I earth structural changes, and in piercement by salt masses.
! In a belt one-hundred miles wide onshore along the Gulf of
i
: Mexico, the group found that cumulative production and _ |
■ " "  - —  • -  . .  . ■ - - -  - - - - -  -  j
^^Released to the public in The Houston Post.
October 26, 1952, p. 1.
^^Senator Lehman pointed out that Texans are some­
times prone to exaggerate just a little when talking to 
outsiders, but that this tendency does not ordinarily assert 
itself when Texans are talking to Texans. This report was 
for home consumption. Congressional Record. April 13, 1953, 
p. 3084.
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proved reserves, as of January 1, 1952, amounted to 11 bil­
lion barrels of oil, 62 trillion cubic feet of gas, and 121 
million long tons of sulphur. Potential resources of about 
this magnitude should lie offshore in the belt of sediments 
averaging one hundred miles in width.
Actually, the report stated, the potential produc- 
tion from the offshore lands should be much greater than 
that of the onshore belt because of better reservoir con­
ditions, the full use of modern methods of recovery, and 
the greater mass or thickness of sediments in the Gulf 
The report also noted that the proved reserve estimate for i
j
the land area was very conservative and covered only the i 
resources absolutely proved by the drilling bit. Revisions; 
of the estimates on proved reserves, which because of their 
conservative methods of calculation have always been upward, 
and additional new discoveries should greatly increase the > 
amount of petroleum and sulphur found and to be found in 
the area used for conparison. Accordingly, the report 
roughly doubled the estimate of expected reserves to recog­
nize the probability of future discovery and to allow for 
the greater production expected offshore,^?
• ^^his last point overlooked in the estimates by 
Pratt and Weeks,
^?The report converted the physical estimates of 
oil, gas, and sulphur into dollars at the current market 
prices and arrived at a gross valuation of $41,492,650,000,00, 
The report doubled the monetary estimate, rather than the
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The United States Geological 
Survey Estimate^#
The Geological Survey report of the potential oil 
and gas resources in the Continental Shelf areas of the 
United States is the most exhaustive and comprehensive study 
made on this subject to date. This report, like the report 
of the Texas group, assumes that the Continental Shelves 
are underlain by sediments that are similar to and poten­
tially as productive as those under the adjacent land areas. 
The Geological Survey utilized two different methods 
of estimating the potential offshore oil in the Gulf of 
Mexico seaward of Texas and Louisiana, First, the Survey 
estimated the quantity of oil and gas that has been dis­
covered in an onshore strip adjoining the coast con^arable ; 
in width to the Continental Shelf. Assuming the density 
and productivity of the geological structures to be the 
same in both areas, the oil in the entire Continental Shelf 
off Texas and Louisiana would approximate 13 billion barrels.
physical estimate, stating that "a more realistic forecast 
is $00 billion,” If it can be assumed that the Texas group 
meant that their physical estimates should be doubled, the 
submerged lands seaward of Texas should produce, over time, 
almost 22 billion barrels of oil, 124 trillion cubic feet 
of gas, and 242 million long tons of sulphur,
^%,S, Department of the Interior, Geological Sur­
vey, Potential Oil and Gas Reserves of the Continental 
Shelf""Jff* the Coast of Louisiana. Texas, and California. 
February 16, 1953.
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The 10 1/2 mile strip offshore from Texas should contain 1,2 
billion barrels of oil; the 3 mile strip offshore from 
Louisiana, 0,25 billion barrels.
Second, the Geological Survey used the Mississippi 
delta as a sample of the oil occurrence in the Gulf Con­
tinental Shelf. In relatively recent geologic times the 
Mississippi River has built a delta seaward for nearly one : 
hundred miles from a line connecting the shore lines of the : 
Gulf on the two sides of the delta (See Figure 2), The 
delta extends a river-made platform to within ten or twelve| 
miles of the edge of the Continental Shelf, |
The Geological Survey thought it reasonable to | 
assume that oil occurrence in this sangle area would indi- i
i
cate results to be expected from nearby portions of the ! 
shelf. On this delta area of about 10,000 square miles, or;
slightly less than 20 per cent of the Continental Shelf
; !
; bordering Louisiana and Texas, more than 100 oil and gas
fields with somewhere around two billion barrels of oil have 
been discovered thus far. Ultimate petroleum discoveries 
; of at least 2 1/2 billion barrels can reasonably be ex- ! 
pected in the delta. Therefore the Continental Shelf should 
: contain approximately 13 billion barrels of oil. While the 
Survey did not assert that the known delta reserves pro­
vided a reliable yardstick for the entire shelf area, they 
did find it significant that the total reserves estimated 
by using this yardstick were roughly equivalent to the
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estimate of 13 billion barrels obtained by using the shore- | 
ward belt of equal width as a yardstick.
The Geological Survey found that natural gas has |
I  been associated with oil in the Gulf Coast region at approx-r 
jimately 5,000 cubic feet of gas for each barrel of oil. The 
I same ratio is expected in the Continental Shelf. Since 
I petroleum reserves of 13 billion barrels are estimated, a 
total of 65 trillion cubic feet of gas can be inferred for 
the entire Continental Shelf off Texas and Louisiana. The 
10 1/2 statute mile strip seaward of Texas should contain 
6 trillion cubic feet and the entire shelf off Texas about 
45 trillion cubic feet. The 3 1/2 statute mile belt off 
Louisiana should contain 1 1/4 trillion cubic feet and the 
entire Louisiana shelf about 20 trillion cubic feet of gas, 
(Table 3).
These estimates of the Geological Survey admittedly 
ignore the effect of future discoveries in the yardstick 
land areas. Should additional discoveries be made there, 
the estimates for the offshore areas should be correspond­
ingly increased. Nor do the estimates consider the possi- 
bility of future technical improvements that may substan­
tially increase the percentage of oil recovered from 
producing fields. In addition, the Geological Survey re­
port does not attempt to estimate the effect of such 
presently unpredictable geological factors as possible 
changes of character and thickness in the sedimentary rock
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED POTENTIAL OIL AND GAS RESERVES OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 
LANDWARD OF "TRADITIONAL STATE BOUNDARIES" OF TEXAS AND LOUISIANA 
AND FOR THE ENTIRE GULF CONTINENTAL SHELF
Oil Gas
(billions of (trillions of
barrels) cubic feet)
Texas:
Within 10 1/2 statute miles of the coast 1.2 6,0
Total Continental Shelf off Texas 9.0 45.0
Louisiana:
Within 31/2 statute miles of the coast 0.25 1.25
Total Continental Shelf off Louisiana 4.0 20,0
Total:
Within "traditional state boundaries" 1.45 7.25
Total Gulf Continental Shelf^ 13.0 65.0
Source: United,States Geological Survey, Potential Oil and Gas Reserves of the
Continental Shelf Off the Coasts of Louisiana. Texas and California. 
February 16, 1953.
4 h e  Geological Survey assumes no oil and gas in the Continental Shelf seaward 
of Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.
ë
00.
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from land to subsea areas and changes in the prevalence and 
size of structural traps. These factors in the aggregate 
might serve either to increase or decrease the estimates 
substantially. The Geological Survey did not feel that an 
attempt to consider these factors with the present state of i 
knowledge would improve the quality of the estimates.
■ ■  ■  j
In the matter of oil reserve estimates, the Geolog-I 
ical Survey has generally preferred to be on the conserva- | 
tive side.^^ In the case at hand, the estimates would seemj 
to be of the minimum reserves expected, with no attempt to 
predict the maximum quantities possible. I
I
Potential Income of the Leasing I
Governmental Body |
In the submerged lands controversy, one of the 
principal questions concerned which governmental unit, I  
Federal or State, wo.uld get the sums accruing to the under-! 
water landowner from the private industry development of 
the resources located therein.^ 0 Aé this phase of the con­
troversy boils down to the question of who gets the money, 
i the problem arises of determining the amount at stake.
In an effort to indicate the general order of magni­
tude of the values involved, three illustrative calculations
49Personal interview with Mr. Ralph Miller, Fuels 
Division, United States Geological Survey, May 20, 1953.
^^The author knows of no plans for drilling by the 
Federal or State Governments.
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have been made by the author. These calculations are not 
intended as forecasts; they are merely for purposes of il­
lustration. The calculations are based first of all on the 
best estimates of physical quantity made by geological ex­
perts; furthermore, certain assumptions concerning the ex-
i
pected levels of royalty, price,lease bonus, delay rental
■ j
and severance tax are made, based upon existing average | 
prices and percentages. The answers derived are no more
I
accurate than the estimates and assumptions used. Develop- |
:  I
ments in the near or remote future may make these calcula- | 
tions unrealistic,
I
If royalty payments were the only amount involved, |
the problem would be relatively simple. The royalty owner !
51would receive an agreed-on percentage of the oil, gas,  ^ :
: and sulphur produced, delivered in kind at the expense of 
the operator to the tanks, pipelines, or storage bins of the 
landowner located on the leases involved. If the landowner;
I  or lessor, so elected, delivery of the royalty oil, gas, and 
! sulphur would be made in money at the highest established 
; field prices. Whether in kind or in cash, the royalty pay-!
I ment would be an established portion of the gross production,
^^he customary royalty on oil and gas has been 
12 1/2 per cent of the gross production. For sulphur the 
amount has generally been 5 per cent of the gross produc­
tion, These royalty percentages can vary and have been as 
high as 90,5 per cent on oil and gas, Houston Post. April 
7, 1954.
I l l
free of all costs to the royalty owner.
Royalty payments will not be the only income going 
to the owning government. The Federal or State governments 
asserting ownership over the submerged lands will be able to 
collect not only lease bonus payments and annual delay |
rental pa3nnents, in addition to the royalty payments, but 
will also collect taxes. The amounts involved will vary | 
according to the contractual agreements made with the les- ' 
sees and the tax laws of the governmental body concerned. 
Since the royalties, bonuses, delay rentals, and severance | 
taxes are not fixed amounts, and, since the physical quanti-: 
ties of oil, gas, and sulphur to be found in the submerged | 
lands are largely unknown, it will not be possible to arrive 
at a fixed sum that would accrue to the owning governmental I 
body. The present division of ownership between the Federal
j
: and State governments requires a further division of ex- 
ipected incomes, |
In order to reduce the number of variable factors 
in the equation, certain minimum assumptions will be made, 
i First, it will be assumed that the royalty payments for 
oil and gas will amount to 12 1/2 per cent and for sulphur 
to 5 per cent. These percentages are customarily in 
use at the present time. Second, the lease bonuses will 
be assumed to average $15 per acre. While the average 
lease bonus payments for submerged lands leased for oil 
and gas to-date have been much higher, averaging $S3 per
112
acre,52 these leases have been on selected acreage on and | 
around promising formations. It is doubtful that payments | 
for all submerged lands will continue this high.^^ Third, | 
the delay rentals will be assumed to average |5 per acre |
I per year with the rental being paid for one year only.^4
! ' ' '
: last assunç>tion will place the severance and gross produc-
! tion taxes on gas, oil, and sulphur at 5 per cent. The !
severance taxes in effect at the present time average
cc
I around 5 per cent in Texas and 10 per cent in Louisiana.
I It is anticipated that the Federal government will establish 
a levy in lieu of state severance taxes that will approxi- I 
i  mately equal the State t a x e s . i
52ïhe total acreage leased to the end of 1954, both 
Federal and State, amounted to approximately 2.65 million 
acres, on which lease bonus payments of close to $220 mil­
lion have been made, an average of $03 per acre. World Oil
August 1, 1954, and Houston Post. November 14, 1954.
53On the other hand, the owning government may be 
able to lease the same areas for oil and gas more than once 
In addition, sulphur leases may be made on top of oil 
leases. A bonus can be extracted from the lessee on each 
transaction, thereby substantially increasing the bonus 
income of the lessor.
j
54oelay rentals, also called minimum royalty pay- | 
ments, are annual payments made during the life of a lease i 
on non-producing properties. Once production is accom­
plished and as long as it continues, delay rental payments ; 
are hot required.
55Hearings on 5.1901. p. 2Ô0, 301.
^^Public law 212, &3d Gong., 1st Sess., Sec. 6(9). ; 
The outer Continental Shelf Act contains a "windfall" pro- ; 
vision in the handling of State leases found to be located ;
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In no cases thus far, in the leasing by Texas and 
Louisiana, have the leasing provisions brought a smaller 
amount to the leasing authority than would be forthcoming 
with the assumed provisions. In many cases the royalty and 
rental schedules and the tax rates have been much greater. 
The United States Department of the Interior has stipulated
j
ia royalty of 16,6? per cent, a minimum lease bonus of $15 
per acre, and an annual rental of $3 per acre for Federal 
Ileases off Louisiana.5?
I Applying these assumptions concerning the expected
i
levels of royalty payments, lease bonuses, delay rentals,
land severance taxes, to the most conservative estimates of
I
the offshore oil and gas, the report of the United States 
Geological Survey, and the only estimate of offshore sulphur, 
that of the ei^teen Texas geologists and engineers,we 
derive a total income to the owning government over the 
years from the entire Continental Shelf of the Gulf of
on Federal property. The lessees are required to pay an 
amount equivalent to any State severance tax imposed by the 
State issuing the lease,
5?Houston Post. August 15, 1954.
^^Actually, this report could be called two separate 
estimates. The Texas group made a formal prediction of 121 
million long tons of sulphur and then stated that the esti-| 
mate was much too low and should be doubled. Here, the 
more conservative estimate has been used. The Texas group ; 
included only the sulphur located offshore of Texas, Mr, 
Fred M, Nelson, president of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company, 
told the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee that 
the Texas geologists and engineers really were speaking of I 
the entire Gulf Continental Shelf in the estimate,Hearings 
on S.1901. p, 118,
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Mexico seaward of Texas and Louisiana of $7.#9 billion. 
(Table 4)«
For the belts 10 1/2 miles wide offshore from Texas 
and 3 miles offshore from Louisiana, using the same assunç)- 
tions and estimates, the total income to the level of gov­
ernment exercising ownership would amount to a minimum of 
|059 million over the years (Table 5). I
If Pratt*s seemingly more generous estimate of the 
offshore oil is used to ascertain the amounts likely to 
accrue to the owning governments, the Texas and Louisiana
I
submerged lands would contribute less to the owners than is ; 
found to be the case when the Geological Survey estimate is | 
used. This incongruous situation can be explained by the j 
lack of strict comparability of the estimates, Pratt stated 
only that the Continental Shelves and Slopes of the United | 
States and Alaska should contain 100 billion barrels of oil* 
If one took liberties with Dr. Pratt^s estimate and inferred 
that one half of this oil would be found in the Continental 
Shelves^? and that the oil would be found evenly distributed 
: throughout the Continental Shelves of the United States‘and 
Alaska, the Continental Shelf seaward of Texas and Louis­
iana, which comprises approximately 6.S per cent of the 
total Continental Shelf area, would contain only 3.4 billion 
barrels of oil. This inferred estimate is so much lower
^%he other half would be in the Continental Slopes.
TABLE k
MINIMUM EXPECTED AMOUNTS TO ACCRUE TO THE LEASING AND TAXING AUTHORITY
FROM THE ENTIRE CONTINENTAL SHELF SEAWARD OF TEXAS AND LOUISIANA
Royalty:
Oil- 13 billion barrels @ $2,50/bbl. X 12 l/2^ royalty 
Gas- 65 trillion cubic feet @ $ .lO/mcf X 12 1/2^ royalty 
Sulphur- 121 million long tons @ $25/ton X 5^ royalty •
Lease Bonus and Delay Rental:
38,300,000 acres @ $20/acrel ........... ... .. ..... .... 
Seyerance Tax:
Oil- 13 billion barrels @ $2.$0/bbl. X 5% tax ............
Gas- 65 trillion cubic feet @ $.10/mcf X 5% tax ............
Sulphur- 121 million long tons @ #25/ton X 5% tax
4.062 billion 
0.813 billion 
0.151 billion
0,766 billion
1.625 billion
0.325 billion 
0.151 billion
H
Total 7.893 billion
Source: United States Geological Survey, Potential Oil and Gas Reserves of the
Continental Shelf Off the Coasts of Louisiana. Texas and California 
(Oil and Gas). Eighteen Texas Geologists and Engineers. Houston P^st. 
October 26, 1952 (Sulphur).
^The total acreage of the submerged lands is not definitely known. However, the 
area seaward of Louisiana approximates 19,400,000 acres an^ the area offshore from 
Texas is close to 18,900,000 acres. The assumption is made that the delay rentals 
will be paid for one year only for the average acre of submerged lands. $15 lease 
bonus plus $5 delay rental is equal to
TABLE 5
MINIMUM EXPECTED AMOUNTS TO ACCRUE TO THE LEASING AND TAXING AUTHORITY
FROM THE CONTINENTAL SHELF LOCATED WITHIN "HISTORIC STATE
BOUNDARIES" OF TEXAS AND LOUISIANAI
Royalty;
Oil- 1.45 billion barrels @ $2.50/bbl. X 12 \/2% royalty $ 0.453 billion
Gas- 7.25 trillion cubic feet @ $ .10/mcf X 12 1/2% royalty ... O.O9I billion
Sulphur- 11,1 million long tons @ $25/ton X 5% royalty O.OI4 billion
Lease Bonus and Delay Rental!
3,500,000 acres? @ $20/acre ... ..... . .... ..  ...........   O.O7O billion
Seyerance Tax:
Oil- 1.45 billion barrels @ $2.50/bbl. X 5% tax ............ 0.1Ô1 billion
Gas- 7.25 trillion cubic feet @ $,10/mcf X 5% tax ............ 0.036 billion
Sulphur- 11.1 million long tons @ $25/ton X 5% tax ........... O.OI4 billion
Total O.S59 billion
Source:
ON
United States Geological Suryey, Potential Oil and Gas Reseryes of the 
Continental Shelf Off the Coasts of Louisiana. Texas and California 
(Oil and Gas). Eighteen Texas Geologists and Engineers. Houston Post. 
October 26, 1952 (Sulphur),
^The "Historic State Boundaries" of Texas are rather well established at 10 I/2 
statute miles, or three leagues from shore. For Louisiana, the matter is somewhat 
less settled with the so-called "Historic State Boundaries" being located somewhere 
between 3 miles and 31 1/2 miles from the Louisiana shores. For this table, the 
Louisiana boundary has been assumed at 3 miles from shore.
?The area within the 10 l/Z mile strip off Texas approximates 2,600,000 acres. 
3 mile strip off Louisiana comprises an area of about 900,000 acres.
The
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than any other estimate that it may be discarded. In addi­
tion since Pratt made no attempt to estimate the potential 
gas and sulphur, the data are lacking to determine the 
potential income to the royalty owning government.
For the same reasons. Weeks* estimate of the physi­
cal quantity of offshore oil is of little value in finding 
the income to the owning government. This leaves only the | 
estimate of the eighteen Texas geologists and engineers. If 
the basic assumptions concerning royalties, bonuses, rental?,
I !
and taxes are applied to the admittedly conservative 11 !
billion barrels of oil, 62 trillion cubic feet of gas, and | 
121 million\long tons of sulphur predicted by the Texas |
group in the submerged lands seaward of Texas, the income to
I
go to the government owning these submerged lands would be |
iapproximately $6,575 billion (Table 6), !
Following the qualifying statement in the report of ;
!  , I
; the Texas group that the estimate of physical quantities was
!
itoo low, the physical amounts involved should be doubled. 
This would produce a total income to the owner of the lands 
I  offshore from Texas of over $13 billion.
Each of the geological estimates of the physical 
volume of expected resources that was used in determining 
the royalty and leasing income, as well as the two estimates 
that were not used, were labeled by their authors as being 
on the conservative side. By any estimate the amount at 
stake in the dispute is large. The three tables in this
Total $ 6.575 billion
TABLE 6
EXPECTED AMOUNTS TO ACCRUE TO THE LEASING AND TAXING AUTHORITY FROM THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF LOCATED SEAWARD OF TEXAS, USING PHYSICAL QUANTITIES
ESTIMATED BY EIGHTEEN TEXAS GEOLOGISTS AND ENGINEERS
Royalty;
Oil - 11 billion barrels @ #2.50/bbl. X 12 1/2# royalty ..... # 3.43^ billion 
Gas - 62 trillion cubic feet @ $.10/racf X 12 royalty 0.Ô13 billion
Sulphur - 121 million long tons @ $25/ton x 5# royalty ...... 0.151 billion
I
Lease Bonus and Delay Rental!
10,900,000 acres @ $20/acre              0.766 billion |
i
Seyerance Tax: !
Oil - 11 billion barrels @ $2.50/bbl. X 5# ........ 1.375 billion
Gas - 62 trillion cubic feet @ $.0/mcf X 5# . 0.310 billion
Sulphur - 121 million long tons @ #25/ton X 5# .............. 0.151 billion
Source: Eighteen Texas Geologists and Engineers, Houston Post, October 26, 1952.
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section show the minimum amounts that the leasing govern­
mental authorities might be expected to derive from develop­
ment of submerged lands oil, gas, and sulphur resources, 
other things being equal. Since it was impossible to de­
termine an annual income, the figures are given to show 
what the lessor may minimally expect from the "basic re­
serves" as they are developed, no matter when, so long as 
development proceeds under the outlined assumptions.
Summarv
Even among experts there is disagreement concerning | 
the size and value of the resource deposits in the Contin- j
I
ental Shelf seaward of Texas and Louisiana, but at least two
i
I
salient points of agreement can be recognized. First, geo-| 
logical evidence indicates that large quantities of oil, gas, 
and sulphur exist in the submerged lands. This has been 
I proved empirically by the drilling bit in a limited portion| 
of the offshore area. Little doubt exists in the minds of I 
the technicians, geologists and geophysicists most familiar 
with the Gulf Coastal region, that other large areas of the 
Continental Shelf will prove highly productive. Second, the 
royalties and perquisites incident to the ownership of the 
submerged lands will amount to a large sum of money, althou^ 
the amount is unknown.
CHAPTER IV
METHODS AND COSTS OF RECOVERING PETROLEUM 
FROM THE GULF COAST SUBMERGED LANDS
In this chapter an examination will be made of the 
imethods in use and proposed for developing and producing the 
offshore petroleum. Then an attempt will be made to conpare 
the costs offshore and onshore.
Man's ability to recover à portion of the oil and 
I  gas locked in the floor of the Continental Shelf is an 
established fact. Pioneering operations have demonstrated 
that production from these offshore reserves is technically 
feasible, for the problems of offshore drilling alone are 
not greatly different from the problems of comparable on­
shore drilling. Geologically the Gulf Continental Shelf is 
part of the Gulf Coastal Plain covered by a veneer of water, 
so the offshore operator can capitalize on the experience 
gained from drilling on structures in the immediately ad­
jacent land areas.
Offshore operators have discovered that geophysicali 
costs can be reduced below the current costs of such work 
on land. Geophysical operations conducted thus far have
120
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disclosed the presence of about 250 structures in the sub- I 
merged lands seaward of Texas and Louisiana that can be
i  1  '
I  labelled first class. Of the sixty-four structures drilled
I I
up to March 1955, thirty-six proved to be oil or gas fields | 
and twenty-eight fields were discovered with the first wellJ
I  I
Of all wildcat wells drilled, about 40 per cent have been
successful.2 I
1I
Although offshore drilling operations are relatively 
expensive compared to comparable dry land operations, most 
of the operators believe that technological developments in 
drilling, producing, and transporting of offshore oil and 
igas will permit them to realize a competitive cost per 
I barrel in a large part of the Continental Shelf area.^
The cost of Continental Shelf petroleum development 
jmay be expressed in two ways: (1) the cost per well and (2)
ithe cost per barrel of oil or 1,000 cubic feet of gas. 
Although the latter cost is the more significant figure for 
use in comparing the cost of onshore and offshore petroleum.
Ira H. Cram, "Review and Appraisal of Offshore 
Operations," an address before the Southwest District Meet­
ing, Production Division, American Petroleum Institute. New! 
Orleans, Louisiana, March 11, 1955, p. 3 (mimeographed).
2lbid.. p. 4.
^National Petroleum Council, Submerged Lands, p. vii.
^ h e  cost per barrel of oil or per thousand cubic 
feet of natural gas can be found by dividing the total cost 
of field exploitation, including all costs of exploration, 
development and operation, by the total volume of production
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such data are unavailable. Literature on the subject fails
to reveal any unit cost experience and the writers even I
hesitate to make estimates. Under the circumstances analy- j 
I  !
Isis must be based on cost per well figures, but an attempt j
will be made to point out its inherent shortcomings, !
j I
I Such costs will vary from well to well, from area |
to area, and from time to time. Variables like depth of the
water, distance from land, type of strata below the ocean i
I
[bottom, depth of the productive zone, size of the reservoir, 
[pattern of well spacing, rate of production, and number of j 
I operations being carried on in the area, will cause great | 
idifferences in cost. Accordingly, cost data, if available, | 
could be applied accurately only to limited areas thus far 
explored.
Offshore Developmental Methods and Costs 
In order to attempt a determination of the cost of 
recovering oil from the submerged lands of the Gulf, it is 
necessary to go step by step throu^ the field development 
operation. First is the search, then acquiring the lease, 
and then setting up the drilling rigs, After that the off-I 
shore drilling procedure is similar to that onshore. Each |
over all time. The true cost per unit of production cannot! 
be calculated accurately until all of the petroleum is pro­
duced by both primary and secondary recovery methods and 
the physical plant scrapped. However, by the use of ac­
counting artifices the approximate unit cost can be derived 
for any given volume of production in a given time period, |
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step needs clarification and eventual synthesis so that one 
can see the particular problems of offshore development, how
I
|they are met, and what prospects the future shows.
Geophysical Operations i
! The first step in the development of the Continen- :
tal Shelf petroleum resources is the obtaining of a permit ' 
to engage in geological and geophysical operations. These ; 
permits convey no property right, interest, or reservation | 
to the lands involved, and are issued by the State or Fed- | 
eral agencies charged with the administration of the area 
of interest, namely, the Texas Land Commission, the Louis- ! 
iana Department of Conservation, and the Bureau of Land
I
! Management, Department of the Interior. In general, the
permits are given freely to persons and organizations agreef
Î
ing to abide by the rules and regulations of the issuing 
jurisdiction, governing such matters as the safe use of 
dynamite in the interest of property and wildlife preserva­
tion. The cost of obtaining such permits is very low.5
Next the area for survey must be located. Ordinary 
land methods for locating positions cannot be used but '
^The State of Texas charges $50 per active day of ! 
scientific sounding and requires that the conpany conduct-  ^
ing the geophysical operations provide free transportation,; 
lodging, and meals to the representatives of the Land Com­
mission and the Fish and Game Commission. General Land 
Office, Rules and Regulations Governing Geological. Geo­
physical and Other Surveys and Investigations in the Areas 
Within Tidewater Limits Within Jurisdiction of the State of 
Texas. December 1, 1953» p. 2. ------------ ---
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several methods are available that give acceptably accurate
positional surveys. Triangulation by the shoran, lorac, and
i
raydist methods, each a specialized type of radar, can plot j
i
a position up to one hundred miles with a tolerance of one | 
hundred feet.& These systems require two or more trans­
mitters on shore and a receiver on the survey ship. A spe- | 
cialized firm usually owns and operates the transmission
i -
systems, charging offshore clients a service fee of about |
I
,000 per month for each geophysical party using the serv- |
i  
I  
I
8
I 7
lice. A fourth system, the sonobuoy method, utilizes our
knowledge of the speed of sound in water to plot locations. 
Sonobuoy equipment is generally owned and operated by the 
exploring company.
The principal methods used in locating and mapping 
structures in the Gulf of Mexico favorable for the accumu­
lation of petroleum are magnetic, gravimetric, and seismic 
surveys. It is unfortunate that two relatively inexpensive 
exploration methods, aerial photography interpretation and 
: surface mapping, are of little use in the submerged lands.^
:   - - --   - — ■ ■ — ■ —- —....—   i
A  I
National Petroleum Council, Submerged Lands, p. 018,
1
7Ibid.
^Sonobuoys, or small sound wave detectors with radio 
transmitters attached, are anchored at known positions. The 
exploring party plots its position by setting off dynamite 
discharges and then recording the time it takes the radio 
wave from the sonobuoy to reach the ship.
^There has been a limited amount of "surface" geol­
ogy carried on byskin-diving geologists in the shallower
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The structures most sought after in the Gulf of 
Mexico are the buried salt domes. The magnetometer, gravi-
1
! meter, and seismograph have proved excellent tools for find-j
I i
Iing and outlining these salt domes. All three instruments j
jhave been used on land for many years and after some alter- I
i  ;
iation of equipment and techniques for marine geophysical 
! exploration, it was found that some marine operations could | 
be carried out faster and with less expense than comparable I
,
i 10I operations on land.
I The magnetometer, which registers continuously while
I I
being towed behind a boat or suspended from an airplane,
! ' I
measures the variations of magnetic intensity brought about
I  I
iby salt domes. The cost of marine magnetic surveying is not
iI
I found to be greater than land surveying with this 
I instrument
The gravimeter, a sensitive weighing device, helps 
to locate and define salt domes by recording variations of 
I  gravity around the dome. Salt has a specific gravity that 
I is somewhat less than the gravity of surrounding formations
waters of the Gulf of Mexico. In most cases, however, the i 
outcroppings are covered by thick deposits of silt, making | 
such methods difficult if not impossible.
^®To show the speed of modern geophysical methods, ; 
twenty salt domes were located in twenty weeks by two gravi­
meter parties operating on land. W. A. Ver Wiebe, North 
American Petroleum (Wichita, Kansas, ¥. A. Ver Wiebe, 1952);
p. 248.
11National Petroleum Council, Submerged Lands, p.
Eia. ---  -....   - - --- - - - --------
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Marine gravimeters may be lowered to the ocean floor, then 
leveled and read by remote control* Due to the difficulty 
of leveling in rough water or on a soft sea bottom, marine 
gravimetric surveying cannot match the speed of land opera­
tion* It is reported that surveying costs approach $120
1 O
I  per marine station as compared to $20 per land station*
I Reflection and refraction seismic surveying trace
the inclination of rock strata and their depth below the 
surface by recording and timing reverberations of artifi­
cially generated sound w a v e s A s  sound waves travel at 
different speeds throu^ different strata, it is possible 
to outline salt domes with considerable accuracy* Reflec­
tion seismic surveys, most used in marine operations to 
date, are less expensive and generally more precise than 
refraction surveys, though they often do not give as much 
information about the underground formations* In its most 
recent development, all of the shooting and recording equip­
ment can be operated from one ship and continuous recordings 
made while the vessel is underway*^^
IZlbid*. p. E13*
l^The reflection seismograph times the echo of an 
explosion going straight down and bouncing back* The re­
fraction seismograph times the refracted reverberations of 
an explosion some distance away from the instrument*
the one ship, continuous system developed by 
one geophysical firm, the seismic detectors are placed at 
intervals in a long, oil filled plastic hose, or streamer, 
that is attached to a reel at the stern of the ship* Just
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The total monthly cost of operating a marine seismic 
party is three or four times that of a land crew, but be­
cause of the speed and continuity of the marine operation, 
the productivity is five to seven times that of a normal 
land crew, even counting in the days of unfavorable weather 
io f f s h o r e .15 With proper scheduling of surveys so that long |
I and continuous lines can be run without interruption, the 
exploration cost per acre should be considerably less than |
I that for land surveys,1^ I
I  !
I  I
; Lease Acquisition Costs |
Once a promising structure is located the interested
i
i conpany or joint venture must acquire a lease from the gov- 
iernraental body concerned. The offshore leasing procedures 
used by Louisiana, Texas and the Federal Government, while
! before the shot is fired from a separate shooting cable, the 
I  reel is released and the streamer permitted to become motioh- 
I less' in the water. After the shot is recorded, the streamer ! 
i is reeled back to its original position. The ship never de|
: creases its forward speed. John ¥. Wilson, "Single Ship 
I Takes the Place of a Fleet," World Oil. June, 1954, p. 162.|
A, Boulware and E. D, Aicock, "Offshore Seis- | 
mographic Survey," World Petroleum. March, 194#, p. 6l. An! 
important advantage in marine seismic work is the ability 
to use explosives in water without having to drill shot 
holes, a time-consuming operation in land seismic surveyings
^^One of the larger offshore operators has found the 
cost per profile obtained by water-borne parties to be 75 
per cent of the coastal land belt profile cost. Dean A. Mc­
Gee, "Economics of Offshore Drilling in the Gulf of Mexico," 
Reprint of paper presented to the Division of Production, 
American Petroleum Institute, Chicago, Illinois, November 9,
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differing in detail, and similar in practice. From time to ; 
time these governmental units entertain nominations to make 
certain parcels of underwater land available for lease. 
Interested parties request that parcels containing their 
finds be included in the sale. So as not to show their 
hands, the prospective bidders commonly nominate a.larger 
area than they e3q)ect to bid on. They are not committed to • 
bid on these camouflage parcels, known as "scenery” or 
"whale pasture" in the industry, but only to guarantee that 
they will make a substantial bid in the general area,^?
TShen all nominations are in, the owning government 
works out the conditions of the sale and places the sug­
gested parcels up for competitive sealed bidding. The 
present practice is to leave the bid open at one end only,
i.e., to fix the minimum royalty and accept bids on the cash 
bonus. The leasing governments prefer this method whereby ! 
they will get some cash, even if the lease is dry,^°
The amounts bid in cash bonuses for offshore leases ; 
have mounted steadily since 1945, when Louisiana sold leases
^7Information on Texas leasing procedure obtained 
from the General Land Office, Austin, Texas; on Louisiana 
from State Land Office, Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
l^It must be noted that this procedure works in 
favor of the bidder with a plentiful supply of cash as 
against one who does not, but is perfectly willing to gamble 
with a heavier percentage of the product, in case he finds 
oil. However, any conçany with the financial ability to 
operate in the offshore area should have no difficulty in 
finding cash bonus money. The little operators stay on dry
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on 89,000 acres for an average of §5«13 per acre, Texas | 
and Louisiana averaged $36 per acre on the 1,839,932 acres | 
sold up to August 1, 1934.^^ In two sales held in late | 
1954 by the Federal Government, 46l,8?0 acres located in | 
the outer Continental Shelf brought $139,405 in bonus moneyjI
I or $302 per acre.^^ As of November 9, 1954, a total of 
I 2,301,802 acres of State and Federal submerged lands had 
been leased for $205,888,873• The average lease acquisition 
cost over the nine years has been $89 per acre.
While the lease acquisition cost per acre and the 
i totals paid to the leasing governments appear large, these'
: figures have little meaning unless compared with the cost 
of acquiring nearby onshore leases. No accurate data and 
few estimates are available on the sums that have been 
spent in acquiring onshore leases. It is known, however, 
that, in addition to the usually substantial lease bonuses, 
very large sums have been spent searching and securing 
titles, defending title suits, assembling and pooling small 
tracts, handling dsimage and drainage claims, and other costs 
that are not experienced when one lessor owns the entire I 
area. Over the years these additional costs may exceed the| 
cost of leasing and maintaining offshore acreage.
I9world Oil. August 1, 1954, p. 98,
ZOpersonal letter from Sidney M, Groom, Jr., Manager, 
Outer Continental Shelf Office, Bureau of Land Management, ! 
Department of the Interior, March 11, 1955.
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The successful bidder for an offshore lease received
I
a clean original title to a relatively large parcel of land.j 
ITexas lease blocks are of 64O acres each up to three miles | 
from shore and 1440 acres each from there to the Outer Con- j 
tinental Shelf. Louisiana leases up to 5000 acres in one | 
parcel.2^ Federal lease blocks are of 5760 acres each.^Z 
No lessor has established a limit as to the number of blocks 
that may be purchased by any one bidder.
Lease costs will probably continue to increase as 
more companies seek acreage in the offshore areas. Three 
; factors that would attract them there are:
1) The relatively large size of the lease block.
2) The freedom from title defenses and block assem­
bling.
3) The probable right to set their own well pattern 
instead of having to conform to offset conpeti- 
tive drilling as on land.
Granted certain necessary technological changes and probable 
incentives, the larger companies may well move out to sea. 
The long range costs of acquiring and maintaining offshore 
leases should not deviate greatly from those associated 
with onshore leases,
?
^^Hearings on S. 1901. p, 75,
2243 C.F.R. 201,3 (c).
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Marine Drilling Operations 
The only way to discover oil and gas on a lease, 
under present technology, is to drill a hole in the ground 
with a bit.- In offshore drilling the main problem has been 
cost. Economical methods had to be developed whereby cum­
bersome rotary drilling rigs could be supported out of the
j open waters of the ocean. The sea is a hard taskmaster and 
demands sturdy construction. Although the much publicized
i
I Gulf Coast hurricanes do not cause as much lost drilling
I  time as do the frequent line squalls and "northers," off­
shore installations must be designed to withstand any prob-
1 lem hurricane force.^3
I
While drilling over water is not an entirely new 
venture,previous experience could not be applied directly 
to open water drilling in the waves of the Gulf. For drill­
ing into promising submerged areas close to shore, methods 
developed many years ago in the California coastal oil 
fields can be adopted. Using directional drilling, in
^%cGee, O P. cit.. p. 5, points out that offshore 
drilling time lost due to weather conpares favorably with 
lost rig time on land. Mud, the constant enemy of onshore i 
rig operators, is no problem in offshore drilling and !
moving.
2^As early as 1894, extension wells from California! 
coastal fields were drilled from piers built out in the open 
ocean. The great Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela, oil fields 
were developed by drilling from fixed platforms in water up 
to one hundred feet in depth. Operations have been success­
fully conducted from drilling barges for a number of years 
in the Louisiana bayou and marsh country. All these opera­
tions were accomplished in relatively protected waters.__
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which the bit is slanted out under the ocean from rigs lo-
j
cated on the land, operators have hit the object target with 
remarkable accuracy, even with drift angles up to seventy- i 
five d e g r e e s . !
I Directional drilling has been incorporated into the
offshore drilling procedure, allowing several wells to be i
I ;
jdrilled and produced from one installation. Even so, the |
economies of multiple well operations from one platform are 
partially offset by the higher cost of directional drilling. 
While costs vary with the angle of drift required, the for­
mations encountered, and the degree of accuracy required, 
the per foot cost of directional drilling is reported to be, 
on the average, half again as expensive as vertical drill- 
ing. More footage of drilling is required in a directional 
well than in a straight well and directionally drilled wells 
are somewhat more expensive to maintain.^7 However, the 
additional cost of drilling and producing wells by the 
directional method is small conpared with the savings on 
[platform construction.
John Eastman, ’‘Producing Directionally Drilled 
Wells," World Oil. April, 1954, p. 234.
26personal interview with Otis Danielson, Chief , 
Drilling Engineer, Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc., Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma, July 5, 1954.
27Eastman, o p . cit.. p. 243. Operating expenses are 
reported to be about ten per cent more on directional wells ; 
than on straight wells.
133
Often shore bases must be established to supply the |
offshore platforms and barges. In remote areas where port |
facilities are not available, this involves constructing
supply depots and docks with cranes for handling the rela- |
itively heavy oil field equipment. These facilities must be |
I duplicated in part at the well site. The general experience 
I I
'has been that a shore base, once established, can supply |
many drilling operations in the adjacent ocean area. Under I
Ithese circumstances, only a portion of the shore base cost |
I  I
lean be charged to any one well. If drilling is successful, ; 
the shore base may be used for years to service the produc-! 
ing wells. |
j '  I
I Regardless of the type of drilling installation, an}
offshore operation must be supported by a small fleet of 
crew and cargo vessels to transport the drilling crews, 
supervisory personnel, and supplies between the shore base 
and the drilling location. One crewboat is required to 
stand by the scene of operations at all times to evacuate 
personnel in case of emergency.
Several operators have utilized helicopters to 
transport personnel and light supplies on regular schedules I
between land and specially built heliports on the drilling !
!
installation. This has resulted in savings on portal-to- 
portal pay, less overtime pay, better supervision, and less : 
down time for the rig while waiting for parts. If heli­
copter transportation is proved capable ofoperating in a^ ;
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kinds of weather, possibly smaller and less expensive plat-I
2.È 'forms and barges can be used.
Drilling Installations
Three general methods, of supporting the drilling rig
j I
I have been used in submerged land operations; 1) the self- |
I
I  contained platform, 2) the small platform combined with a 
drilling tender, and 3) the mobile, self-contained unit,
I  either submersible barge or elevated platform,
! Both from cost and operational standpoints, none of
: the three drilling devices are completely competitive in 
all water depths,^9 The submersible barge appears to be 
I the most economical method of drilling in waters up to forty
j  .
I feet in depth. The mobile elevated barges and platforms, 
because of their high initial cost, cannot compete with the 
submersible barge in waters of less than forty feet. The 
large, self-contained, fixed platform can be used in water 
up to 150 feet, but operations from these permanent struc­
tures would probably exceed the cost of and lack the
^^The S-55 helicopter is claimed to be capable of j
operating in winds of 60 miles per hour, with ceilings of |
300 feet and visibility of one mile. The S-55 helicopter ,
can transport an entire drilling crew in one load, J, C,
Craig, "Auxiliary Floating Equipment and Helicopters," 
paper presented at Spring Meeting of the Southwestern Dis- ; 
trict. Division of Production, American Petroleum Institute!, 
Houston, Texas, March 5, 1954 (mimeographed),
29personal interview with Ray Lacy, Shipbuilding 
Division, Bethlehem Steel Company, Beaumont, Texas, on 
March 6, 1955, He pointed out the platform methods could 
theoretically be used in waters 200 f eet . deep., .....  |
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flexibility of similar operations from mobile devices in I
I
any depth of water. The closest approach to a method com- I
petitive in all depths of water is found in the small plat-I
30form combined with a drilling tender, |
Self-Contained platform. At first, operators |
I mounted all drilling machinery, supplies, and crew quarters;
j  :
I  necessary to sustain extended drilling operations on one ; 
massive platform. The advantages in such a procedure are 
structural safety through size and the ability to continue 
operations in all but hurricane weather. The obvious dis­
advantages are great original cost and the expense of mov­
ing or salvaging the platform should the location prove non­
productive.^^
The largest structure of this type, the Humble 
Grande Isle platform, located in forty-five feet of water 
seaward of Louisiana, is 206 feet long, 110 feet wide, and 
the lowest deck is 35 feet above the mean low water mark; 
it has facilities for drilling one strai^t hole and six 
slanting holes and cost $1,250,000.^^
^%cGee, O P . cit.. p. 5.
^^he cost of moving a self-contained platform to 
another location has been estimated at 50 per cent of the 
original cost of the platform. National Petroleum Council,; 
Submerged Lands, p. C22.
32
Testimony of Mercer Parks, Humble Oil and Refin­
ing Conpany, before the Senate Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, Hearings on S. 1901. p. 82.
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Small platform with floating drilling tender. One i 
method of reducing platform costs in offshore drilling is | 
the use of a small platform, fifty feet by one hundred feet,!
I  to support the derrick and a minimum of drilling equipment, |
! i
and a barge or ship to contain auxiliary supplies and equip-j 
ment and to house the crews. The drilling tender is snubbed 
up to the platform and the auxiliary equipment intercon- ! 
nected with the drilling rig by hoses, cables, and ramps. 
Such a platform can be erected for around $300,000; if oper­
ations are unsuccessful, it can be moved and relocated for | 
approximately sixty per cent of its original cost.33 It isj 
reported that this general method has been used in 90 per 
cent of the offshore wells drilled to 1934.
^ The vessels used as drilling tenders have been 
either converted war-surplus LSTs and IF barges or custom 
constructed craft.33 in bad weather these vessels are 
moved to sheltered locations.36 Drilling operations must
33National Petroleum Council, Submerged Lands, p.
I 024.
34McGee, op. cit.. p. 3. !
33%n service or near completion on March 4, 1955, I  
were fifteen converted L.S.T.s, ten converted YF barges, 
and six new tenders. Personal interview, Jim Savage, 
Assistant Vice-President, Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc., i 
Houston, Texas, March 4, 1955.
36self propelled tenders may head for deeper waters; 
to ride out any storm. Most tenders, especially the war- ' 
surplus craft, do not have propulsion equipment that is 
; operational.       j
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crease when the tender is not attached to the platform.
The operators who bou^t surplus YF barges and LSTs 
were able to convert these craft to drilling tenders at a
I
total cost of from $700,000 to $1,500,000 each. New drill- i  
ing tenders of comparable size cost about $2,700,000 now
and are much more satisfactory operationally than the con- j
30 iverted tenders. As these special purpose ships may be |
used in the drilling of many wells during their working j
lives, only a portion of the acquisition cost need be
charged to any one well.
This method of offshore drilling is generally less
expensive than the large self-contained platform method.
The continuing popularity of the platform-tender combination
is attested by the orders being placed with shipyards for
new drilling tenders. Still, this drilling method suffers
from two inherent disadvantages. Operations cannot proceed
in rough weather and there is also the substantial cost of
erecting the fixed platform before the operator is certain
37As much as ten per cent of the drilling time may 
be lost due to unfavorable weather conditions. John M. I
Payne, "Mobile Units for Offshore Drilling," a paper pre- I
sented at the %)ring Meeting of the Southwestern District, ! 
Division of Production, American Petroleum Institute,
Houston, Texas, March 6, 1954, p. 29.
^%ational Petroleum Council, Submerged Lands, p.
026.
^^To further reduce costs, one company has mounted I 
two rigs on one platform. Both drilling rigs can be served 
by one tender. Oil and Gas Journal. January IS, 1954, p. Si.
13Ô
of successful exploratory wells. These disadvantages led tcj 
the development of methods in which a fixed platform is not j 
needed until production is accomplished and in which opera- | 
tions are not appreciably affected by weather. |
I Mobile drilling units. To cope with these two dis- |
!  I
I advantages mobile drilling units have been developed. These
I
■units can be grouped into three main categories: l) sub­
mersible barges, 2) mobile platforms, and 3) elevated
barges.40
Submersible drilling barges have a floating hull 
which, when flooded, rests on the bottom. In open water 
models, first used in 1952, fixed legs keep the drilling 
platform well out of the water. Drilling operations carriec. 
on to date have been highly successful in waters less than
40 feet deep.41 One submersible barge drilled 132,000 feet
of hole in a five month period, an average of 26,500 feet 
per month.42 The complete cost of one barge capable of 
drilling in forty feet of water was $1,750,000.43
A mobile platform differs from a submersible barge 
in that the drilling platform is mounted above the |
4^Classification from Payne, o p . cit.. p. 30,
4lMcGee, o p . cit.. p. 5.
42payne, op. cit.. p. 30.
43Houston Post. April 25, 1954. This barge was 
built for the Ocean Drilling and Exploration Company by the! 
AlexanderShipyard, New Orleans, Louisiana. ;
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submergibïe hull on extendable legs* The one mobile plat­
form so far completed can operate in waters up to one hun­
dred feet deep,^^ but plans have been completed for a model 
usable in two hundred feet of water. The one hundred foot 
model was built and equipped at a contract price of 
$4,250,000.45
I Elevated barges differ from the other two mobile
drilling craft in that the floating hull containing the 
drilling equipment is lifted out of the water on extendable 
legs. One barge, capable of drilling in one hundred feet of 
water, is now in use off the Louisiana coast.
Mobile drilling units do not answer all the problems 
of offshore drilling, but they may contribute to offshore 
development by lowering costs in shallow waters and provid­
ing economically feasible means for drilling in the deeper 
waters.47
Proposed methods of offshore drilling. The great 
potentialities of offshore oil development have stimulated
^^his mobile platform, named "Mr. Gus," was built 
by Bethlehem Steel Company for the C. G. Glasscock Drilling 
Company. The author was privileged to inspect this piece of 
equipment in the Beaumont, Texas, yard of the Bethlehem j 
Steel Company.
45fersonal interview with Ray Lacy, Bethlehem Steel ; 
Company, Beaumont, Texas, on March 5, 1955.
^^Personal interview, Jim Savage, Kerr-McGee Oil In-j- 
dustries. Inc., March 4, 1955. He indicated several more 
such barges are nearing completion. ;
47personal interview with Ray Lacy, March 5, 1955. i
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much engineering thou^t in the past decade. A few of the | 
plans will indicate trends of thought in attempts at solu- | 
tion of these new problems.
I
One plan envisions a giant sphere containing all the! 
drilling equipment to be submerged on the Gulf floor. If 
drilling were successful, a submarine gathering system or a | 
gathering platform would be erected. Servicing would be ;
i
carried out by personnel and equipment in portable diving 
b e l l s P r e s u m a b l y  such a unit could operate in waters | 
out to the edge of the Continental Shelf. The cost is |
unknown. I
j
Another plan calls for a recoverable tripod drilling 
platform with legs 724 feet long firmly grounded in the sea | 
bottom. Such a rig, if feasible, could drill out to the j 
edge of the Continental Shelf
In another plan the drilling rig and production 
equipment are placed on a floating foundation. The con­
ductor pipe from the surface of the water to the ocean floor
would be moderately flexible to permit some lateral movement
■ !
of the floating platform. The greatest difficulty would be| 
experienced in anchoring the platform to prevent undulation}
^^Houston Post. May 17, 1954o
i
1
^^Anthony Gibbon, ”New Techniques Await Resumption 
of Offshore Drilling,” World Oil. November, 1952, p. 166.
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under changing wave and load conditions,50
Nearer fruition is a project of the Gulf Oil Corpo­
ration for drilling in 300 feet of water. While no details 
have been released, speculations report that the unit will 
jbe a combination fixed platform and elevated barge, A plat? 
I  form 150 feet high would be erected on the ocean floor with|
I a giant elevated barge placed on top of the platform,
Future methods may bear no resemblance to current
practice,52
The Cost of Marine Drilling
In the nine years of drilling in a limited portion 
of the Gulf submerged lands, cost studies have been made, 
but they have been inconclusive,^^ Some operators hesitate
5%énry E, Gross, "Possibilities and Problems of 
Drilling Beyond the Continental Shelves," Transactions of 
the American Institute of Mechanical Engineers. Vol, 170, 
1947, p. 180,
^^Houston Post. May 17, 1954.
I 52^% interesting case in point is a proposal, sug-
I  gested for the California submerged lands, of sinking verti- 
: cal shafts into the earth on land and driving tunnels 
: laterally out under the ocean. The network of tunnels would 
: end in caissons large enough to hold electric drilling rigsl 
Each caisson rig, by directional drilling, could tap a | 
fairly wide area. Such a plan, because of the great ex­
pense, would only seem feasible where the petroleum deposits 
were clearly delineated. The techniques involved are 
familiar to mining engineers, however, and the bomb-proof 
aspects of such a plan cannot be ignored, Ed Lundburg,
"Oil City Under the Sea," Popular Mechanics. August, 1951, |
p. #6.
55lra H, Cram, Senior Vice-President, Continental 
Oil Company, had this to say: ", . .JC have worked a_
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to give out any cost information.^^
Offshore drilling costs vary widely, depending on 
such factors as the method of drilling used, the number of 
wells drilled from each location or platform, the depth of 
the well, and many other considerations. In drilling under-r
taken to date in the shallower waters of the Gulf, total |
I
costs per well are reported, to cite extremes, as equal to i 
costs for land wells^^ or as being five times greater than | 
the cost of counterpart land w e l l s . |  
Before comparing offshore to land drilling, it will 
be well to make a cost comparison of the various offshore 
drilling methods in use. McGee has provided data showing 
that an 11,000 foot dry hole in thirty-five feet of water 
would cost in 1954 an estimated $372,000 if drilled from a 
mobile device, $536,000 from a small platform and drilling 
tender, and $700,000 from a self-contained platform. Plat- 
I form costs account almost entirely for these cost
I lot of data on costs and decided that none of these figures 
were worth putting o u t L e t t e r  to the author, dated March 
17, 1955. Dean A. McGee, President, Kerr-McGee Oil Indus­
tries, Inc., says, . . it is impossible to arrive at a 
reasonable figure which would represent an overall offshore 
producing cost.** Letter to the author, dated March 31, 1955.
54one conç)any official, refusing to let the author 
see a cost study on his desk, frankly stated that his com­
pany was embarrassed to let others see how much money they 
had spent on so few wells. :
^%cGee, OP. cit.. p. 9.
!  '  i
56jjational Petroleum Council, Submerged Lands, p.
.037. .... ....... :_____        !
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differentials. The cost of a single completed well of |
11,000 feet in thirty-five feet of water is estimated to be |
I
$536,000 with a mobile device, $768,000 for the platform and 
tender combination, and $1,256,000 for the self-contained j  
platform {Table 7).5?
A cost comparison has been made for six completed |
wells of 11,000 feet in thirty-five feet of water by the |
three drilling methods (Table 8), The assumption is made
I
that the mobile devices would be moved from location to | 
location to drill vertical holes, rather than drilling direc 
tional holes from one location.5^ The average cost per | 
well would be $'535,600 if drilled by a mobile unit, $658,700 
from a small platform and tender, and $672,300 if a self- 
contained platform were used.
It can be seen that, for a development program of 
several wells within the reach of one platform, there is 
little cost differential between the three drilling methods 
in current use. For exploratory drilling, however, the
^%cGee, OP. cit.. p. 5. Account must be taken of 
the fact that the entire cost of the platforms in the last j 
two drilling methods was borne by the one well drilled from 
each. In practice, several wells would be drilled from 
each platform, thereby reducing the platform cost per well. 
The additional cost of directional drilling would be more 
than offset by the savings on platform construction.
^%t would be a point of indifference, costwise, 
whether directional wells were drilled from one location or 
vertical wells from several locations. The additional cost 
of directional drilling would about equal the cost of erect 
ing separate caissons, piling, and production platforms for 
vert 1 cal wells dralled by mobile—units*.— — ....— -- — - 
TABLE 7
COST GCMPARISON OF DRY HOLE AND COMPLETED WELL OF 11,000 FEET 
USING VARIOUS METHODS OF OFFSHORE DRILLING!
Item
Deep Water 
Barge or Mobile 
Platform
Minimum Platform 
and
Drilling Tender
Self
Contained
Platform
Platform 250,000 800,000
Caisson and guide piling 25,000 — — — --------
Rotary Drilling to 11,000 feet 201,000 2 3 6,aoo 199,300
Day work - ten days 57,500 47,500 35,000
Drilling casing, cementing, mud, 
logging, rental tools, and use 
of shore base facilities 114,000 1 1 4 ,0 0 0 1 1 4 ,0 0 0
Total dry hole cost, including platform 397,500 648,300 1 ,1 4 8 ,3 0 0
Less platform drilling salvage 25,000 1 1 2 ,5 0 0 360,000
Net dry hole cost for single well 372,500 535,800 7 8 8 ,3 0 0
Total dry hole cost, including platform 397,500 648,300 1 ,1 4 8 ,3 0 0
Day work in cong>letion-ten days 57,500 47,500 35,000
Oil string, casing, cementing, per­
forating, tubing, well head, packers, 
and miscellaneous equipment 72,600 72,600 72,600
Production platform a,000 -- — ——
Total completed single well cost 535,600 7 6 8 ,4 0 0 1 ,2 5 5 ,9 0 0
?
iSource: Dean A, McGee, "Economics of Offshore Drilling in the Gulf of Mexico,"
pp. 11, 12,
1As sûmes wat er, dep th „.of—thirt.yjrfi3te_Xe.et_and_19-54_cjosJuS_.„
” TABLE è
COST COMPARISON OF SIX COMPLETED WELLS OF 11,000 FEET 
USING VARIOUS METHODS OF OFFSHORE DRILLING^
Item
Deep Water 
Barge 
or 
Mobile 
Platform
Minimum
Platform
and
Drilling
Tender
Self-
Contained
Platform
Completed cost of single well (from Table 7) 535,600 768,400 1,255,900
Additional costs of drilling and completing 
five other wells:
Caissons, guide pilings, and production platforms 165,000 —— — —
Rotary drilling:
Vertical
Directional (150^ of vertical)
1,005,000
1,776,000 1,495,000
Day work-twenty days per well 
in drilling and completing 575,000 475,000 350,000
Casing, cementing, logging, mud, rental tools, 
well heads, share of shore base costs, 
and miscellaneous equipment 933,000 933,000 933,000
Total cost of six wells 3,213,600 3,952,400 4,003,900
'
Average cost of each well 535,600 658,700 672,300
M-P-
\_n
Source: Dean A. McGee, "Economics of Offshore Drilling in the Gulf of Mexico," p , 14.
^Assumes water depth of thirty-five feet and 1954 costs.
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mobile unit appears to have a decided cost advantage.
In comparing the cost per well offshore with com­
parable wells onshore, McGee has assembled representative 
data from thirty-five offshore wells in waters up to forty- 
three feet and twenty-eight inland w e l l s , ^9 From these |
data, McGee constructed the cost curves reproduced in Figure
I i
! 3. Admittedly, the curves are not completely dependable;
I still, they roughly reflect the comparative costs 
experienced.
Two significant points appear from the McGee cost 
study. First, at depths greater than 10,000 feet, the dif­
ference in offshore and onshore costs remain approximately 
constant. Thus, below 10,000 feet, the deeper the well, 
the less becomes the cost disadvantage of offshore drilling. 
Secondly, at depths of 5,000 feet and less, wells can be 
drilled from submersible barges at total costs not appreci­
ably greater than comparable wells on land. While the 
capital and operating costs are higher on the submersible
i
I barge rigs than on land rigs, much less preparatory expense
! is needed in rigging up the marine unit.&O
^^Of the thirty-five offshore wells, fifteen were 
drilled from a small platform and tender and twenty from a 
submersible barge. To enlarge the sample, a method was 
used that added the average completion costs to the dry 
holes in order that they might be included. Personal letter 
from William N, Mosley, Production Engineer, Kerr-McGee Oil|
Industries, Inc., April 1Ô, 1955. I
60a land rig often cannot be moved into location
until roads are _built, the ground leveled,_ and _the. pit s_  j
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The National Petroleum Council, in a study completed 
in 1953, found that offshore wells, both exploratory and | 
developmental, cost from two to five times as much as the
61 Isame type wells would cost on land. The study shows that ! 
ten offshore exploratory wells, averaging 11,000 feet,
I  I
!drilled from fixed platforms in sixty feet of water to test ; 
lone large structure, would cost $0,200,000, while ten on­
shore exploratory wells drilled to the same depth would cost 
$3,200,000.^2 Under these circumstances, the offshore cost^ 
per well were 2.6 times the cost of the onshore. A twenty 
well development program in sixty feet of water to depths 
averaging 11,000 feet would cost $14,045,000, as conpared to 
an estimated $4,9^0,000 for twenty similar wells drilled on 
l a n d . H e r e ,  the offshore cost would be 2.Ô times the land 
cost.
Although the industry is trying to evaluate the
[effect of water depth on cost of drilling, there is no agree
!
iment on the expected cost of drilling in waters of over one 
hundred feet. One authority expects that the platform cost
I
dug. Except where the rig can be skidded, it must be torn | 
down and reassembled between each well. i
^^National Petroleum Council, Submerged Lands, p.
037.
^^ Ibid.. p. C38. It is assumed that five platforms 
would be used to drill the ten wells and that there would be 
at least one productive well on each platform.
^^Ibid.. p. C43. The offshore cost includes four
, 3.^ j^C03^ HlS 0 - —■ — — -' - ~- —  — ----- ------  — ...
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will increase as a square of the depth of the water and thatj 
transportation costs will run directly in proportion to the 1 
idistance from the shore base to the well location. Other 
Idrilling costs will not be affected by the depth of the !
:water or the distance from land.^^ Another authority says
Î i
Ithat drilling between 120 feet and 200 feet will be quite as
; ! 
feasible as, and only slightly more expensive than, drilling
in waters shallower than 120 feet.^5 |
Since there has been no breakdown of onshore costs, !
I
exact comparison between the various aspects of onshore and |
offshore drilling activities can only be conjectura. In j
!
spite of the general agreement that the drilling cost per | 
well offshore is higher than the per well cost onshore, many 
industry spokesmen hesitate to accept those estimates as 
definitive. Certain mitigating factors may counteract the 
disadvantage shown by acceptance of the cost per well 
approximations.
This incongruous cost picture of higher absolute 
costs per well, yet comparable net costs per unit of pro­
duction, can be explained by taking into account the state 
of development in adjoining land areas and certain
Statement of Mercer H. Parks, Petroleum Engineer, 
Humble Oil and Refining Company, before the Interior and 
Insular Affairs Committee, United States Senate, Hearings 
on S. 1901. p. #4.
Statement attributed to Ben C. Belt, Vice Presi­
dent, Gulf Oil Conpany, Oil and Gas Journal. June 21, 1954,
p. 108.    . _____________
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institutional features peculiar to large scale offshore 
operations. The simple and easily drilled structures on 
land have already been discovered and tested for petroleum. 
To find additional deposits on shore now requires deeper and 
I more expensive drilling. The gloomier prospects of more 
expensive deeper drilling on land was one of the major
j
I factors that led the operators to turn their attention to 
the large virgin territory offshore. The Committee on Sub­
merged Lands Productive Capacity of the National Petroleum 
Council pointed this fact out in their statement;
Their /the operator^ decision to explore on the 
Continental Shelf is based on the conviction that on­
shore exploratory work along the Gulf Coast is reaching 
the point of diminishing returns and that offshore 
costs will be reduced materially by utilizing the tech­
nical "know how" gained from large scale operations 
particularly,in the developmental phases of offshore
operations,DO
The institutional features that partially offset 
the greater cost per well for marine as compared to land 
development are the result of the unique offshore ownership 
I  pattern. Larger leasing blocks with the virtual absence of 
offset drilling commitments, greater freedom for geological 
exploration, greater ease of establishing unit operations, 
among other factors, make development work more efficient 
and reduce the net cost per barrel of petroleum produced to 
a price somewhat lower than the absolute cost per well
66
0 4 ,  5.
National Petroleum Council, Submerged Lands, pp.
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figures would indicate.
Offshore Production Methods and Costs
Regardless of how efficient the drilling techniques 
become, unless the offshore petroleum can be lifted and 
transported to shore at a reasonable cost, the Continental 
Shelf fields will be priced out of the market. Production
and transportation costs appear to be somewhat higher than
I
the costs experienced in adjacent land areas. However, 
certain economies, such as the elimination of small leases
and the concentration of operations from several wells on |
I
one platform, serve to effect savings in offshore productioh.
The per well and per day operating costs tend to 
approach constancy, regardless of the producing rates. 
Depending on the area, until the daily production in any 
field reaches a daily volume of 1,500 to 4,000 barrels, the 
production costs are reported to be in excess of those on 
land.67
A problem encountered after drilling any oil well 
is that of deciding whether to complete the well for pro­
duction or abandon it. Drill stem tests may show a well to 
be good, bad, or indifferent. Many operators prefer that a 
well be very good or very bad, as the worst possible out­
come of any exploratory venture is the indifferent well.
^7McGee, o p . c i t . .  p .  7.
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known in the industry as a "teaser." The operator hesitates
to abandon the well uncompleted because it may.be more pro-;
1
ductive than drill stem tests indicate; he hestiates to |
incur the additional expense of completing the well as it |
may not pay out the cost of the completion, much less the 
drilling costs.
Because of the higher costs of marine oil production 
a well is not completed for production in the offshore un­
less it is very, very good. Exactly what constitutes a
"good" or "commercial" well is relative. One offshore
I
i operator recommends plugging and walking away from the I
: !
j  !
I smaller discoveries, i.e., wells that locate fields with an|
ultimate recovery of less than twenty-five million barrels 
Too, the productive life of each offshore well is 
shorter. Stripper wells making ten to fifteen barrels a 
day will rarely pay their way. The operating head of one 
large company recently bemoaned the fact that he was forced 
I to abandon some fifty to one hundred barrel a day offshore 
; wells making water, because it would cost $100,000 to work 
over each well.^9
Production and Storage 
After a drilling program is successfully completed,
^^Statement of Ben C. Belt, Oil and Gas Journal.
June 21, 1954, p . 109.
^^Cram, o n . c i t . .  p .  7 .
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facilities for handling the petroleum must be provided. I 
Flow lines must be laid from the wells to gathering.stations. 
Automatic safety equipment must be installed to protect life 
and property from the hazards of blowout, fire, storm, and !
; collision. The production personnel must be provided with 
living quarters, boats, and supplies,
I ;
Production costs, as this term is narrowly used in 
the oil industry, consist of the direct lifting costs,7^ 
jdepreciation, taxes, interest, and overhead, McGee has | 
jfound these costs to run from fifty cents to eighty cents 
per barrel in one fairly representative offshore area in ! 
:its early stages of production while comparable costs on- j 
shore run from thirty to forty cents per barrel.
Three basic methods of handling and storing the off- 
ishore production are now being used. In the first, all pro-
I
!duction facilities are mounted on the production platform. 
The petroleum is stored on the platform until it can be 
barged to shore. In the second, the oil flows or is pumped 
from the production platforms to centrally located gathering 
barges. Submersible tank battery barges have been developed 
that can be left on location in all but hurricane weather.
^^Direct lifting costs, in turn, consist of labor, 
maintenance, supplies, fuel, and lubricants necessary to 
lift the petroleum to the surface,
^iMcGee, op, cit,. p, 8. As these wells become 
older, less productive, and require more working over, the 
production costs are expected to rise.
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The third method consists of connecting the well to shore 
with an underwater pipeline. Commingled oil and gas can be 
sent throu^ the pipeline for separation, treatment, and 
storage on land. If the distances involved are not too 
igreat and the volume of oil and gas sufficient to justify
i
'the construction of a pipeline, the last method is reported 
to be the most economical of the three.
Transportation 
Oil produced from most of the offshore wells is now 
being carried to storage onshore in barges. This method is
' I
: relatively slow, difficult, and expensive. The necessity of 
I loading the oil at the offshore storage platform or barge 
land rehandling it when the barge reaches shore serves to 
increase the transportation cost from fifteen to twenty- 
five cents per b a r r e l . T h i s  compares rou^ly with the 
cost of gathering oil by truck for short hauls on land, | 
where pipeline connections are not available.
Natural gas does not lend itself to easy transport |
i
by surface craft. Special barges containing high-pressure |
3
containers for the gas have been developed, but this equip-' 
ment is relatively expensive. It is generally conceded 
that the laying of oil and gas pipelines is the ideal solu­
tion to the transportation problem in the offshore,' where
'^ ^ I b i d . . p .  6 .
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circumstances permit,
From an engineering point of view, the construction
of pipelines in the open waters of the Gulf does not appearj
to be much more difficult than in the swamplands of Louis- i
74iana or the mountainous terrain of Wyoming. The longest 
line laid in the Gulf taps production twenty-five miles
I  i
I from shore. Forty-eight miles of gathering line collected
the oil and gas from the scattered w e l l s T h e  cost of a i
I
properly laid and protected pipeline is reported to be fromj 
two to four times the cost of a similar line on land.?^ |
I
Summarv
The consensus of opinion among authorities on the | 
Continental Shelf development is that it costs more to drill, 
a well in the Gulf offshore than in the nearby coastal land 
areas. Geophysical operations may be less expensive off­
shore because of the greater productivity of relatively 
unimpeded seismic surveying. Present offshore lease costs 
! would seem to compare favorably with onshore ones. However;
; even with the best marine mobile drilling installation, thej
; .  I
cost of drilling a well 10,000 feet deep is approximately |
7^An elaborate gathering system in waters that 
average ninety feet has been in operation for some time in : 
the Tia Juana Field, Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela.
^^Oii and Gas Journal. September 13, 1954, p. 97. 
"^^artinus W. Mouton, The Continental Shelf, p. 29#.
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twice as much offshore as onshore. Added to that are the I
necessary expenses of transportation and storage for off- ;
j
shore production beyond the usual expenses incurred by land i 
operators. The total cost of offshore production per well j 
might be five times as much as the onshore total, ;
Granted that the costs per well are higher, it does | 
not follow that the costs per unit of production will neces-- 
sarily be higher. Several economies unique to Continental ;
Shelf operations serve to counter the hi^er costs per well,
!
To begin with, the offshore is a virgin territory, i
First rate structures that are relatively easy to find and |
!
test exist in great number. By use of highly efficient 
marine geophysical procedures, these promising formations 
can be located at a lower cost per structure than is pos-
I
jsible on land. Next, the leases can be acquired and main-
I
tained at what appears to be a relatively low cost. Because 
of the nature of the submerged land ownership and the large 
size of the leasing blocks, fewer wells are required to 
develop the structures found to be productive. The competi­
tive offset drilling often associated with land operations 
need not be present in the offshore.
While data are not available to show the effect of 
these special offshore economies on the cost per barrel of 
oil and per thousand cubic feet of gas, it can be inferred 
from the interest of many major companies in the submerged 
lands that the total costs per unit of production are not
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expected to exceed those on land, McGee optimistically 
states that offshore operations are very attractive at cur­
rent costs and that these costs are comparable now with 
those in some areas of the United States where exploration 
I and development are being aggressively pursued. Further­
more, McGee unequivocally contends that, "Drilling and
i
! operating costs /In the offshor^ can and will be reduced 
materially as experience is accumulated by the industry."77
'^'^McGee.  o p .  c i t . .  p .  9 .
: CHAPTER V
i
I RISKS AND INCENTIVES IN OFFSHORE OPERATIONS
I
Spokesmen for the petroleum industry have long pub­
licized the "risks’* inherent in the search for oil and gas,
!
I Trade associations have pointed out that the searchers in
I "I
I ei^t out of nine exploratory attenpts find no oil. Lay
I  readers are led to believe that this is the success record 
for all oil wells drilled. Fortunately, it is not. While 
thé petroleum trade associations make no attempt to publi­
cize the over-all success record, the industry has averaged 
approximately two successful wells out of each three wells 
drilled,2
In 1953 the chairman of the National Petroleum 
Council Committee on Submerged Lands Productive Capacity 
foresaw the possibility of a net loss for the oil industry 
in the offshore development. He pointed out that great : 
amounts of capital would have to be risked in exploration
^American Petroleum Institute, Searching For Oil; 
The Gamble That Pavs Off For You (New York: American
Petroleum Institute, 1953), p. 5,
2American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Facts and 
Figures (11th ed,; New York; American Petroleum Institute,
- — -— —  —  - - - - — ■— ■ - -—  ' ■ ■— — ' ■ —  — — — ,.
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and drilling, and these expenditures, with production, roy- } 
alty and lease bonus costs added, might exceed the value of ! 
the oil and gas produced over the entire operation.^ I
I Oilmen apparently use the word "risk* in different |
jways at different times, such uses being acceptable in turn |
I  I
to the statistician, the actuary, and the economist. Such
I  I
an observation suggests a convenient classification of risks
for the purpose of analysis in this study. |
The first class, the exploration and development |
i
risks, might be called "probabilities** by the statistician. | 
They are concerned with degree of success or failure in |
finding and producing offshore oil. The second group are 
the physical risks. These are the pure risks familiar to 
the actuary in which there is a chance of loss but no pos- 
Isible chance of gain. They include unforseen and fortuitous 
occurrences such as accidents, war damage and those commonly 
referred to as "Acts of God." The last class, the economic 
risks, refers to the potential profits or losses that may 
i accrue to the offshore oil and gas producers under the 
established institutional framework. These economic risks 
are primarily concerned with the institution of the market.i 
Granted that profits or losses will be influenced by the ! 
previously defined development and physical risks, the
^Report of L. S, Wescoat in National Petroleum 
Council, Submerged Lands Productive Capacity (Washington: 
National Petroleum Council, 1953), pp. 6-7.
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market risks could have the greatest effect on the profit- i
j ,
ability of the offshore development.
In light of the risks as defined, it is the purpose|
of this chapter to examine and analyze the nature and the
severity of these different risks and to ascertain what
factors, including incentives, tend to offset or minimize
ithem. An attempt will be made to show that, for the large !
:  I
established producing oil companies with diversified opera-|
I  j
jtions, the likelihood of financial loss may be negligible* {
I
! The Nature of Risk
Risk has been defined as "uncertainty in regard to 
I cost, loss, or damage"^ and includes both "the occurrence 
I  of results entirely unforseen as well as those imperfectly 
[allowed for. . Knight found the term "risk," as used
I in everyday speech, to mean two categorically different 
things. The first type of "risk" is capable of quantitative 
measurement and is not in effect an uncertainty at all.^ 
While a single situation might be regarded as uncertain, it 
may be converted into an effective certainty by adding
^Charles 0, Hardy, Risk and Risk Bearing (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1923J, p. 1.
^Frank H. Knight, "Risk," Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1934),
p. 392.
^Kni^t, Risk. Uncertainty, and Profit (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Coinpany, 1921), pp. 19-20.
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together a sufficient number of cases. The greater the 
number of cases that are added, following the statistical 
"law of large numbers," the less the uncertainty becomes.? i 
If an accurate quantitative knowledge of the probability of I  
every possible outcome is available, the losses from these 
combined ventures may be converted into fixed costs.° Thisi 
is the principle of insurance.
The chance of success of a large number of offshore 
drilling ventures cannot be measured with the degree of 
accuracy experienced, say, in the repeated flipping of a 
coin or the insuring of ten thousand lives. In each of 
these cases, the frequency distribution of the two possible 
outcomes of heads or tails and life or death can be ascer­
tained in advance within close limits. In the drilling of 
an oil well many shadings of success or failure are possible. 
The well may discover a highly productive oil field, paying 
out its costs many times, or it may be a completely dry |
hole. Most of the instances will fall between these two 
I  extremes.
Althou^ the degree of success of an extended oil 
development program is not capable of exact quantitative 
measurement, the drilling experience of the past has shown 
that a direct and surprisingly stable correlation exists
7lbid.. p. 46.
Ü lb id . .  p p .  198- 199.
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between the number of wells drilled and the quantity of oil ! 
discovered. The correlation is close enough so that, assum*- 
ing a sufficient number of cases, a diversified oil company 
should be able to ascertain within relatively close limits 
the amount of oil they could reasonably expect to discover I 
from a given amount of drilling, onshore, or offshore, Sucli 
a company, in effect, self-insures against the dry holes
that are sure to be a part of any extended drilling program!
I
The other form of "risk," or true uncertainty, does 
not lend itself to quantitative measurement. As it is not 
possible to predict the outcome of an individual case or 
even a group of cases with any degree of certainty, this 
type of risk is much more difficult to offset than the 
measurable risks,9 Knight suggests several possible ways 
in which these business uncertainties may be r e d u c e d .
First, they may be reduced by grouping or consolidation.
This method relies on the assumption that uncertainties
should be less in groups of cases than in single instances. 
In offshore oil operations, this would consist of combining
many drilling ventures into one operational program with a i
I
reasonable assurance that at least some of the ventures ! 
would be successful. Second, by geographical and opera­
tional diversification the consequences of unfavorable
9%bid.. p. 20.
lOlbid.. p. 239.
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contingencies may be diffused. In the offshore development| 
the normal dispersion of operations used in the search for | 
I oil should reduce considerably the chance of a random ill- ' 
’wind of fortune smiting all of the installations. Third, 
some of the risks may be passed on to specialists in the 
form of hedging contracts. For example, offshore operators! 
i  may be able to hedge part of the dry hole risk by giving 
shares in the wells to drilling contractors in payment for I  
their services. Last, true uncertainty may be reduced by 
I gaining a better knowledge of and securing some control 
over the future contingencies. New developments in the 
fields of meteorology, oceanography, geology, and engineer-
}
I ing may serve to help make the uncertainties more certain 
and more subject to human control,
Exploration and Development Risks 
The first risks to be examined deal with the un­
certainties of the productive process. Included in this 
category are the possibilities that the petroleum deposits | 
do not exist offshore in commercial quantities, that the | 
geologists and geophysicists will be unable to locate the |
I ■ . . ■ ■ ■ _  --------  T—r - r  —  ir '
llRardy, largely agreeing with Knight, maintains 
that, although it may not be possible to eliminate the loss’ 
or damage itself, much can be done to eliminate the uncer­
tainty concerning its time, place, or extent. The uncer­
tainties can be reduced or eliminated by preventing the 
harmful effects, where possible, and accumulating reserves ; 
to meet the risks when it is impossible to prevent the loss 
or damage. Hardy, o p . cit.. p, 10,
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deposits if they exist, and that the petroleum engineers | 
will not be able physically to recover these deposits with ;
a degree of success conducive to commercial development, |
Î
should they be located. It can be immediately noted that no 
Irisk of loss exists in the offshore area until funds are t 
expended on the development of the petroleum resources ex- | 
Ipected to exist therein. A frustrated hope or expectation | 
is not by itself a loss.
j The drilling of an individual oil well is a highly I
jspeculative operation.However, the only assured way of | 
finding new reserves is to bore holes in the earth. This | 
worthwhile procedure, called "wildcatting,** is the as sump- | 
tion of a speculative risk that must be shouldered by some 
persons or organizations within the economy if the new 
reserves are to be forthcoming.
Because drilling an individual oil well is a highly 
speculative venture, it does not follow that the production 
end of the petroleum industry constitutes a financially 
hazardous operation. The same relationship or, more 
correctly, lack of relationship can hold true for the indi­
vidual frma within the oil industry. Frank H. Knight said:
. . Risks which would be dangerous to producers on a
TO .
Hardy, o p . cit.. p. 125. Technically, oil explo­
ration cannot be called gambling,” as true gambling in­
volves the creation of an unnecessary risk and, by its 
nature, represents an economic loss to the community.
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small scale may lose their serious character for large scale 
enterprises, . ,
For a new firm with no established production, the :
! drilling of an exploratory well or a series of such wells |
jwould be very risky indeed. This firm could drill a dry ;
!
ihole, or series of dry holes, and go bankrupt. On the other
I hand, for a large oil company with established production I
and widely diversified exploratory operations, the tax lawsj
I and the law of averages turn the speculative risk of "wild-1 
! : 
catting" into a relatively safe investment. Larger com- |
panies do not stake their fortunes on the outcome of one
well, but rely on the probability of obtaining a reasonable j
ratio of success in many scattered wells.
It is maintained that the major producing companies,
using scientific geological and geophysical methods, modern
drilling and production methods, the depletion allowance,
and the ability to expense certain drilling and development
costs, take little if any risk,
!
I
Geology and Geophysics I
■ ■ ' ■ I
1
It has been established that oil, gas, and sulphur  ^
exist in considerable quantity in the submerged land areas ; 
seaward of the Gulf States, From the limited and widely
11
Frank H, Kni^t, "Risk," Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences (New York: The Macmillan Coup any, 1934),
p .  3 9 3 .
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scattered geophysical exploration that has been accomplished 
to date, empirical proof is forthcoming that the offshore 
j areas have about the same number of potential oil, gas, and :
! sulphur structures per square mile as the adjacent onshore 
areas have. Exploratory drilling has proved that about the i
! same number produce oil and gas as the structures located
I
{under land areas•
While the sciences of geology and geophysics cannot :
1
I  definitely locate where those resources are sure to be 
I  I
I  found, they can greatly increase the chances of success in |
; the search. By methods outlined in Chapter IT, the geolo- i
i gists and geophysicists locate underground structures that
I  may contain petroleum and/or sulphur. Unfortunately these
technicians cannot take a direct reading on the structure
and report either the presence or absence of the resources.
It remains the prerogative of the lowly drill bit to actu-
I  ally discover the deposit .
!
j The fact that the earth scientists cannot detect
I  the absence or presence of valuable resources trapped in
the structures does not detract from their useful function 
of reducing risk. By the use of technical advice, the ex­
ploratory operator can substantially reduce the number of 
dry holes, or, stated another way, reduce the risk that any 
particular hole will be dry. Dr. Frederic Lahee, in a 
study of exploratory wells drilled in 1953, found that 
wells located on technical advice were 2,5 times as
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successful as those located without such advice. Dr. Lahee*^ 
study shows that 11.9 per cent of the technically located 
exploratory wells were successful as compared to 4.7 per 
cent success for the exploratory wells located without the |
I help of geology and geophysics.Since the end of World 
|War II, or from 1946 through 1953# the technically located | 
wells have had 3.Ô times the success of non-technically ! 
located wells.15
Because of the expense and complexity of offshore |
I  '  ■ i
I operations, the development can be undertaken only by com- ; 
panies of considerable absolute size. The larger companies | 
lhave learned over the years to advance into virgin oil 
country behind a vanguard of geologists and geophysicists. 
jThe Continental Shelf is not a good province for the 
I"doodlebugger,” the operator who relies on intuition or on
I
I  a witch-hazel fork. The companies developing the submerged 
I lands have relied on the most advanced technical advice |
I  obtainable.
1 Drilling Technology |
1 I
As was developed in. Chapter IV, competent and ex­
perienced petroleum engineers state that a sizeable portion
l^Frederic H. Lahee, "Exploratory Drilling in 1953," 
Bulletin of the American Association of Petroleum Geologists. 
XXXVIII (June, 1954), p. 1231. ---
^^Lahee, Bulletin of the American Association of 
Petroleum Geologists. June issues, 1947-1954.
168
of the offshore petroleum can be recovered with known and 
proven drilling methods. They do not anticipate that tech­
nical problems will hold up the development of the deeper 
I  water areas. Cost, rather than the physical inability to 
I  locate and produce the petroleum, will be the main factor. ; 
I However, relative costs should tend to go down as the |
I !
! industry finds short-cuts and new methods in offshore |
d r i l l i n g . I
i !
In the drilling of any oil well, there are certain | 
I drilling hazards to plague the operator. Machinery failure 
lost circulation, obstructions in the hole, and other j
familiar mishaps of drilling can require expensive shut-
i
jdowns, fishing jobs, and even the loss of the hole. These 
I drilling hazards are not unique to offshore operations and
i
on both land and sea they can often be insured against by 
the process of contracting out the drilling. In the Con­
tinental Shelf area, several competent drilling contractors 
are ready, willing, and able to deliver "turnkey" jobs for 
a fixed price per foot of drilling.^?
^^estimony of Mercer Parks in Hearings on S. 1901.
p. 97.
l^The largest and most experienced of the offshore ; 
drilling contractors seem to be Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, ! 
Inc., of Oklahoma City, Loffland Brothers Co., of Tulsa, 
and Noble Drilling Corp., of Tulsa. The contractors preferj 
day work where the risk of delay or mishap is carried by 
the operator. Personal interview with Mr. Otis Danielson, % 
Chief Drilling Engineer, Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc., 
July 5, 1954.
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The Probability of Success in Drilling 
The probability of success in the drilling of oil 
wells cannot be based upon a priori probability, but must be 
analyzed from the standpoint of empirical probability. A |
j
priori probability deals with the occurrence pattern of
I
chance phenomena. Since offshore drillings cannot be class-f 
ified as chance happenings, as defined by statisticians, 
oilmen must rely empirically on past experience to get the I 
range of future probability. With empirical probability as 
la starting point, the oilmen can then use a priori reasoning 
to predict the future tolerance limits of expectation.
The petroleum industry has accumulated over the 
i years a large body of knowledge on the relationship of suc- 
!cessful wells to dry holes. That this relationship has
I
j been a relatively stable figure indicates that technological
I
I  improvements in finding new oil are almost offsetting the
increasing difficulty of finding suitable exploration areas
because of the increasing maturity of the American petroleum 
1 A
industry.
One of the leading oil consultants in the United 
States, Max W. Ball, has pointed out that the more oil the |
iSDavid D. Moore, "Role of Technology in the Future 
of Petroleum," (Unpublished report to the President’s j
Material Policy Commission, September 15, 1951), p. 3»
This report is now located in the files of the National 
Security Resources Board, Washington, D. C.
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oil industry finds, the less there remains to be found; but 
that the more that the industry finds, the more it learns 
to find more.
Experience has taught that certain things happen 
with a degree of certainty that can be depended on. In the 
absence of factors that would change the chances of occur­
rence, a reasonable assumption can be made that, given a 
large number of cases of physically similar phenomena, the 
future occurrence will not be much different from the past. 
This assumption has been made and used with a considerable 
Idegree of success in the search for oil by the petroleum 
industry. In 1952 the National Petroleum Council, using 
American Petroleum Institute statistics, stated:
The best evidence of the continued discovery of oil 
is the experience that discovery is in proportion to 
the exploratory effort and in the current high level of 
exploration. In the states in which extensive drilling 
was carried on during 1950, the number of oil and gas 
I discoveries was directly proportional to the number of 
exploratory w e l l s  .20
That this relationship is not an isolated case is 
i suggested by another statement of the National Petroleum 
I Council: • The rate of development of /petroleum/
ireserves has been in proportion to drilling during the past
^^Hearings on S. Res. 239. p. 69.
20
National Petroleum Council, Petroleum Productive 
Capacitv (Washington: National Petroleum Council, 1952J,
p. 58.
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quarter century of scientific exploration, without any downl 
ward t r e n d ;
In the ninety five years that have intervened be- | 
tween the completion of the first oil well in Titusville, i
Pennsylvania, and the end of 1953, 1,481,844 wells have 
been drilled in the United States. Of this number, 979,637 
were oil wells, 103,768 were gas wells, 368,177 were dry 
holes, and 30,263 were service wells drilled for the pur­
pose of injecting water or gas into underground formations 
Of all wells drilled in the United States since 1859, 
omitting service wells, 73.1 per cent have been successful,
i 21
i.e., completed as producing wells. ^
I During the eight .years from 1946 through 1953, a
I
! total of 310,545 oil and gas wells were drilled in the
I
United States, excluding service wells. Of this number 
200,206, or 64.5 per cent, were successful. During the 
most successful year, 1946, 70.2 per cent of the wells were 
producers. In the least successful year, 1952, 60.1 per 
cent of the wells were completed as producing wells. This
Zllbid.. p. 52.
ZZlmerican Petroleum Institute, Facts About Oil 
(New York: American Petroleum Institute, 1954J, pp. 4-5.
Z^The degree of success, of course, is another 
matter. Undoubtedly, many of these "successful" wells 
never paid out the investment made in them. Suffice to say 
that the well owners considered the prospects of potential 
production good enough to complete the wells for production.
1 7 2
decline can be accounted for partially by noting that the 
number of exploratory wells^^ as conpared to developmental 
wells^S increased during the period (Table 9). In 1946,
121,5 per cent of the total wells drilled were exploratory 
Iwells; in 1953, 27.7 per cent. As the exploratory wells 
I generally experience a lesser degree of success than the 
idevelopmental wells, the increase in exploratory drilling 
over the eight year period is reflected in the decreased 
I success of the total wells drilled.
I The relative success of the exploratory wells
: drilled in the eight year period remained about constant,
The average of success for the period was 19.4 per cent,
I
with a range from 18.3 per cent in 194& to 20,3 per cent in 
1947. The success of the developmental wells drilled from 
11946 through 1953 averaged 79.5 per cent, A slight decline 
trend can be detected in the success of these wells over 
the period. However, in spite of this decline, over three- 
fourths of the developmental wells drilled in any year founci 
petroleum (Table 9).
The statistics given thus far have been for the
^^Exploratory wells include new field wildcats on 
structures never before productive, deeper and shallower 
pool tests on structures already productive, and outpost 
tests drilled to extend partially developed pools,
^&ield or developmental wells are wells drilled to 
productive zones already roughly established by exploratory; 
drilling.
TABLE 9
RELATIVE SUCCESS OP EXPLORATORY, DEVE: 
DRILLED IN THE UNITED STATES, .
Year
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
Exploratory Wells
Number Number Per cent 
Drilled Successful Successful 
(Thousands)
5.8
6.8
8.0
9.1
10.3
1.1
1.4
1.5 
1.8 
2.0
19.8
20.3
18.3 
20.2 
19.5
Develop]
Number N
Drilled Sue 
(Thousand
21.2
24.1
29.3 
28.6 
31.7
1951
1952
1953
11.8
12.4
13.3
2.2
2.3
2.7
18.9
18.8
20.1
31.4
32.0
34.7
Total 77.5 15.0 19.4 233.0 1;
Source: Compiled from data in Frederic H. Lahee, Bulletii
June issues, 1947-1954, and American Petroleum Ii 
11th editions; New York: American Petroleum Insi
lB L E  9
LY, DEVELOPMENTAL AND TOTAL WELLS 
ITATES, ANNUALLY, 1946-1953
Developmental Wells 
id
Total Wells
Number Per cent Number Number Per cent
iccessful Successful Drilled Successful Successful
Ids) (Thousands)
17.8 83.9 27.0 18.9 70.2
19.9 82.5 30.9 21.3 68.8
23.8 81.1 37.3 25.2 67.6
23.0 80.4 37.6 24.8 65.9
25.2 79.5 42.0 27.3 64.8
24.2
24.4
26.9
77.2
76.2 
77.3
43.2
44.4
48.1
26.5 
26.7
29.5
61.3
60.1
61.6
185.2 79.5 310.5 200.2 64.5
Bulletin of the American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 
oleum Institute, Petroleum Facts and Figures.(9th, lOth and 
,eum Institute, n.d. ).
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entire United States* They may or may not be representative 
of the degree of success that can be expected in the Gulf 
of Mexico submerged lands. Fortunately, some statistical
!
I data are available on the relative success of exploratory 
I wells, developmental wells, and total wells in the area 
! adjacent to the submerged lands in the Gulf of Mexico. The
I  (
j  oil provinces known as the Texas Upper Gulf Coast and the 
Louisiana Gulf Coast are admirably suited as examples of
I
what could be expected in the offshore area. As a matter of 
fact, statistics on the Louisiana Gulf Coast include the 
offshore lands contiguous to Louisiana. I
Table 10 combines the statistics on the Texas Upper ; 
Gulf Coast and Louisiana Gulf Coast provinces gathered from 
year to year by the Committee on Statistics of Exploratory 
Drilling of the American Association of Petroleum Geologists.
I
The percentage of success on exploratory wells and total | 
wells along the Gulf Coast of Texas and Louisiana is roughlÿ
comparable to the national average. For the eight years |
I
from 1946 through 1953, the Gulf Coast exploratory wells 1 
have been 26.7 per cent successful and all wells have been ! 
63.9 per cent successful.
Offshore drilling has not proceeded far enough to 
draw any conclusions as to the ratio of producing wells to I 
dry holes. World War II and the Federal-State ownership 
controversy held drilling activity in the offshore area to ; 
a virtual standstill_for several years . From the .limited
TABLE 10
RELATIVE SUCCESS OF EXPLORATORY, DEVELOPMENTAL AN] 
IN UPPER GULP COAST OP TEXAS^ AND LOUISIAN]
Year Exploratory Wells
ANNUALLY, 1946-1953
Developmental W(
Number Number Per cent Number Number
Drilled Successful Successful Drilled Successful 1
1946 217 30 13.8 1,148 846
1947 353 80 22.7 1,167 919
1948 341 50 14.7 1,576 1,181
1949 620 180 29.0 1,642 1,283
1950 654 189 28.9 2,093 1,692
1951 755 221 29.3 1,804 1,432
1952 862 231 26.8 2,052 1,535
1953 1,047 315 30.1 2,314 1,744
Total 4,849 1,296 26.7 13,796 10,632
Source ; Compiled from data in Bulletin of the American Associati
The Texas Upper Gulf Coast area consists of twenty-nine counties 
Gulf of Mexico.
)
The Louisiana Gulf Coast area consists of the southmost thirty-e 
contiguous waters of the Gulf of Mexico,
TABLE 10
ÎATORY, DEVELOPMENTAL AND TOTAL WELLS DRILLED 
 ^OP TEXASl AND LOUISIANA GULP COAST,% 
ANNUALLY, 1946-1953
Developmental Wells Total Wells
13,796 10,632 77.1 18,645 11,928 63.9
Number Number Per cent Number Number Per cent
Drilled Successful Successful Drilled Successful Successful
1,148 846 73.7 1,365 876 64.2
1,167 919 78.7 1,520 999 65.7
1,576 1,181 74.9 1,917 1,231 64.2
1,642 1,283 78.1 2,262 1,463 64.7
2,093 1,692 84.1 2,747 1,881 68.5
1,804 1,432 79.4 2,559 1,653 64.6
2,052 1,535 74.8 2,914 1,766 60.6
2,314 1,744 75.4 3,361 2,059 61.3
r the American Association of Petroleum Geologists, June issues, 
of twenty-nine counties which partially adjoin Louisiana and the 
f the southmost thirty-eight parishes of Louisiana and the
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storms exceed these limits, for example, the October 1949 
h u r r i c a n e , 30 but to build structures able to withstand the 
greatest possible storms would be uneconomical, The realis­
tic solution worked out by operators has been to build the 
operational platform sufficiently high to clear all but 
freak waves and to let insurance take care of damage caused : 
by extraordinary occurrences
Blow-out and Fire 
The risks of blow-out, the forcing of the drill pipe;
I
casing, or drilling mud out of the hole by high gas pressure,
I
followed by rapid expulsion of oil and gas from the hole andj 
by possible consequent fire, are not unique to offshore 
operations. Fortunately blow-outs can rather safely be !
controlled with a combination of heavy drilling muds and 
blow-out preventers,32 Further, storm choke valves can be 
located below the ocean floor to shut in the well in case 
the platform is knocked down, A differential pressure drop
^ R, C, Farley and J, S, Leonard, "Gulf Hurricane," 
Oil and Gas Journal. February 23, 1950, p, 141. A drilling 
platform twenty-seven feet above the mean water level re­
ceived damage amounting to $205,600,
^^Personal interview with Otis Danielson, chief 
drilling engineer of Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc,, June
29, 1954.
^^Lester 0, Uren, Petroleum Production Engineering 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946), p. 602, Blow-out preventers
are pressure rams that can be closed on the drill pipe or 
casing.
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will actuate the valve.23
To combat fire risk, all equipment considered as 
sources of ignition are placed on platforms separate from 
the drilling and production platform.24 However, operators 
usually rely on the added protection of insurance to cope 
with these particular risks.
Collision
Although permission to erect platforms will be 
granted only when such structures in no serious way interfere 
with navigation, and even then, strict rules govern the 
placing of lights and fog horns,25 the risks of collision 
during a storm cannot be avoided. With a crippled steamer 
in the grip of unpredictable winds and sea, the master can 
only pray for "lots of water under the keel, miles to the 
nearest shoal, no ships about, and . . .  no unwatched im­
mobile drilling structures."26 case electronic
22Statement by Otis Danielson to author, June 29,
1954.
24john N. Donhaiser, "What’s Being Done About Off­
shore Safety," World Oil. June, 1954, P . 21Ô.
25The State of Texas has rules on this matter. Rule 
;N, Rules and Regulations Governing Drilling and Producing 
Operations in Coastal Waters. General Land Office. State of 
Texas, November 17, 1951, states; "In order to provide anple 
safeguards against collisions, proper signal lights or buoys 
shall be installed at, or in immediate vicinity of well and 
structures erected in the water. Signal lights shall be 
kept burning except during daylight hours." The U.S. Coast 
Guard has similar rules.
J, J, Tucker, "Those who Go Down to the Sea in 
Drilling Rigs," World Oil. November. 194&, p. 116.
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navigational aids fail to avert a collision, the damage 
caused by collision can be covered by insurance. Usually 
liability would fall on the shipowner rather than on the 
platform owner, for responsibility for avoiding collision 
goes to the party having mobility and control.
Enemy Action
Offshore platforms, storage tanks, and underwater 
pipelines would be extremely vulnerable to enemy action in 
time of war. Bomb, torpedo, shell, and depth charge attack 
I could do great damage to persons and property,^? Unfortu­
nately the hazards of an exposed physical position can not 
I be remedied, although naval and air protection might mini­
mize the risk. Financial protection from war damage would 
I probably become an obligation of the Federal government,30 
I Precedent for such action was established in both World
I Wars by the creation of the Bureau of War Risk in 1914 and j 
I I
I by the War Shipping Administration and the War Damage Corpo-|
I ration during World War 11,39
I 37such damage would go much further than the instal-
I lation itself as overflowing oil would damage fisheries, 
i  beaches, and harbors. See Mouton, o p . cit.. p , 307.
3&standard marine insurance contracts include war 
risk in the perils clause, but when war threatens or is 
declared the marine companies hasten to cancel this section. 
War risk coverage by private concerns is usually at pro­
hibitive premiums,
39gome authorities on insurance recommend that the 
government provide automatic indemnification for war damage, 
with costs shared on a nation-wide basis, John H , Magee,
lÔl
The Insuring of Offshore Operations 
Insurance is a stop-gap by which the offshore opera­
tor can purchase the difference between successful operation 
and possible failure due to physical hazards and can convert 
the possibility of property and liability losses into fixed I  
costs.Although the insurance industry hesitated at first 
to write policies for offshore petroleum operators, commit-i 
ments through liability, compensation, and floater policies |
drew them into fairly complete coverage. However, there is I
I
no standard form for offshore insurance contracts, each |
! being essentially the result of operator-underwriter |
! n e g o t i a t i o n s . i
The combined marine policies are commonly written |
: ' '  ^ ' 1 
with deductible clauses. The usual deduction in use on |
policies of this type is $10,000, or 2 1/2 per cent of the I
value at risk, whichever is g r e a t e r T h e  annual premium I
' ;
; General Insurance (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin,
fine., 1953J, p. 166.
E. Pike, "Off-Shore Drilling Coverage Reviewed;
I by the Underwriter," Journal of Commerce. June 5, 1950, p. 56,
^^Richard McKiddy, Director, Insurance Department,
IKerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc., in personal interview with 
I author, June 29, 1954, outlined how Kerr-McGee and Southern 
! Marine and Aviation Underwriters, Inc., of New Orleans, 
hammered out one marine policy to cover vessels, cargoes,
; platforms, drilling rigs, well completion equipment, and 
'submersible barges.
^%ary Schiflett, "Tidelahds Oil-Big Values, Unknown 
Risk-A Challenge in Specialty Insurance," The National 
Underwriter. March 4, 1954, P* 31.
1 Ô 2
is around 5 per cent of the amount at risk for drilling 
platforms and barges and 3 l/Z per cent for production 
platforms .4-3
Since physical risks may assume disaster proportions 
and since the Federal Government has acted under the concept 
of the public welfare in aiding individuals, companies, and | 
local governmental units in other areas of the economy by I 
insurance, loans, grants, and subsidies to alleviate dis- !
I
aster distress, it may be that offshore petroleum operators | 
will also receive Federal relief if disaster occurs, I
:  j
A review of the special physical hazards of offshore
i operations reveals that most of the risks can be either re- 
i  „  ]
duced by technological advances in petroleum, structural, j
: , 1 
i and safety engineering or passed on to others by means of I
: insurance, public and private. Further technological ad-
Ivances and more experienced underwriting of the risks may I
I bring future reductions.
r  ■ I
Market Risks
In a dynamic industrial society, the greatest risks : 
'are not those concerned with the technological processes of j
I !
physical production, but are those that have to do with the
K. Griffin, president of the Southern Marine 
and Aviation Underwriters, Inc., in personal letter dated 
July 15, 1954, stated that rates are expected to decline as 
operators gain more experience in marine operations and in­
surance carriers acquire familiarity with coverages involved.
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institution of the market. Long chaotic, the market situa­
tion of petroleum has been stabilized in recent years to a 
degree found in few other industries.
The Demand for Petroleum Products 
Most responsible authorities agree that demands for 
energy are on the increase. World Oil recently made a pre­
diction of 1975 crude oil demand. If domestic consumption 
increases by 300,000 barrels daily per year, its present 
increase rate, the United States will need 15 million bar­
rels daily in 1975.^^ The Présidentes Material Policy Com­
mission report in 1952 estimated domestic demand in 1975 at 
13,7 million barrels daily,^^
The sources for such demand may be found in a com­
plex of factors. Population experts suggest that by 1975 
ithe population of the United States may reach 206 million |
jpersons,^^ a 28 per cent increase over 1953. The increasing 
j  ■  ■  '  .  I
! mechanization of agriculture and the increasing use of roads
'and highways by a growing population indicate a greater |
quantity of petroleum to fuel the larger number of tractors,'
:________:_______________ :_______________________ _ l
^Warren L, Baker, "Hi^er Oil and Gas Producing ' 
iRates Lie Ahead of the U,S,, World Oil. July, 1954, p. 58, 
This increase would amount to three per cent per year,
^^President's Materials Policy Commission, Resources 
for Freedom. "The Outlook for Key Commodities," Vol, II 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), p, 129,
The 1953 domestic demand was 8,0 million barrels daily,
46u,SI Bureau of the Census, Current Population Re­
ports : Population Estimates Wo. 78. August 21, 1953» P« 2,
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automobiles, trucks, and busses. The emphasis on the air­
plane and on diesel fuels for railroads, the growth of the 
petrochemical i n d u s t r y , the probable doubling of con­
sumption of natural gas as a consequence of new pipeline 
connections with hitherto untapped population centers^^—  J
I
these among many support the estimates.
The Supply of Petroleum
If these estimates are correct, the question arises:
' j
where will the oil come from? In 194# Secretary of Defense |
■ ■ " ! 
James Forrestal stated "It now appears that the United
States military and civilian needs for a major war effort |
would exceed by at least 2,000,000 barrels a day the fore- |
I
seeable production from the continental United States."49 |
Another authority recently stated that even if imports are 
three times as high in 1975 as in 1953, or up to 3 million |
barrels a day, the United States will still need to produce|
i
domestically at least 10.9 million barrels of crude oil andi 
one million barrels of natural gasoline per day in 1975 to
^^American Petroleum Institute, Facts About Oil. p.| 
24, predicts that over 50 per cent of the nation’s chemicals 
will be produced from petroleum within the next decade,
4%orld Oil. July, 1954, p. 59.
^^U.S. Congress, Senate and House, Committees on 
the Judiciary, Joint Hearings on S, 19## and Similar House 
Bills, Both Cong,, 2d Sess, (Washington: Government Print­
ing Office, 194o), p. 605.
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meet the anticipated demand,50 One consultant to the Atomic 
Energy Commission has predicted that the peak for the domes-r 
tic production of oil will be reached by 1960,^^ The off­
shore oil fields are expected to supply a large part of the 
increased demand.
!
The Competition of Foreign Oil
At present, certain elements of the petroleum in­
dustry seem alarmed at the flow of foreign oil into the |
i ' !
domestic market. They maintain that the foreign oil is 
supplanting rather than supplementing the domestic supply,
' I
The basic problem is brou^t on by the difference in
f
production costs between the United States oil fields and | 
the newer foreign oil regions. In Venezuela and the Middle j  
East some institutional and geological factors have combined 
to permit low production costs. In both areas the single
! ownership of the minerals by the sovereign governments has i
! ■ i
(permitted well spacing to be dictated by engineering con­
siderations alone. The relatively large size of several of
^^VTarren L, Baker, op, cit «. p . 59. The 1953 
domestic oil production was 6,5 million barrels daily,
^^Palmer C, Putnam, Energy in the Future (New York: 
D, van Nostrand, 1953), p . I69, A decline in domestic pro­
duction after I960 will be caused, not by any lowering of 
demand, but by the exhaustion of economically recoverable 
reserves,
^^National Petroleum Council, Submerged Lands, p, 5.
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the principal foreign fields, 3^ the thickness of the oil 
producing zones,3^ and the unique fissured nature of some of 
the reservoir formations33 have permitted a high volume of 
production from a small number of wells.
The average well in Kuwait and Arabia is reported to
' !
produce better than 6,000 barrels per day, while the Vene- i
zuelan wells average around 200 barrels per day.56 This far!
i
.surpasses the daily production of 13 barrels for the average 
well in the United States.57
While the costs of production in these foreign 
fields are closely guarded business secrets, it is known 
that Persian Gulf oil enjoys a price advantage of approxi­
mately one dollar per barrel over East Texas oil delivered
53iphe recently developed Ghawar field of Saudi |
I Arabia is 72 miles long and 15 miles wide and has a pay sand 
1100 feet thick. This field is believed to extend another 58 
: miles in length. World Oil. May, 1954, p . 90.
54rhe Burgan field of Kuwait, second only to Ghawari 
; in potential production, has a producing zone 1000 feet I 
thick. Ibid.. p. 91. |
I 55The Massid-el-Suleman field of Iran has been effi--
I ciently produced with an average well spacing of two miles, i 
ior one well for each 2560 acres. U.S. Congress, Senate'and I 
House, Selected Committees on Small Business, The Third 
I World Petroleum Congress. Joint Committee Print, 82d Cong,, | 
2d Sess. (Washington: ' Government Printing Office, 1952), 
p. 19.
5%ines H. Baker, Oil Alert I (Houston; Humble Oil 
and Refining Company, 1954), P . S.
American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Facts and
Figures. 11th ed., p. 100.
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in the Port of New York.5^ One authority has estimated the 
actual cost of producing Middle East crude oil to be less 
than one-half of the average United States crude oil costs, 
with the Venezuelan crude costs being not much hi^er than 
those in the Persian Gulf.^^
It is obvious that the South American and Middle 
East oil could undersell domestic oil if the owners of the 
foreign oil chose to conpete on a price basis. Thus far, 
they have not so chosen.
Should the importing companies fail to restrict 
I  voluntarily the flow of imports, it is possible the United 
States Government would intervene. Military, political, and 
economic considerations could require that the "law of com­
parative advantage" be ignored. Under present laws, petro- 
jleum and petroleum products are free of duty, but are sub- 
jject to an import tax up to 10.5 cents per b a r r e l . T h e r e  
lare no import quotas in effect at this time.^^ However,
5^U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and | 
ilnsular Affairs, 03d Cong., 2d Sess., Report of the Minerals. 
iMaterials, and Fuel Economic Subcommittee on the Assessibil-' 
jitv of Strategic and Critical Materials to the tJnited States 
in Time of War or for Our Expanding Economy (Washington; '
IGovernment Printing Office, 1954J, p • 241.
^^P. H» 'Frankel, Essentials of Petroleum: A Kev to
Oil Economics (London; Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1946j, pp. 
1114-115.
^^Internal Revenue Code, Section 3422,
^^Personal letter from Donn N. Bent, Secretary, 
United States Tariff Commission, July 29, 1954.
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should the imports threaten to injure the domestic industry, 
the President of the United States is empowered to restrict 
imports under the "escape clause" written into all trade
62agreements concluded since 1942. Should the President 
fail to act, the Congress could step in and raise tariff
63 '
barriers or establish import quotas.
On the other hand, for diplomatic purposes, the i
United States may be forced to open its domestic market to i
i
Middle East oil. Should this course of action become im- I 
perative to keep the Middle East out of the Soviet clutches,; 
the high cost domestic producers, onshore and offshore, 
could find themselves priced out of the market.
The Competition of Other Energy Sources
Until recent years the natural petroleum industry 
has had only one important rival for the energy markets, the 
I coal industry. This battle for markets has been notably j
I one-sided, with oil and gas holding coal to no gain since |
I  ,
1913, while petroleum use increased elevenfold. ^ Unless
.  '  i
inew technological developments in the field of coal
I_____________________________________________ :______________ :
^^Trade Agreements Act of June 12, 1934, as amended '
in 1951.
^^Congress can regain direct control over tariff 
matters by allowing the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, which 
empowered the President to handle such matters, to expire 
when it comes up for renewal yearly.
64
American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Facts and 
Figures. 9th Edition, p. 117, and 11th Edition, p. 81,
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m i n i n g ^ 5  or utilization substantially reduce the relative 
cost of coal or unless the relative costs of petroleum in­
crease materially, the petroleum industry does not have much 
to fear from competition with bulk coal and manufactured gas.
In recent years, new threats to the supremacy of 
natural petroleum as an energy source have come from atomic I 
energy, solar energy, and synthetic liquid fuels. It is j
i
conceivable that rapid technological developments in these : 
new sources of energy could enable them to supplant petro- | 
leum in most of its uses long before the reserves of petro- ;
I
leum are exhausted. I
The Atomic Energy Commission expects nuclear power !
to be supplying electricity in the industrial field by
1960.66 However, due to the extremely high present cost of |
the fixed plant needed to utilize nuclear fuels, some
authorities believe that power from atomic fission will not |
|be cheap power.6? At least for the immediate future, it
lappears that fixed nuclear power plants will be utilized 
    ^ :
■'^ Experiments in coal gasification, in which coal is| 
Ifired underground and the gases brought to the surface, may ! 
leliminate the need to mine coal. The Bureau of Mines in 
Conjunction with the Alabama Power Coup any is working on a 
gasification project at Gorgas, Alabama. U.S. Department of 
the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Report of Investigations L9U.2 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p . 73.
66world Oil. June, 1954, p. 57.
67Gordon Dean, Report on the Atom (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1953 ), p . 153.
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principally in areas where other fuels are unavailable or 
very costly.However, rapid and radical technological 
developments may change the cost picture for nuclear energy 
at any time.
Because of the lack of continuity and reliability of 
the sunshine and the low recovery from known methods of
I
i
gathering the heat energy, the present use of solar energy | 
is limited to the occasional space heating of buildings,| 
Solar energy does not loom as a serious competitor of |
natural petroleum at this time.
Until recently gasoline and lubricating oil from 
i  crude petroleum have been in sole demand for road trans­
portation use because there were np equivalent products to 
energize and lubricate the internal combustion engine. This 
situation no longer exists.70 Rapid progress in the devel- |
opment of synthetic liquid fuels and lubricants has provided
I . !
I substitutes that are mechanically on par with the natural |
^^Putnam, op. cit.. p. 214.
I ^^Eugene Ayres and Charles A. Scarlott, Enerev
ISources-The Wealth of the World (New York: McGraw-Hill,
11952, pp. 19^-199. The maximum power recovery from an acre ! 
I of optical solar collectors in Arizona on an average annual 
basis would be fifty horsepower. To supply the present 
power needs of the United States would require the erection 
of optical collectors over an area of 50,000 square miles 
in Arizona. .
70Synthetic liquid fuels made from coal supplied 
almost half of the aircraft and motor fuels used in Germany
in 1944.
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petroleum products.71 From information gained in the opera­
tion of certain demonstration plants, the Bureau of Mines 
has established that certain types of motor fuels may be 
produced from oil shale at costs nearly competitive with the 
similar products from natural petroleum and from coal at j 
somewhat hi^er costs.72 I
Although this threat of potential competition from i
. ]
synthetic liquid fuels will face the petroleum industry from 
now on, the opinion is widely held that the synthetic fuels,; 
if not subsidized by government, will remain as high cost |
supplementary energy supplies, to be utilized only when the |
I
crude natural petroleum supply will not fill the demands of I
7 0  I
the nation. !
7^U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate & 
Foreign Commerce, Hearings on Fuel Investigation. 80th Cong;, 
2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), pi
912. The synthetic liquid fuel processes presently involved 
: are the hydrogenation of coal, known as the Bergius process^
: which is best suited for the production of high octane avia-- 
tion and motor gasoline; the gas-synthesis of coal, known as 
the Fischer-Tropsch process, best suited for lower grade I  
I gasoline and distillate fuels ; and the retorting of oil 
shale, a process that turns out heavy oil, usable almost as ! 
recovered for fuel oil and, after processing, as distillate!
'fuel and diesel oil, but not well suited for conversion into 
i higher-octane fuels,
^^U.8. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 
Report of Investigations 4942. pp. 31-39•
^^President^s Materials Policy Commission, Resources 
for Freedom. “The Outlook for Energy Sources,” Vol. Ill 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. B. The
National Petroleum Council found that "all methods of manu­
facturing synthetic liquid fuels proposed by the Bureau of 
Mines are definitely uneconomical under present conditions,”
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Incentives to the Offshore Oil Development
The petroleum industry has been aided greatly by the 
actions of government, both Federal and State. The benefits 
of tax incentives offered by the Federal Government and the 
price stability incident to the regulation of production by
the governments of the oil producing States are enjoyed by I
I
all oil producers, onshore and offshore. In the matter of 
production allowables, however, offshore operators have an 
advantage over their counterparts on land. The prorationing
, ■  I
authorities have seen fit in certain instances to permit | 
greater production quotas for the offshore wells. |
The combination of these favorable features in the |
tax and regulatory laws relating to oil production has done j
1
much to reduce the financial risk of such operations. |
Tax Incentives 
The Federal income tax structure includes two pro- | 
visions that greatly reduce the financial hazards in petro-j 
leum production. These are the percentage depletion allow-| 
ance?^ and the ability to "expense," or deduct from current 
income, the "intangible drilling and development c o s t s . i
National Petroleum Council, Final Report of the Committee on 
Svnthetic Liquid Fuels Production Costs (Washington; National 
Petroleum Council, 1953)» P« 10.
74lnternal Revenue Code,- Reg. Ill, Sec. 29.23 (m)-2, 
and Sec. 29.23 (m)-4.
75internal Revenue Code, Reg. Ill, Sec. 29.23 (m)
—1 ^ ( b )  .....
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The depletion allowance is an income tax deduction | 
given to wasting asset industries in an attempt to make up 
for the gradual exhaustion of the resource. The cost or 
"discovery value" of a property which decreases in direct 
relation to the rate of extraction of the asset is returned ; 
through depletion either at a statutory percentage of the 
gross income from the property or at a rate based on the
ratio of the value of the asset used up to the total asset
76 Ivalue.' The statutory percentage depletion allowance for
petroleum has been established by Congress at 27 1/2 per
cent. Each year the property owner may deduct from taxable
income this percentage of the gross income from the property,
with the limitation that the allowance cannot exceed 50 per
cent of the net income from the property.??
The percentage depletion allowance has no necessary
relationship to the cost of developing the property. As
I the owner can deduct from the Federal income tax base every
I year 2? 1/2 per cent of the gross income from the petroleum
produced, it is possible under certain circumstances to take
! in total depletion allowances, over the years, several
 ^ i
times the cost of the property. Congress designed the
"^^Arthur Anderson and Company, Oil and Gas Federal 
Income Tax Manual. Sixth Edition, January 1, 1950, p. 47.
77lnternal Revenue Code, Reg, 111, Sec, 2923 (m)-4. 
Periodic attacks on percentage depletion in Congress have 
been unsuccessful in eliminating or reducing the allowance.
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percentage depletion allowance as an incentive to the wild­
catter, The allowance was granted to help make up for the 
dry holes that are a part of any oil operator's lot in life. 
An intangible drilling and development cost, gen­
erally speaking, is an expenditure that has in itself no
i
salvage value. This would include the cost of drilling the |
hole, mud, wages, fuel, and hauling. The operator has the I
: ■ ! 
option of capitalizing these items or charging them to ex- |
7Ô Ipense during the year they are incurred. As capitalized !
intangible drilling and development costs are recoverable |
: ■  j
only through depletion and may not be depreciated, it is ;
:  .  I
generally considered poor business practice to capitalize
these items.79 All of the unrecovered costs of a dry hole j
■ i
may be expensed if the operator retains no interest in the | 
property.
I With the aid of these two special income tax pro-
I  visions, the operator with established production and un- !
I drilled leases need not pay any income taxes. The operator^ 
! individual or corporate, can "live" on the 2? 1/2 per cent 
I depletion allowance on the gross income from the property
j and expend the rest of the gross income remaining after
operating expenses on new holes. The latter procedure is 
known in the trade as "tax drilling,” If the operator is
7&Arthur Anderson and Company, op, cit.. p. 29, 
79ibid.. p, 50, .
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reasonably successful in finding new production, he will 
have new depletable assets and the process can go on
indefinitely.
Conservation and Price Stability
I
At the request of a substantial portion of the 
petroleum industry and with the blessings of the national 
government, the Interstate Oil Compact was formed in 1935. | 
The Compact now includes most of the inportant oil producing 
states.
Spokesmen for the Compact and the industry contend I  
that it was designed to prevent physical waste and can point 
to many achievements such as the reduction of gas flaring, 
the limitation of production to the maximum efficient with­
drawal rate, the elimination of much unnecessary offset 
drilling by the. wider spacing of wells, and the prevention | 
of premature abandonment of stripper wells. They uni­
formly insist that ho price fixing is intended in the con- | 
servation measures, althou^ frequently, as they point out,| 
price stability is an incidental and fortuitous by-product
âoThe depletion allowance and the right to expense 
intangibles was called **the sweetest combination in U.S. 
business" in "The Depletion Uproar," Fortune. April, 1950, 
p. 76.
^^Hines H, Baker, Achievements and Unsolved Problems 
in Oil and Gas Conservation, reprint of address delivered at 
meeting of Interstate Oil Coup any Commission, March 10,
1949 at Galveston, Texas, pp. 9-14.
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of proration of s u p p l y . i n  a reversal of the dictum of 
Adam Smith, by conscientiously endeavoring to promote the 
public welfare, the petroleum industry has furthered its
own "selfish interests.
For the purpose of this study, it is not necessary | 
to review this long controversy. A number of students of
I
the subject have pointed out that, as the permissible supply 
is based on estimated demand at the prevailing price, the '
workings of the Interstate Oil Compact can be understood s
! . ■ ' ' ' ' ! 
only in terms of a method of avoiding price fluctuations, i
especially downward. Instead of permitting prices to fall,
g,
the Compact member states have cut production. The pro­
ration of oil supply to the estimated market demand, what­
ever the motive, has the effect of stabilizing the price,
‘ If the price is stabilized, the most severe risk in business 
I is eliminated. In the words of Frank Knigjht: ". • . .In j
I a highly changeable or 'dynamic* society, the most unpre­
dictable element in the situation, or the greatest risk, ’ 
has to do with price changes rather than with the physical |
B. Fell, "Excess Oil Production Causes Waste,
: Oil For Today . . « And For Tomorrow (Oklahoma City: Intei^x
I state Oil Compact Commission, 1953^, p. 67.
^^George ¥. Stocking, "Stabilization of the Oil In­
dustry; Its Economic and Legal Effect," American Economic 
Review. Supp., March, 1933, p. 55.
^Slyron W. Watkins, Oil: Stabilization or Conserva­
tion (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937J, p*. 247. ”
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volume of production.
Under existing regulations, all of the petroleum 
producers in the Gulf of Mexico seaward of the shores of 
Texas and Louisiana receive the blessings of price stabili-; 
zation. The leases granted by Texas and Louisiana are pro-! 
rated to market demand by the Railroad Commission of Texas j 
and the Louisiana Department of Conservation, respectively. | 
The leases in the Outer Continental Shelf granted by the
I
Federal Government are prorated to market demand as directed
I
by the Secretary of the Interior. Federal regulations |
specifically define the "waste of oil and gas" as, among
'other things, "the production of oil or gas in excess of
transportation or marketing facilities or in excess of
Ô7reasonable market demand." |
Special Production Allowables 
The offshore wells in the area under the juris- '
I  I
diction of the Louisiana Department of Conservation, because
j
^%rank H. Kni^t, "Risk," Encyclopaedia of the ;
! Social Sciences, p. 392. |
! :
To prevent duplication of proration authorities, 
the Department of the Interior has authorized the States of 
Texas and Louisiana to establish the allowable production 
for all wells drilled on Federal leases seaward of those 
States. Letter from Sidney M. Groom, Jr., Manager, Outer 
Continental Shelf Office, Bureau of Land Management, New 
Orleans, Louisiana, dated May 6, 1955.
^^U.S. Department of the Interior, Leasing and 
Operating Regulations for the Submerged Lands of the Con­
tinental Shelf. May 8. 1954. 30 C.F.R. 250.2 (h)[k).
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of the increased cost incident to offshore drilling opera­
tions, have received special consideration on allowable 
production* The Department of Conservation gave all wells 
not otherwise prorated by special order the following 
allowables:
Daily Well
Depth Allowable ( Bi
Offshore
0-2,000 151
2-3,000 162
3-4,000 174
4-5,000 185
5-6,000 202
6-7,000 219
7-8,000 242
8-9,000 265
9-10,000 288
10-11,000 311
11-12,000 333
12-13,000 356
Below 13,000 385
Daily Well 
Allowable(BPD) 
Onshore
46
I
91
106
122
136
156
177
198
218
246
The Department of Conservation found that, due to
I  ;
I  the nature of the offshore development, where fewer wells |
j
are needed to produce from a reservoir of given size and |
I
characteristics than would be the case in comparable land
j
operations, a larger allowable per well could be assigned 
to each offshore well without causing underground waste or ; 
inequity.
The President of Standard Oil Coup any of California
^^Department of Conservation, State of Louisiana, 
Order No. 151: Order Concerning the Per Well Allowable for
Wells Completed in Offshore Reservoirs. September 24. 19A8. 
as amended by Production and Proration Order No. 7. Effec­
tive July 1. 1954. Dated June 23, 1954.
•  e  •
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had this to say about the production allowables:
. . .  In order that the return from the sale of 
oil might be counted on to pay out the large investment ; 
required to bring them / n e w field^ into production . . ; 
. it is necessary • « . that State and Federal régula- ; 
tory bodies continue to recognize this economic reality,; 
as the State of Louisiana has done, and set allowables I  
for the offshore fields which are h i ^  e n o u g h . j
The State of Texas, at the present time, does not 
have a fixed special allowable for offshore wells. The 
Railroad Commission of Texas has a scale of allowables for 
discovery wells, both onshore and offshore.After the 
completion of the sixth well in a field or the expiration 
of eighteen months, whichever comes sooner, the wells are 
assigned a yardstick allowable based on twenty acre incre­
ments until such time as a hearing can be held to establish 
'the most efficient rate of production for the wells in the 
f i e l d . A t  this hearing, the Railroad Commission is ableI !
; to make special dispensation for offshore wells in order to ; 
I help make up for the additional cost of offshore operationsj
j  j
iif such action seems appropriate.
'   I
s. Peterson, "New Horizons," a paper presented! 
I  before the joint session of the American Association of 
jPetroleum Geologists, the Society of Exploratory Geophysi- I 
I  cists, and the Society of Economic Paleontologists and 
iMinerologists, St. Louis, Missouri, April 13, 1954. Re­
printed as a pamphlet.
90jiailroad Commission of Texas, Special Order No. 
20-17.S49. dated March 20, 1950.
91personal letter from Harry M. Batis, Chief Super­
visor, Oil and Gas Division, Railroad Commission of Texas, 
July 9, 1954.
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The wells on Federal leases are prorated by the ad­
jacent States, Therefore, Outer Continental Shelf wells 
seaward of Louisiana receive the special allowable offered 
by that State; those off Texas may receive special consider^ 
ation by the Texas Railroad Commission. |
t
Such action by the regulating authorities seems 
reasonable and equitable. As fewer wells are needed to
I
efficiently produce a given structure than would be required
on land, a larger allowable per well offshore may result in i
roughly the same production from the reservoir as would be |
: ■ I
permitted from an onshore reservoir. The higher production!
: I
allowables serve to help the offshore operator recover his 
initial investment more rapidly, thereby greatly decreasing j 
the financial risk,
Summarv
I
I  There are three kinds of risk involved in offshore
!
I oil operations . The first type is concerned with the
I '
probabilities of locating oil in any development program -
: undertaken. Geologists and petroleum engineers feel assured
! that oil exists in the submerged lands and can be recovered
I
I by known methods. Diversification of drilling operations 
and the law of averages in an extensive development program 
greatly lessen the dry hole risk. The second group of 
risks involves the physical hazards of wind, wave, fire, 
blow-out, collision, and enemy action. These hazards for
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the most part can be offset by marine and casualty insurance. 
Lastly, there are the institutional risks of the market 
reception of the offshore oil and gas and the actions of 
government •
The market demand for oil and gas has increased 1 
steadily in the past and there is reason to believe that the
: ' I
demand will continue to grow in the future. Petroleum I
i
products, it is believed, will play an increasingly larger !
. . !..
part in the needs of the larger economy of the future. Off-r 
shore operations should supply a substantial portion of the 
oil and gas to fill the increasing needs. While imported 
petroleum products, synthetic petroleum substitutes, and 
! nuclear energy will possibly supply at least a portion of 
the energy market in the future, it is presently believed 
that these products will be used to supplement, rather than 
supplant, the domestic natural petroleum. However, should 
IMiddle East oil be imported into the domestic market in 
; great quantity or should rapid technical developments in | 
i  nuclear power radically lower the production cost of nucleaij
ienergy, the domestic petroleum industry would be forced to I
! ■ :
I make an agonizing reappraisal.
For the most part, government action has been 
directed at stimulating and protecting the petroleum in­
dustry. Tax incentives, proration of production with the 
resultant stabilization of prices, and, in the case of off­
shore operations, increased production quotas, have tendered
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many of the winds of adversity on the offshore operators.
It appears that the favorable factors combine to 
offset the three categories of risk to a degree sufficient 
to permit successful offshore operations. At least, it 
seems that the operators believe that this possibility | 
exists, or they would not be so industriously engaged in thé 
waters of the Gulf of Mexico, If the overall "risk" picture
i
looked bleak, i.e., the profit expectations poor or non­
existent, the operators would certainly be conducting their 
search for oil in drier and more promising areas. As
: Senator George W, Malone has noted, they are not turning in
Q2their offshore leases,^
Certainly, with the outcome of a large number of 
I drilling ventures known, with the aid of insurance to ward 
I off physical catastrophe, with an ever-expanding home mar- 
I ket, with the help of tax incentives, and with prices 
I stabilized by proration, the large oil companies engaged in 
i  the offshore development are in a less "risky" situation 
I  than are many of their counterparts in other lines of 
I endeavor,,
^%earings on S. 1901. p, 108,
CHAPTER VI i
I
LEASING METHODS AND GOVERNMENTAL CONTROLS
!
Oil development in the upland areas of the United | 
States has been characterized by economic waste arising from
the atomized landownership pattern* As a result there have i
!
Ibeen many squabbles over land ownership and many needless | 
wells drilled, merely to comply with offset drilling re- 
:quirements * This situation can be remedied if the attrac­
tive aspects of oil development abroad are adopted in the 
Continental Shelf development. In many areas of the Middle
IEast and South America it has been possible for a single
1 !operator to acquire oil rights covering extensive tracts* |
: j
I Here petroleum engineers have had a chance to show what can i
!be done in efficiently draining large oil reservoirs. In a I
i  I
•few land areas in the United States, notably on large 1
' i  i
I ranches in the Western States and in the marsh lands of
•Louisiana, the ownership patterns have permitted development
with little regard for boundary lines* The Continental
Shelf offers the opportunity to develop oil pools as natural
4he Kirkuk Field in the Middle East is located in a 
concession covering 32,000 square miles* Concessions in 
Colombia are as-large as 494,000. acres .
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units, if only the institutional rigidities that have pre­
vailed in most upland operations are not extended into the 
Gulf.
As was pointed out in Chapter II, the greater part I
of the oil industry seemed to favor State ownership of the i
submerged lands. Proponents of Federal ownership contended|
that oil companies figured they could acquire more favorable
terms from the States;^ proponents of State ownership vowed I 
' ' ■ ! 
that the States extracted much harsher terms from the !
.  I
i lessees than did the Federal Government.-^ The latter could j
I ■ I
: only guess at the cost and restrictiveness of Federal leases
: I
; in the offshore for, until August 1953, no applicable leas-|
I ing statute covered this area. If they used the Federal 
I statute dealing with oil and gas leases on the public domain 
I  as their guide, they found support for their claim that
iFederal leases were less costly than State leases. Because:
I  I
I most of the attacks on the oil industry in the past had |
i o
i  '^Testimony of 0, A. Knight, C.I.O., Hearings on S.Ji
' Res. 13. p. 446. Also Marion Clawson, Uncle Sam*s Acres 
I(New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1951), p* 334. Clawson;
I  averred: "Most people who have raised the state vs. federal!
I claim have really had in mind . , , , a desire to obtain 
I from state administration a more favorable deal for them- 
I selves than they can get from the federal administration,"
^Statement of Price Daniel, United States Senator,
! Hearings on S.J. Res. 13. pp. 209-210. Senator Daniel main- 
I tained that the entire Federal-State controversy was started 
when certain persons, colorfully called "claim jumpers," 
filed for Federal leases at fifty cents per acre under the 
Federal Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 on producing properties 
located in the California offshore.
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emanated from Washington, not from Austin or Baton Rouge, 
and because of the lack of knowledge of how harsh the new 
Federal offshore leasing statute would be, the larger oil 
companies sought’to perpetuate State leasing of the sub­
merged lands.
In order to gain a picture of the conditions in
1952-1953 as well as those today in leasing and supervisory I 
:  i
control, comparison will be made of the leasing laws of !
Texas and Louisiana in 1953 with the Federal Mineral Leasing
Act of I92O; then comparison will be made of present régula
jtion, both State and Federal.
Leasing Procedure
Oil and Gas Leases 
An oil and gas lease conveys certain rights in !
realty to the lessee. In the leasing of both private and |
I  I
'.public lands, the lessee has the exclusive right to prospect;
jfor, produce, and take the petroleum from the area under 
lease for a stated period of time and as long thereafter as | 
oil and/or gas can be produced in commercial quantities,
Jin consideration for this lease the lessee contracts to pay, 
in the absence of production, a periodic delay rental, and 
if production is accomplished, a stated percentage of the 
petroleum produced, known as royalty. All the expenses of 
operation are borne by the lessee. As additional consider­
ation, the -lessee- may also pay the landowner an initial cash
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bonus. Furthermore, oil and gas leases generally contain 
express or implied covenants, whereby the lessee is required 
to drill and produce such wells as are necessary to protect j 
the lessor from loss by reason of production on adjacent 
properties and to drill and produce such other wells as may |
j
reasonably be required to develop the property in an orderl]| 
and timely manner, i
Within this general lease framework, there is much ; 
room for variation. Differences can be found in the royaltj^ 
^percentage, the annual delay rental, the cash bonus payment,
I and the drilling requirements. In the case at hand, the 
landowner is also the sovereign government of the area in­
volved with the taxing and regulatory powers incident to the 
exercise of sovereignty. The degree and severity of the
; taxation and regulation enforced by the owning governmental I 
I I
junit can also vary within wide limits, |
With these variables, it is difficult to compare |
itwo leases under different leasing provisions or under dif-!
I .  I
ferent governmental jurisdictions. It cannot be stated
I  definitely that a high royalty and low cash bonus on the 
I ■  :
Ileases of one governmental owner will bring a greater total i
Iincome over the years than a low royalty and high cash bonus 
will bring to another owning government. The total income 
to each landowner will be known only when the last unit of 
oil and gas is produced. The various claims of the land­
owners cannot be reduced to the common denominator of money
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until the final tabulation.
The Federal Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 
The leasing of public lands in America is a rela­
tively recent innovation.^ The big problem until almost the 
close of the 19th Century^ was one of securing settlers to ;
bring the unclaimed lands into useful production. Accord- !
: ’ I
ingly, to encourage settlement and development, land was j
; given away or sold at nominal prices (largely by the Federal
Government), with no proprietary ri^ts reserved in the }
' 6 I; alienated lands. |
The Mining Law of 1Ô72, known as the Placer Act, j
: . i
originally passed with metallic minerals in mind, was 
! applied to the development of petroleum when that mineral
! . I
was discovered on public lands near the turn of the century!
j
i  Under certain conditions the discoverer of a mineral lode !
I could get clear title to the property. In the case of oil 
i it was necessary for the wildcatter to drill and discover
I
petroleum deposits on each claim before valid title to the
40ne exception, an act passed in 1807, provided for; 
the leasing of federally owned lead miles in Indiana. The : 
leasing operations were not successful and this act was 
repealed in 1847. Marion Clawson, o p . cit.. p . 75.
^Frederick Jackson Turner placed the close of the 
frontier at 1893.
^exas, alone among the western states, retained 
all of the unpatented lands within its boundaries when 
entering the United States.
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property could be obtained.? During the expensive and time-r 
consuming drilling operations the interest of the petroleum 
prospector in the property was indefinite and insecure. As : 
a result, the development of petroleum in the public domain | 
was anything but orderly and economical.
In an attenpt to remedy the many deficiencies in ths 
Placer Act, Congress passed the Federal Mineral Leasing Act j 
in 1920. It was a compromise measure, attempting to recon­
cile the various regional and economic interests concerned 
with the utilization of the public lands. Here, for the 
; first time, the Federal Government made large scale pro-
i
vision for leasing public land, rather than selling it or 
giving it away.
As applied to petroleum, the Act provided for the 
issuance of prospecting permits that granted the exclusive 
;ri^t to explore for oil and gas on specific areas up to 
12,560 acres for a period of two years. If the permittee 
; was successful in producing petroleum in commercial quanti­
ties, the law rewarded him with a lease on one-fourth of the 
I area included in the permit, or one square mile, with a
I
I  royalty of five per cent. The discoverer also received
I
ipreferential right to lease the remainder of the area con­
tained in the prospecting permit at a royalty rate and cash
"^After discovery, the land could be patented for $5 
per acre. However, no claim could exceed I5OO feet by 600 
feet in dimensions.
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bonus payment to be established by competitive bidding. The 
principal disadvantage of the permit system, from the point; 
of view of the permittee, was that it required that drilling 
operations be started within six months after the permit was 
issued. To maintain the permit in good standing, the per- i 
mittee had to pursue a stipulated developmental schedule | 
during subsequent periods, |
Later amendments to the Leasing Act had the effect ; 
of abandoning the permit system apd substituting a form of ;
lease,^  The "competitive lease,** available on lands within I
: !
' known geologic structures, remained about as before, but j
the "non-competitive lease," applicable to lands not within:
: known geologic structures, enabled the first qualified I 
: !
; applicant to secure five year leases on all of the land in |
: I
: any lease blocks desired, up to an established statutory ;
I acreage limitation. The non-competitive lease had no drillr 
I ing requirements and could be extended at the option of the!
I  ■■ j
I leaseholder for an additional five years. The only payment!
called for in this type of lease was an advance rental of
! fifty cents per acre for the first year and smaller rental | 
j  ■  I
I payments in subsequent years. The royalty was established
at 12 1/2 per cent.
The Secretary of the Interior had no discretion in
the issuance of the non-competitive leases. The law
^Public Law 297s, 74th Cong, (1935) and Public Law 
696, 79th Cong, (1946). This is the procedure in use tqday.
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specifically stated that the first qualified person making 
application for a lease "shall be entitled to a lease of 
such lands without competitive bidding."^ While the Secre­
tary was required to lease any lands applied for, he did 
have the authority to raise the rental payments above the 
minimum in the issuance of hew leases.
For the operator the non-competitive lease method 
had three main advantages over the permit system in use 
from 1920 to 1935, and for that matter over most private 
leases:
1. The leases were inexpensive. An operator could 
carry a large inventory of prospective oil land 
at nominal cost.
2. There were no drilling requirements.
3. The lessee had a preferential right to renew 
the lease to a total of ten years.
This is not to say that members of the oil industry 
have had no criticism of the Federal Mineral Leasing Act.
As a matter of fact, the Act has been under fire from the 
industry most of its career. The first major revision of 
the Act was accomplished in 1946^^ with the blessings of 
the industry and officials of the Department of the Inte­
rior. This amendment removed many of the inequities and
^Public Law 696, 79th Cong. (1946), Sec. 3»
^^60 Stat 950, 30 U.8.C., Sec. iSl, et sea.
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brought the law up to date in certain respects, but'it 
failed to remove the sources of three major objections on 
the part of the oil industry;
1. The limitation on acreage.
2. The reservation of authority by the Secretary 
of the Interior in respect to methods of opera­
tion, conservation practices, restriction of 
assignments, and rate of development.
3. The difficulty of dealing with an administrative
agency located so far from the field of opera­
tions.
In general it was suggested that the law was too 
restrictive and too inflexible.
As these objections were heard again and again dur­
ing the course of the offshore oil debates, they will be 
studied in some detail later. Suffice here to say that the
objections that seem to have merit were corrected for off-
nshore leasing in the Outer Continental Shelf Act.
State Leases
The states of Texas and Louisiana have followed the| 
procedure of leasing all state lands by sealed competitive | 
bid after block nominations by prospective bidders. Either!
^^Congress in in the process of again amending the ; 
Federal Mineral Leasing Act, It is believed that many of j 
the objectionable features will be eliminated in the leas- ; 
ing of onshore public lands. ;
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the royalty or the cash bonus is left open for bidding. 
Because of the difficulty experienced in selecting the 
highest bid when both the royalty and cash bonus are left 
open, it has been found advisable to fix one and accept 
bids on the other. In most cases, the royalty, the delay 
rental, and the minimum cash bid per acre have been estab­
lished by administrative decision with the cash bonus being 
established by competition,^^
Public officials of these two states maintain that 
this system permits the highest possible return from State 
lands,13 Should the land prove unproductive, the lessor 
state has benefitted by the amount of the cash bonus and the: 
rentals collected. On productive leases the state not only ; 
iobtains the initial cash bonus but also receives the royalty: 
from production,
I It is to be noted that Congress substantially adopted
this State leasing procedure when it passed the legislation ;
to govern the leasing of the Outer Continental Shelf,
Minerals Included in the Lease 
Since other minerals besides oil and gas may be 
ifound in the subfloor of the Continental Shelf, it is of
l^Testimony of Bascom Giles, Texas Land Commissioner,
: Hearings on S, 1901. p, 77.
13 IIbid, Also, see testimony of C, J, Bonnecarrere, ;
i  Secretary, State Mineral Board of Louisiana, Hearings on S. ;
1901. p, 269,
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interest to determine the mineral rights granted in the 
leases of the various proprietary governments.
Louisiana includes sulphur, potash, and "other 
minerals” with oil and gas under one l e a s e T h e  Louisiana 
Attorney General has rendered an opinion to the effect that 
the "other minerals” exclude those on the surface of the 
land, of which sand, gravel, and mudshell are examples, but 
cover and apply to all minerals which are found and produced 
by drilling and m i n i n g T h i s  is the usual practice in 
leases made by private lessors. The widely used and well 
standardized "Form ÔÔ” lease form includes "gas, oil, and 
other minerals," The purchaser of a lease gets the benefit 
of other minerals that he may find while drilling for 
petroleum.
The State of Texas for many years has followed the 
policy of issuing leases for oil and gas only. Separate 
leases must be acquired for the exploitation of sulphur and 
other minerals on State lands. In scattered instances Texas 
has leased the same geographic areas for both purposes, but 
always under separate leases.
The Federal Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as amended, 
also called for separate leases for each mineral. This
^^Personal letter from Max A, Gianelloni, Jr., State 
Mineral Board of Louisiana, dated July Ô, 1954.
l^Testimony of Fred S, LeBlanc, Attorney General, 
State of Louisiana, Hearings on S, 1901. p, 263.
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procedure has been followed in the leasing of the Federal
offshore lands under the Outer Continental Shelf Act.^^
In the Federal oil and gas leases, all uranium,
thorium, and other minerals determined to be peculiarly
essential to the production of fissionable materials, are
specifically reserved to the l e s s o r . A l s o ,  the United
States reserves and retains the ownership of and the ri^t
to extract all helium contained in the gas produced from any 
1 AFederal lands. Such reservations do not appear in the 
leases issued by the States of Louisiana and Texas.
There is no way of determining which method of 
leasing will bring the largest return to the lessor. Even 
assuming that a lease including all minerals can be sold for 
somewhat more than a lease for petroleum alone, it seems 
doubtful that an oil company would pay much of a premium 
for the additional mineral rights in an oil and gas lease. 
However, sulphur companies are interested in obtaining 
leases on the Continental Shelf and, it is believed, would 
pay sizable amounts for such leases. They prefer to 
lease the sulphur ri^ts only and do not want to pay the 
additional amounts necessary to lease all the mineral
^^United States Department of the Interior, Bureau 
of Land Management, Oil and Gas Lease Form 4-1255. Sec. 3(b)
17Public Law 212, Sec. 12(e).
18 , ,
Ibid.. Sec. 12(f).
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r i g h t s . " ~
Fortunately the production of petroleum and sulphur 
from the same geologic formation is not mutually exclusive. 
Sulphur is found in the anhydrous cap-rock formations on
the top of buried salt domes. Petroleum is generally found
20along the flanks of the salt domes. If care is taken, the 
production of one mineral does not interfere with the re­
covery of the other.21 Usually, the oil companies consider 
any sulphur deposits discovered in the course of drilling 
for petroleum as a gratuitous by-product, to be tagged with 
a stiff overriding royalty and turned over to a sulphur 
company for development. They feel that the sulphur in­
dustry gets a free ride as a result of the geophysical work
and exploratory oil drilling in the areas where sulphur is
22not included in the oil and gas lease.
With modern geophysics, there is no sound reason lA) 
the land cannot be leased more than once for different min­
erals. The owning governments could benefit financially 
from the sale of separate leases: the sulphur industry
^^Testimony of Fred M. Nelson, President, Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Company, Hearings on S. 1901. p . 115.
^^One exception is the Spindletop Field, where a 
large portion of the petroleum was found directly above the 
salt dome.
^^Testimony of Eugene H. Walet, Jr., President, 
Jefferson Lake Sulphur Company, Hearings on S. 1901. p. 402,
22letter of Jack Porter, oil operator. Hearings on 
-S. 1901-^ . - 7 7 -^ ---------:---------------------------------
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would have access to more potential leases, and the petro­
leum industry would not be seriously harmed by such an 
arrangement,^ 3
Size of Lease Blocks and 
Acreage Limitations
One of the most important criticisms directed at 
the Federal Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 during the submerged, 
lands controversy concerned the provision dealing with 
acreage limitation. In the original act anti-monopoly senti 
ments in Congress had ordained that no individual or cor­
poration could hold more than three oil and gas leases in 
any one State and not more than one 64O acre lease within 
the geologic structure of the same oil or gas field.
These safeguards against monopoly were imposed to 
prevent a few large operators from depriving others of a 
fair participation in the resources available for develop­
ment. Obviously the solons were not familiar with the 
nature of the petroleum industry. In their anti-monopoly 
zeal they made it difficult if not impossible to carry on 
economical operations, for no efficient oil development can 
be built on a basis of 64O acre leases. The best possible 
way to assure waste in the development of an oil pool is to 
parcel it out to competing operators. This is what the
^3Ibid.. p. 113.
24public Law I46, 66th Cong. (1920), Sec. 14 and 27.
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Congress did in the 1920 Leasing Act,
In 1926 an amendment raised the limits per indivi­
dual or company to 7630 acres in one State and 2560 acres on 
25one structure. The new, more generous limits did not ease 
the situation for long. Many operators who held the maximum 
acreage allowable, much of which was substantially depleted 
by production, were prevented from further development of 
the public lands unless they abandoned or sold the older 
leases. Even more important, the structure limitation often 
stood in the way of sound conservation practices. From a 
technical point of view, efficient operation of an oil pool 
can be accomplished best by producing the pool as one unit. 
This is difficult to arrange when many operators are 
involved..
In 1946 Congress increased the acreage allowable to 
15,360 acres in one State and abolished the acreage limita­
tion on each structure. Furthermore, any areas included in 
an approved cooperative or unit plan of development and
operation were specifically exempted from the acreage re- 
26striction. The benefits derived from unitization were 
thought to justify the waiver of acreage charges in unitized 
areas.^ 7
^^Public Law 159, 69th Cong. (1926), Sec. 27.
26public Law 696, 79th Cong, (1946), Sec. 17 and 27.
^Trestimony of Julius A Krug, Secretary of the In- 
terior, before the Senate Committee on Public Lands and
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It was now possible for a producing company to ob-
pd
tain leases on twenty-four adjoining sections, which 
should permit control of a substantial portion of any normal 
structure. Also, if the operating company would undertake 
to include each well drilled in a unitization agreement, 
there would be no limit to the amount of public land that 
could be held in each State. The only effect that the re­
maining acreage restriction had on the actions of an opera­
tor was a limitation on his inventory of undrilled lands 
blocked up in advance of developmental operations. This was
the Federal leasing situation at the time the offshore
29ownership controversy was being argued. ^
Whatever the virtues or vices of the amended 1920 
Leasing Act, this Act could not be applied to the submerged 
lands of the Continental S h e l f W h e n  the Congress finally 
passed a leasing law for these offshore lands, the acreage 
limitation was dropped entirely. The maximum leasing block
Surveys, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., Hearings on S. 1236 (Washing­
ton: Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 237.
28One section, or square mile, contains 64O acres.
29under the 1946 amendment to the Federal Mineral 
Leasing Act, operations proceded with little apparent dif­
ficulty. The limitation to 15,360 acres not under unitiza­
tion plans did not prove to be unduly restrictive. In 1954, 
however, the acreage limitation was again relaxed to permit 
the holding of 46,000 acres in each State by an individual 
or corporation. Public Law 561, 83d Cong. (1954), Sec. 27.
Letter of the Attorney General to the Secretary of 
the Interior, dated August 29, 1947; text found in Senate 
Report Number 1143. 82d C<ong^ ._2d__8asaj._._n_._J3^
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was established in the Outer Continental Shelf Act at 5,760 
acres, but no restriction was placed on the number of blocks 
an individual or company could hold.^^ This Act recognized 
the need for petroleum operations on a very large scale in 
the offshore. The justification of the acreage restriction 
on the grounds that such limitation prevented the "little 
man" from being shut out did not fit the circumstances found 
in the submerged lands.
The offshore is the province of the large operator. 
Any company with capital resources necessary to develop a 
part of this oil province should be well able to take care 
of itself in the competition for leases. The public inter­
est would not be served by the atomization of the offshore 
lease ownership and development.
The maximum size of the leasing blocks sold by 
Louisiana are set by State law at 5,000 acres.^Z There are 
no statutory provisions in Texas limiting the size of each 
lease plat, but the Texas School Land Board, for administra­
tive convenience, has established lease blocks of 640 acres
^^Public Law 212. 83d Cong. (1953); 6? Stat. 468 (b) 
(1). In practice, the leasing blocks in the Outer Continen­
tal Shelf generally contain 5,000 acres in the areas ad­
jacent to Louisiana and 5,760 acres in the areas seaward of 
Texas. Leasing blocks of less than full size are offered 
for sale if the situation warrants such subdivision. Per­
sonal letter from Sidney M. Groom, Jr., Manager, Outer Con­
tinental Shelf Office, Bureau of Land Management, New 
Orleans, dated May 6, 1955.
^^Statement of Senator Russell B. Long, Hearings on 
.S._1901_._b^ Z^7L._____________________ :_____________________ _
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out to three miles from land and 1,440 acres from three
33miles to ten and one-half miles from shore. Neither state 
has any limit as to the number of leases or amount of acre­
age that any individual or company may hold.
Income to the Landowner
The income the landowner receives from leased land 
is composed of royalty, delay rental, and cash bonus.
Royalty
In private oil and gas leases in the mid-continent 
oil provinces, a cost free royalty payment to the landowner 
of one-eighth of the petroleum produced has been customary 
for many years. Elsewhere, however, such a ratio does not 
prevail. The most common arrangement in foreign lands is 
to establish the royalty at one-half of the net profits from 
operations. In most of the oil producing areas of the world, 
with the exception of the United States, all minerals are 
owned by the sovereign government. In order to obtain oil 
concessions in many of these areas and to ward off expro­
priation once the oil fields are developed, the inter­
national oil companies have been generous with the landown­
ing governments. Lease contracts that split the net profits 
are the rule in most of the countries of South America and
Statement of Senator Price Daniel, Hearings on S. 
1901. p. 75.
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the Middle East.34
In Alberta, where about 90 per cent of the mineral 
rights are reserved to the Crown, the Alberta Government 
computes the royalty on a sliding scale formula, based on 
actual production. The basic royalty varies from 5 per cent 
for less than twenty barrels per day to 16 2/3 per cent for 
135 barrels per day and o v e r .35 The basic royalty applies 
only to the portions of an exploratory reservation converted 
to lease form after oil is discovered in commercial quanti- 
ties.36 The reservation holder may take under lease, in
^^Oil and Gas Journal. February 1, 1954, P* 41. The 
Saudi Arabian Government received 50 per cent of Aramco's 
net operating profit since 1950. Arabian American Oil 
Company, Report of Operations to the Saudi Arab Government. 
1953 (New York, Arabian American Oil Coop any, 1954). Vene­
zuelan royalty (called "exploitation tax") is l6 2/3 per 
cent, but the income tax law of 194# provides for an addi­
tional tax on operators whose net profits exceed the taxes 
paid to the government, providing that such conpanies have 
earned more than 10 per cent on their invested capital.
This additional tax serves to bring the total government 
take up to half the net profits from operations. Guillermo 
Zuloaga, "Venezuela," World Geologv of Petroleum, p. 79. 
Trinidad has a royalty of 10 per cent, but the oil operators 
are assessed an income tax of 40 per cent of chargeable in­
come derived from operations in Trinidad, with no depletion 
allowable. A. J. Freie, "Trinidad," ibid.. pp. 93-94.
35
Royal Bank of Canada, Rovaltv Payments to the 
Crown— Bulletin No. 11 (Calgary, Alberta; Royal Bank of 
Canada, 1952), p. 1.
^^Royal Bank of Canada, Alberta-Regulations-Leases 
and Reservations— Bulletin No. 1 (Calgary. Alberta: Royal 
Bank of Canada, 1952), pp. 1-3. The Alberta leasing proce­
dure is much like the permit system used by the United 
States from 1920 to 1935. Exclusive exploratory rights 
over an area not exceeding 100,000 acres in each tract are
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alternate checker-board blocks not exceeding 5,760 acres 
each, only 50 per cent of the land in each township covered 
by the reservation. The other 50 per cent of the land re­
mains as Crown property and is sold at public auction.
Sealed bids on the cash bonus are accepted under terms which 
provide for the pasnnent of the basic sliding scale royalty 
plus an "overriding" royalty of 15 per cent. Thus, for a 
well of 135 barrels per day, Alberta would receive a royalty 
of 31 2/3 per cent and any initial cash bonus that might be 
forthcoming.37
Landowning governmental units in the United States 
have not been uniformly content with the royalty eighth.
The City of Long Beach, California, in leasing the prolific 
oil lands underlying the Long Beach Harbor, extracted a 
royalty of 94 per cent of the gross production after the 
expenses of drilling were r e t u r n e d . Texas recently re­
ceived what is thought to be the world record royalty bid 
when Humble Oil and Refining Company leased sixty-five acres
granted on condition that the reservation holder conduct an 
aggressive developmental program. Hereafter cited as 
Alberta Regulations.
^^Ibid.. p. 6.
3 &  rank J. Taylor, "The Town With Too Much Money," 
The Saturday Evening Post. January 12, 1952, p. 72. The 
wells in this very prolific field paid themselves out in 
three or four months.
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of State land for a flat royalty of 90.5 per cent,39
Most of the leases issued by the States of Louisiana 
and Texas in the offshore have carried the standard royalty 
of 12 1/2 per cent. In very promising areas, Texas has 
charged 16 2/3 per c e n t S i n c e  the Bureau of Land Manage­
ment successfully sold one-sixth royalty leases in the Gulf 
in 1954, both States have gone to the 16 2/3 per cent basisj*'^
Under the Federal Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, the 
holder of a prospecting permit on the discovery of oil could 
obtain a lease on one-fourth of the land in his 2,560 acre 
permit at a royalty of 5 per cent. The other three-fourths 
of the land in the permit was sold at a public auction with 
the royalty based on a graduated scale from 12 1/2 per cent 
to 25 per cent. The sliding scale of royalties was based on 
the production of the wells and the quality of the oil. This 
plan recognized that wells producing more and better grade 
oil could afford to carry a higher royalty than would be the 
case if the wells were small and the oil poor. To further 
extend the life of the smaller wells and to conserve the oil
39h ouston Post. April 7, 1954. This Neches River bed 
tract was adjoined on both sides by Humble wells. Humble was 
willing to pay this unusually high royalty to assure that nc 
other operator would outbid them on this lease.
^^Personal letter from Bascom Giles, Texas Land Com­
missioner, dated June 19, 1953.
41it is of interest to note that California leased 
1175 offshore acres to Richfield Oil Corporation in 1954 foif 
an equivalent of Ô0 per cent royalty on a production of 100 
Jbamels_p.ejr_day..: World_J]il^_AuEUSjt_l._195.4-.—P-.—9^.________
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that would be wasted should they be closed down, the Secre­
tary of the Interior was authorized to reduce the royalty to 
zero on wells not exceeding ten barrels per day when, in his 
judgment, the well could not be successfully operated on the 
royalty fixed in the lease.
When the permit system of leasing was abandoned in 
1935, the effect was to raise the minimum royalty on all new 
Federal leases to 12 1/2 per c e n t B e c a u s e  of the carry 
over of many leases with the 5 per cent royalty, the average 
Federal royalty in recent years has been somewhat less than 
12 1/2 per cent.
The Outer Continental Shelf Act established the 
minimum royalty payments for all Federally owned offshore 
lands at 12 1/2 per cent for oil and gas and 5 per cent for 
sulphur, with the proviso that the Secretary of the Interior 
could charge more.^^ In the lease sales carried out to date 
the Department of the Interior has stipulated a royalty of 
16 2/3 per cent on petroleum and 7 1/2 per cent or |1.50 
per long ton, whichever is higher, on s u l p h u r W h e t h e r  
the one-sixth petroleum royalty will be required in the
^^Public Law 1A6. 66th Cong. (1921), Section 17,
43Public Law 297i. 74th Cong, (1935), Section 17.
44public Law 212. S3d Cong. (1953), Sec. S (b)(3) 
and (d)(4).
^^Oil and Gas Journal. September 13, 1954, p . 96.
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deeper waters of the Gulf is not known. The third offshore 
sale, held on July 21, 1955, disposed of lands located as 
far as 60 miles from shore and as much as 100 feet below the 
surface of the Gulf at the 16 2/3 royalty rate. As long as 
the leases continue to sell at the higher rate, there is no 
reason to believe that the Secretary will return to the 
12 1/2 per cent figure.
Delay Rental
One of the conditions generally included in most oil 
and gas leases is a provision for the payment of a delay 
rental to the mineral owner. The dual purpose of this pro­
vision is to get income to the landowner in the absence of 
production and to encourage the leaseholder to an aggressive 
pursuit of production. Delay rentals cease when the royal­
ties from production paid during the year exceed an estab­
lished minimum. If these delay charges are low, lessees 
consider the rental as an inexpensive way to maintain un­
drilled prospects. If they are high, potential lessees are 
discouraged from taking out leases.
The Federal Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 called for 
a delay rental on non-competitive leases of fifty cents per 
acre for the first year, no rental for the second and third 
years, twenty-five cents for the fourth and fifth years, and 
fifty cents for the sixth and each succeeding year,^& For
________ ^^Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Manage-
ment. Circular No, 1773. Part 192.80 (a), November 29, 1950.
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leases issued competitively, the annual rental was one dol­
lar per acre.^7 The delay charges on the non-competitive 
leases were considerably below those generally found in 
private leases, providing little income to the government 
and little incentive to timely development. To partially 
correct the situation, the Leasing Act was amended in 1946 
to include a minimum royalty of one dollar per year per acre 
on all leases issued after that date.^^
Congress, in passing the Outer Continental Shelf 
Act, left the delay rental provision to the discretion of 
the Secretary of the Interior.^9 The Secretary is author­
ized to raise or lower the delay rentals for each lease sale 
as conditions dictate. For the 1954 Federal sales in the 
outer shelf, the yearly delay rental and minimum royalty was 
established at $3.00 per acre. The enthusiastic bidding for 
leases on this basis serves as testimony that the $3.00 rate 
is not considered out of line by the industry.
The State of Louisiana, to tie in the amount of the 
delay rental with the value placed on each lease by the 
lessee, established the annual rental at one-half of the 
initial cash b o n u s . ^0 Under this arrangement a lease drawidg
47lbid.. Part 192.30 (b) (3).
4&Public Law 696. 79th Cong, (1946), Sec. 3.
4967 Stat, 463 (b)(4).
^^Revised Statutes of Louisiana, Title 30, Chap. 2, 
Part II (a) 129.  .
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a high bonus bid and presumed to be more valuable will pay a 
greater delay rental than a lease sold for a lower bonus.
The average annual delay rental on undeveloped offshore 
leases sold by Louisiana throu^ August 1, 1954, would 
approximate $12 per acre on this basis. On leases thought 
to be valuable the State is assured that the lessee will 
attempt to obtain production rapidly and, if not successful, 
will surrender the property to avoid further rental payments
The State of Texas has followed the procedure of 
charging a flat annual delay rental per acre. The amount is 
established for each lease sale by the General Land Office. 
Originally one dollar per year in the earlier offshore 
leases, it was later raised to two dollars and in May, 1955, 
to three dollars per year,^^ In this matter, Texas has 
followed the lead of the Bureau of Land Management,
Cash Bonus
In addition to the royalty payment, a cash bonus 
payment is usually made to the landowner. Such payment 
varies with the number of parties interested in the propertj^, 
the bargaining power of the parties involved, and the anti­
cipated value of the lease. The highest per acre cash bonus 
on record is the $3,000,000 paid to the Province of Alberta 
for a quarter section of highly desirable land. This bonus
^^Personal letter from Bascom Giles, June 19, 1953.
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amounted to $18,750 per acre.
The Federal Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 had no pro­
vision for bonus payment in the leasing of lands not located 
on known geologic structures. The applicant needed only to 
file for a lease on the public domain, pay a token rental of 
fifty cents per acre, and the Secretary of the Interior was 
obliged to deliver the lease. Although the Interior Depart­
ment has repeatedly asked the Congress to change this por­
tion of the law to permit competitive bidding, no alteration 
has been made. On lands classified as proved the original 
act called for competitive sales. The foresight of Congress 
in making these leases competitive has produced some large 
bonus payments. One oil company paid a cash bonus of $2,50C 
per acre, in addition to a one-fourth royalty, for some 
choice land in Elk Hills, California.
The State of Louisiana made the first competitive 
sale of leases in the Gulf of Mexico in August, 1945, when
89,000 acres were sold for an average lease bonus of $5.13 
per acre.^^ Texas, in November, 1947, sold 304,000 acres 
for an average of $27.36 per a c r e . 55 By August, 1954,
5^Alberta Regulations, p. 7.
53üorsey Hager, Fundamentals of the Petroleum In­
dust rv (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 194.
54McGee, o p . cit.. p. 3.
55Testimony of Bascom Giles, Hearings on 3. J. Res. 
11, P. 336.
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Louisiana had issued leases on 1,100,469 acres at an average 
bonus of $24.00 per acre, Texas, through the same period, 
had leased 651,463 acres for an average of $50,00 an acre.
Together, these two States had disposed of 1,#39,932 acres
56
at an average price per acre of
In view of the much higher bonuses obtained in later 
sales, it can be seen that Louisiana and Texas practically 
gave away the earlier leases. However, a retrospective view 
is hardly fair to the parties involved in the transactions. 
It must be assumed that an oil lease is worth just what it 
will bring on the market• In the early days of the offshore 
leasing, before the interest in this development became wide 
spread, it was to be expected that the bids would be rela­
tively low. The oil industry was not at all sure that off­
shore operations would be successful and profitable. In 
addition, before the passage of the Holland Bill, the off­
shore bidders were taking the chance that their State leases 
would not be valid, should a hostile Congress decide that 
title to the offshore rested in the Federal G o v e r n m e n t ,57 
Slightly over a year after the Outer Continental 
Shelf Act authorized Federal leasing of the Continental
5%orld Oil. August 1, 1954, p. 9#. All of these 
leases were on a one-eighth royalty basis,
57ïhis possibility seemed remote at all times during 
the controversy. Every bill calling for Federal ownership 
recognized the equities of the State lease holders and con­
tained a plan for validating these leases.
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Shelf seaward of the "historic State boundaries," the Bureau 
of Land Management held two lease sales. In the first sale, 
held on October 13, 1954, the Bureau sold 394,720 acres sea­
ward of Louisiana for an average cash bonus of $295 per acre. 
In the November 9, 1954, sale of 67,150 acres off Texas, the 
Bureau received $348 per acre.^^ From both sales the Fed­
eral Government realized an average of $303 per acre on the 
461,070 acres sold. All of the leases called for a one- 
sixth royalty. Separate sulphur leases on 25,000 acres off 
Louisiana were sold for an average of $49 per acre.^^
Officials of the Department of the Interior were 
pleased with the results of the sales. Despite the higher 
royalty involved and the greater distance from shore, some 
new individual Gulf of Mexico lease bonus records were 
established. Forest Oil Company paid $1,220 an acre for a
5,000 acre plot located thirty-two miles seaward of Louis­
iana.^^ Magnolia Petroleum Company bought 1,440 acres off 
Texas for $2,209 an acre.^^
It is interesting to note that Texas, prior to the 
passage of the Submerged Land Act (Holland Bill) in May, 
1953, had sold 114,799 acres of leases in areas over ten and
^^The sulphur bids ranged from $16.50 to $130.20 per 
acre with 7 1/2 per cent royalty. Shell Oil Coup any was the 
only bidder on the five leases sold.
^Qoil and Gas Journal. October 15, 1954, p . 71.
^%orld Oil. December, 1954, p. 88.
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ore-half miles from shore for $2,063,963, or $19.7# an 
acre.^2 Subsequently, these leases were ratified by the 
Outer Continental Shelf Act and Texas was permitted to keep 
the bonus and delay rental monies. Had Texas refrained 
from selling these leases that were clearly beyond the 
"historic state boundaries," it is almost certain that the 
Federal Government could have made a more advantageous dis­
position in the sale of November 9, 1954. If it can be 
assumed that these first choice lands in the outer Continen­
tal Shelf would have brougjit as much as the average in the 
1954 sale, they could have been sold for $50,390,052, or 
17.5 times as much as Texas realized from the sale. In 
addition, the Federal Government would have a higher royalty 
from production over the years.
Since 1954 the States of Texas and Louisiana have 
been receiving much higher bonus bids than were received in 
earlier periods. Also, possibly as a result of the success 
of the Federal sales on a one-sixth royalty basis, both 
States switched to a 16 2/3 per cent royalty. In February, 
Louisiana sold 34,777 acres for $60# an acre with a one- 
sixth royalty,Three months later, Louisiana received 
$#41 per acre for 25,376 acres on the same royalty basis,
^^Statement of John Ben Shepperd, Attorney General 
of Texas, Hearings on S. 1901. p, 1#5.
63Oil. March, 1955, p. 28,
________^^Oil and Gas.
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In May 1955,. Texas sold one-sixth royalty leases on 4^,000 
acres for $132 an a c r e .^5
No doubt the State officials responsible for the 
administration of the property in the offshore regret their 
haste in leasing large blocks of submerged lands during the 
period when the State ownership claim was up for question. 
Since the Holland Bill was passed, these State officials or 
their successors have been more careful in rationing out the 
remaining l a n d s . A  significant decline in the number of 
lease tracts offered in each sale is noted.
An examination of the bids received in representa­
tive sales by the State and Federal governments reveals no 
uniform competitive pattern in the bidding. The examples 
selected for detailed examination are the first sales of 
lands seaward of Texas by the Texas General Land Office and 
the United States Department of the Interior following the 
enactment of the Submerged Land Act in 1953. The conditions 
of these two sales were as follows:
sale that is being contested by the Department of the Inter­
ior, Louisiana sold 4,6&7 acres at the mouth of the Missis­
sippi River for an average of $1,637 per acre,
^^Oil and Gas Journal. May 9, 1955, p. 81. One 640 
acre lease seaward of Galveston Island sold for $1,687 per 
acre.
^^Mr. Bascom Giles, the Texas Land Commissioner 
responsible for all submerged land sales through 1953, was 
convicted of fraud in connection with the Texas Veteran*s 
Land Program. An investigation of his administration of 
the offshore land sales was proposed in the Texas Legisla- 
-tur-s. Houston ..P.ost__Mav 12-...X955-,-------------------------
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Delay
Minimum Bonus Royalty Rental 
Sale Per Acre Percent Per Acre
Texas Sale of
December 1, 1953 $ 5.00 12 1/2 #2.00
Federal Sale of  ^ ,
November 9, 1954 $15.00 16 2/3 #3.00
Other things being equal, the cash bonus bids should 
be lower in the Federal sale. However, two factors.serve to 
offset the harsher Federal terms. First, it should be noted 
that the Federal sale was held almost a year after the Texas 
sale. A somewhat higher price per acre could be expected in 
the later sale in keeping with the rising trend of prices in 
the offshore as the industry gained experience and interest 
in the submerged land development. Also, while the lands in 
the Texas sale had been picked over several times before in 
earlier sales, the Federal lands were almost virgin terri­
tory. The qualification on virginity was caused by the pre­
vious sale of nearly 145,000 acres in the Outer Continental 
Shelf by the State of Texas prior to the passage of the 
Holland Bill. No doubt, some of the most prominent and 
promising structures in the Texas Outer Shelf were included 
in these earlier sales, but, we could hazard, the surface 
was hardly scratched. For these and other reasons unknown, 
the Federal Government realized 4.4 times as much in cash 
bonus per acre as did the State of Texas in their first 
post-Holland Bill sales.
__________ In  th e  Decem ber 1 .  1 9 5 3 . o f f e r i n g  o f  442 t r a c t s  by
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the Texas School Land Board, thirty bidders responded.^7 
Twenty-five of these bidders bought 317 tracts, totaling 
401,057 acres, for $31,491,649, an average of $79 per acre.6& 
A total of 934 bids were received on the land parcels 
offered, or an average of slightly less than three bids on
69each tract sought,
A breakdown of the bids received on each lease indi­
cates that the competition for a large number of the leases 
was somewhat limited (Table 11). One hundred and nine 
leases, comprising 149,622 acres, or 37.3 per cent of the 
total land sold, went without contest for an average of 
$12.22 per acre. In individual cases, however, the sole 
bidders submitted surprisingly high offers to assure that 
they would secure the leases. Therein lies the great ad­
vantage to the leasing government of using the sealed bid 
method. In the absence of collusion, each interested party 
does not know how many others will submit a bid. The 
Standard Oil Company of Texas badly overestimated the
^^The General Land Office normally sends out notices 
of lease sales to more than 2,000 parties interested enou^ 
to have their names on the mailing list. Testimony of 
Bascom Giles, Hearings on S. 1901. p. 226.
&&lhe source of all data on this lease sale is the 
Texas General Land Office, Tabulation of Bids Received Prio^
to 10 o'clock a.m.. December 1. 1953. by the School Land 
Board. Hereafter cited as Tabulation of Bids. December 1,
69No bids were received on 125 tracts. It is assumed 
that the interested bidders requested that these parcels be 
offered for sale as a cover for their real bidding.________
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TABLE 11
NUMBER OF BIDS RECEIVED ON EACH LEASE BLOCK IN SALE 
OF TEXAS OFFSHORE LANDS, DECEMBER 1, 1953
Total Amount
Number Number Percent Received Average
of of Acres of Land (thousands Price ,
Bids Leases .Involved Bought of dollars) per Acre
1 109 149,622 37.3 1 1,829 $ 12.22
2 83 94,464 23.5 2,808 29.72
3 29 30,825 7.7 1,856 60.21
4 29 27,623 6.9 3,740 135.41
5 21 26,611 6.6 2,282 85.76
6 14 24,479 6.1 2,648 108.17
7 10 17,440 4.3 3,699 212.09
9 16,000 4.0 6,275 392.18
9 6 3,840 1.0 1,509 393.08
10 6 9,078 2.3 4,068 448.13
11 1 1,075 ,3 777 723.00
317 401,057 100.0 $31,491 $ 78.52
Source: General Land Office, Tabulation of Bids Re­
ceived Prior to 10 o'clock a.m.. December 1. 
1953. by the School Land Board.
‘Computed from unrounded data.
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competition in four notable instances. This company bid 
$179,203, or $200 an acre, on each of four adjoining 64O 
acre tracts. On two of these parcels there was no other 
bidder. The other two tracts each had only one other bidder. 
Placid Oil Company offered only $5.16 an acre for one and 
the Lamar Hunt Trust bid $5»25 an acre for the other. Shell 
Oil Coup any had about the same experience, bidding $277 an 
acre on two tracts, when opposed solely by Hunt bids of $5.2 
For certain acreage the bidding was highly competi­
tive. The greatest number of bids were submitted on 1075 
acres adjoining Kleberg County. A tabulation of the bidding 
on this lease is given below:
Bids Received on Lease 196-Tract 945?^
Bidder Amount of Bid Bid Per Acre
Standard Oil Coirpany of Texas $777,227.13 $723.00
Sun Oil Company 538,843.36 501.25
Magnolia Petroleum Company 453,650.00 422.00
Gulf Oil Corporation 362,720.00 337.41
Charles Sapp 160,375.00 149.19
The Texas Company 140,943.25 131.11
Shell Oil Company 30,150.00 38.05
Humble Oil and Refining Company 16,404.00 15.26
Atlantic Refining Company 11,120.00 10.34
Pure Oil Company 6,132.00 5.70
Caroline Hunt Trust 5,643.75 5.25
^^ T a b u la tio n  o f  B id s .  Decem ber 1 .  1 9 5 3 .
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It is obvious that the geophysical crews of the top 
six bidders found this area promising. The Standard Oil 
Company of Texas was enthusiastic enough about the prospects 
to bid $723 an acre. It is wise that Texas Standard did, as 
Sun Oil Company was not far behind with a bid for 1501.25 an 
acre. It is also obvious that the five low bidders were 
speculating, as they either did not know the geology of the 
area or did not think much of their seismic pictures if such 
were available. The Hunt interests submitted a bid of $5*25 
only twenty-five cents above the minimum allowed, on this 
and on a large number of other tracts offered, apparently in 
the hope of accidentally getting some good ones.
The highest price for one lease was received for 
5,760 acres located five miles off Mustang Island in sixty 
feet of water. 'The bids were as follows:
71
Bids Received on Lease 331-Tract 77k
Bidder Amount of Bid Bid Per Acre
Gulf Oil Corporation $3,065,880.00 $532.27
Atlantic Refining Company 1,008,000.00 175.00
Charles Sapp 951,212.00 I65.IA
Shell Oil Company 778,460.00 135.15
Standard Oil Company of Texas 708,489.11 123.00
Sun Oil Con%)any and
Seaboard Oil Company 501,120.55 87.00
Humble Oil and Refining Company 290,937.60 50.51
Phillips Petroleum Company 150,000.00 26.04
'^ ^ a b u la t io n  o f  B id s .  December 1 .  1 9 5 3 .
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Gulf Oil Corporation, a newcomer to offshore operations, 
jumped in with a per acre bid of $523.27 for this three mile 
square tract. This indicated that Gulf wanted to get into 
the offshore business badly and, furthermore, that Gulf had 
no knowledge of Atlantic Refining Company*s plan to offer 
$175.00 per acre'.
Several of the tracts drew bids that were very close 
In one 75Ô acre parcel. Sun Oil Company bid $501.25 per acre 
beating Standard Oil Company of Texas*s bid of $449.00 by a 
mere $2.25 an acre. The highest price per acre in the sale 
was paid by the Standard Oil Conpany of Texas for one 64O 
acre lease. Texas Standard beat out nine competitors with a 
bid of $728.28 per acre.
An examination of the total bids submitted by each 
company and the degree of success is revealing (Table 12). 
The H. L. Hunt interests?^ submitted the greatest number of 
bids and were successful in acquiring the lion*s share of 
the leases. Hunt bought 99,77# acres, or 24.9 per cent of 
the land sold, for $622,153, an average of $6.24 an acre.
In fifty-five out of sixty-two leases. Hunt was unopposed.
At first glance, it might be assumed that Hunt bid low only 
on land of dubious value. New Republic was the firstL to
72The Hunt Oil Company submitted bids for itself and 
for H. L. Hunt, the Hassie Hunt Trust, the Nelson Bunker 
Hunt Trust, the Caroline Hunt Trust, the Lamar Hunt Trust, 
and the William Herbert Hunt Trust.
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TABLE 12
AMOUNTS PAID FOR TEXAS OFFSHORE LEASES, 
DECEMBER 1, 1953
Company
Number
of
leases
Amount paid 
(thousands 
of dollars) Acreage
Average 
price 
per acre
Hunt ^  al 62 $ 622 99,778 $ 6.24
Atlantic 36 1,624 38,167 42.54
Shell . 32 3,769' 37,721 99.92
Sun 31 3,336 20,690 161.22
Humble 26 4,443' 47,795 92.96
Charles Sapp 21 201 20,180 9.98
Standard of Texas 19 3,560 17,833 199.63
Sun and Seaboard 14 1,617 .9,306 173.72
Stanolind 9 198 7,718 25.71
The Texas Company 9 425 5,690 74.69
Ohio 7 ' 51 4,903 10.46
Continental 6 687 16,320 42.10
Kerr McGee 6 136 12,960 10.46
British American 5 108 3,200 33.78
Arkansas Fuel Oil 5 92 3,200 28.63
Placid 4 18 2,53* 7.21
Tidewater 4 540 12,099 44.63
Seaboard 4 4,505 14.94
Magnolia 4 6,267 17,920 349.71
Phillips 3 42 1,920 22.00
Gulf 3 3,456 7,040 490.95
Jake L, Harmon 2 . 7 1,280 5.77
Pure 2 185 6,400 28.94
John W, Mecom 2 22 1,254 17.82
American Liberty 1 17 640 26.26
Total 317 $31,490 401,057 $ 78.53
Source: General Land Office. Tabulation of Bids Received
Prior to 10 clock a.m.. December 1. 1953. by the 
School Land Board.
^Computed from unrounded data.
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point out the fallacy of this assumption with the observatiai 
that Hunt bid $5.25 per acre on the lease that Texas Standard 
felt justified in buying,for $723 an a c r e . ? 3
A critical examination of this Texas lease sale dis­
closes what seem to be two major errors. First, the author­
ities in charge placed too much land on the market at one 
time. Over half a million acres were placed on the block in 
this one sale. It is believed that more interest would have 
been generated in each parcel and correspondingly higher 
lease bonuses would have been received if the land had been 
offered in smaller quantities. Second, the minimum bonus of 
five dollars was too low to discourage speculation. The 
serious purchasers would not have been discouraged by a much 
higher minimum and the State of Texas, in addition to realiz­
ing more money from the sale, could be assured that the pur­
chaser was interested enough in the land to spend the money 
necessary to develop it. One major oil company executive 
suggests a minimum bonus of at least $50 per acre.^^ The 
public interest is not best served by the rapid disposition 
of these offshore mineral leases in return for token bonuse^, 
With the exception of the stated objections, the
*^ 3New Republic. January 11, 1954, p. 3. This report, 
however, may have imputed their hindsight to Mr. Hunt’s 
foresight.
7^1etter of Ben C. Belt, Vice-President, Gulf Oil 
Corporation, dated May 22, 1953, Hearings on S. 1901. p. 77$.
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lease sale appears to have been conducted in a manner that 
does credit to the public administrators responsible for the 
sale. The event was well publicized in advance to all 
possible bidders and full disclosure was made of all bids 
submitted. There is no evidence of any collusion on the 
part of the companies bidding in this sale and the unin­
hibited bids submitted on the more desirable properties 
serve to substantiate this appearance of a competitive sale.
On November 9, 1954, slightly less than one year 
after the Texas School Land Board sale discussed above, the 
Bureau of Land Management sold 67,150 acres in the Outer 
Continental Shelf seaward of Texas for $23,357,030, an 
average of $347.#3 per acre. The land was located in three 
areas lying from twelve to twenty miles offshore. Fourteen 
bidding groups, representing seventeen companies, submitted 
ninety bids on the nineteen tracts offered. Each parcel, 
on the average, received 4.74 bids. Four of the tracts, 
containing 34 per cent of the land sold, received only one 
bid. These parcels went for an average of $17.91 per acre 
(Table 13).
The tract receiving the greatest number of bids 
drew the highest price per acre. This 1,440 acre plot, for 
which there were ten bidders, brought $2,209 an acre. A 
tabulation of the bids appears below: ^
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Bids Received on Outer Continental Shelf Tract .0511: S W g
Block 52. High Island Area?^
Bidder Amount of Bid Bid Per Acre
Magnolia Petroleum Company $3,180,960.00 $2,209.00
Standard Oil Company of Texas 1,780,000,99 1,236,11
Pure Oil Company 
Ohio Oil Conpany 
Sun Oil Company 
Seaboard Oil Company
Placid Oil Company
Continental Oil Company 
Atlantic Refining Company 
Tidewater Association Oil Company
Phillips Petroleum Company
The Texas Coup any
Union Producing Company
Stanolind Oil and Gas Company
Gulf Oil Corporation
on this tract that extended into the adjoining tract to the 
North, for it bid only on these two parcels and won both. 
Standard of Texas had the geology mapped out differently: 
it also wanted Tract 0511, but bid even more for the adjoin 
ing tract to the East. Gulf's bid of $42 on Tract 0511, its
1,501,020,00 1,042,37
556,992.00 386,80
513,263,00 356.43
500,666,00 347.68
182,880,00 127.00
109,440,00 76,00
103,680,00 72,00
60,850,00 42,25
a very promising structure
75The source of all data on this lease sale is the 
tabulation of bids released by the Outer Continental Shelf 
Office, Bureau of Land Management, entitled Oil and Gas 
Lease Sale. Outer Continental Shelf Lands, Texas. November
9. 1954, Hereafter cited as Lease Sale. Outer Shelf. Texas.
November 9 . 1 9 5 4 ,
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TABLE 13
NUMBER OF BIDS RECEIVED ON EACH LEASE BLOCK IN 
FEDERAL LANDS SEAWARD OF TEXAS, NOVEMBER 9,
SALE OF 
1954
Number Number 
of of 
Bids Leases
Acres
Involved
Percent 
of Land 
Bought
Amount 
Received 
(thousands 
of dollars)
Average 
Price  ^
per Acre
1 4 22,833 34.0 $ 409 $ 17.91
2
0
2
0
3
4,320 6.4 327 75.62
J
4 12,960 19.3 1,230 94.94
5 3 a,494 12.7 3,778 444.75
6 1 5,583 8.3 3,650 653.77
7 2 2,880 4.3 3,635 1,262.11
S 2 2,880 4.3 2,582 896.60
9 1 5,760 8 .6 4,565 792.58
10 1 1,440 2.1 3,181 2,209.00
Total 19 67,150 100.0 $23,357 $ 347.83
Source: Bureau
Shelf
of Land Management 
Office. Oil and Gas
, Outer Continental 
Lease Sale. Outer Con-
tinental Shelf Lands. Texas. November 9. 1954.
^Computed from unrounded data.
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only bid in this area, seemingly indicates a comparative 
lack of appreciation of the structure.
The lease selling for the largest amount drew nine 
bids. The bids on this 5760 acre plot were:
Bids Received on Outer Continental Shelf Tract 0518. Block
140. High Island Area?^
Bidder Amount of Bid Bid Per Acre
Standard Oil Company of Texas $4,565,251.99 $792.57
Phillips Petroleum Company 4,166,000.00 723.26
Humble Oil and Refining Company 3,602,000.00 625.50
Pure Oil Company
Ohio Oil Company 3,501,020.00 607.82
Sun Oil Company
Continental Oil Conpany
Atlantic Refining Company 3,007,000.00 522.04
Tidewater Associated Oil Company
Shell Oil Company 1,314,432.00 228.20
Stanolind Oil and Gas Company 1,103,731.20 191.62
Union Producing Company 633,600.00 110.00
The Texas Company 305,280.00 53.00
The cash bonus offers from Standard of Texas and Phillips 
were surprisingly close and they were not ahead of the next 
three bids by a very safe margin. This lease must contain 
a large, promising, and easily located structure to draw so 
much serious interest.
7&Lease Sale. Outer Shelf. Texas. November 9. 1954.
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The Standard Oil Company of Texas bought six tracts 
comprising 2506 per cent of the land offered, for $5## per 
acre (see Table I4)'. The joint venture composed of the 
Tidewater Associated Oil Company and the Atlantic Refining 
Company was high on five parcels, buying 37.# per cent of 
the total offering for $244 an acre. Seven of the fourteen 
bidding groups, including some of the most illustrious names 
in offshore oil, were shut out of the sale.
The criticisms leveled at the administration of the 
Texas sale cannot be repeated for the Federal sale of lands 
in the Outer Continental Shelf off Texas. A much smaller 
and more easily digested quantity of land was offered in the 
Federal sale. This may account, in part, for the higher 
bonuses received.?? The higher minimum bonus used in the 
Federal sale brought in a larger amount of money on the less 
desirable leases. It is believed that the minimum bonus 
should be increased on Federal sales to an amount consider­
ably higher than the present $15.00 per acre.
Taxes
In addition to the normal landowner's income accru­
ing to the governmental proprietors of the Continental 
Shelf, the taxing powers incident to sovereignty also apply
77However, it should be noted that the Federal sale 
of lands seaward of Louisiana included 395,000 acres. In 
spite of the large amount of land in one sale, the Bureau 
of Land management realized $295 per acre.
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TABLE 14
AMOUNTS PAID FOR FEDERAL OFFSHORE LEASES, 
NOVEMBER 9, 1954
Company-
Number
of
Leases
Amount Paid 
(thousands 
of dollars) Acreage
Average 
Price  ^
per Acre-
Standard of Texas 6 $10,165 17,280 $ 588.26
Tidewater
Atlantic 5 6,188 25,390 243.72
Phillips 2 1,001 2,880 347.68
Gulf 2 247 11,520 21.41
Magnolia 2 4,876 2,880 1,693.00
Continental
Tidewater
Atlantic
1 103 5,760 17.88
Continental 1 777 1,440 539.59
Total 19 $23,357 67,150 $ 347.83
Source: Bureau of Land Management, Outer Continental
Shelf Office, Oil and Gas Lease Sale. Outer Con­
tinental Shelf Lands. Texas. November 9. 1954.
'Computed from unrounded data.
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in the offshore. Do the taxes borne by the Federal lessees 
differ from those paid by the lessees of Louisiana and 
Texas? To what extent do the taxes borne by the marine pro­
ducer differ from those paid by his counterpart on land?
Lands Under State Jurisdiction
The Federal income and excise tax laws are appli­
cable to the waters adjacent to the United States within a 
three-mile l i m i t . T h e  strip between three miles and ten 
and one-half miles seaward of Texas is legally in the high 
seas, but, although the tax laws are not clear on this point 
it is assumed that the Bureau of International Revenue will 
consider all lands within the "historic State boundaries" 
of Texas to be a part of the United States.
Louisiana levies a severance tax on all oil and gas 
produced within the State boundaries. This tax will apply 
to all offshore production seaward of that State out to the 
point where the boundary is eventually established. The 
severance tax, based on the gravity of the' oil, varies from 
IS cents to 26 cents per barrel. With the price of the oil, 
which varies with the gravity, at $2,50 to $2.85 per barrel, 
the severance tax amounts to slightly less than 10 per cent 
of the gross value of the oil.?9
7&Letter from H. Chapman Rose, Acting Secretary of 
the Treasury, Hearings on S. 1901. p. 695.
^^Testimony of C. J. Bonnecarrere, Secretary, State
_ 2M , ____________________
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Texas also levies a severance tax, but the rate is 
not as high as the Louisiana tax. At present, the Texas tax 
averages approximately 5 per cent of the gross value of the 
petroleum produced. Liability for this tax extends to all 
producers within the ten and one-half mile offshore belt.
Both States have extended their counties out into 
the Gulf of Mexico*. The purpose of this boundary extension 
was to provide law enforcement by county agencies in the off­
shore areas within State jurisdiction. These counties have 
the authority to levy ad valorem property taxes on the im­
provements made in the offshore. The amount of the tax 
would depend on the value of the property and the rate 
assessed. It is unknown how much the county property taxes 
would add to the total tax load of each barrel of oil, but 
the amount could be sizable.
Oil operations carried on in the State offshore 
areas are subject to the same taxes that would be collected 
if the wells were located on land.
Lands Under Federal Jurisdiction
The applicability of the Federal income and excise 
taxes to the areas of the Continental Shelf beyond the three 
mile limit will depend, in many instances, on whether these 
areas are adjudicated to be a part of the United States.
The touchy question of whether the United States can extend
249
its taxing authority without extending its sovereignty has 
not been decided.
There is no question that Federal income taxes are 
collectible on the income derived by citizens and corpora­
tions of the United States in carrying on business or per­
forming services on the entire Continental Shelf. There is 
some question, however, in respect to the income earned by 
non-resident alien individuals and corporations in the area 
beyond the three mile limit. Their income may be held as 
derived from sources outside the United States, resulting in
dp
an exemption from United States income taxes.^ In addition 
if the operations beyond the three mile limit are held to be 
on the high seas, the Federal excise taxes on products ex­
ported to these offshore installations could not be applied 
As a matter of equity these taxes should be applied uniformly 
to all developments on the Continental Shelf, regardless of 
their location in respect to the three mile line.
^^Congress extended the Constitution, laws, and 
civil and political jurisdiction of the United States to the 
subsoil and seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf and all 
fixed structures that may be erected thereon. Public Law 
212, S3d Cong., Sec. 4 (a)(1). This action may have solved 
the tax problem.
^^It is presumed that the greater part, if not all, 
of the operations in the Gulf Coast Continental Shelf will 
be carried on by United States residents or corporations. 
However, there is the possibility that alien corporations, 
chartered as a front by United States citizens, might evade 
the income tax laws. Many ships owned by Americans fly the 
flag of Panama for tax purposes.
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The Federal Government does not collect severance 
or gross production taxes on oil and gas produced from lease^ 
originally issued by the Bureau of Land Management. It col­
lects a sum in lieu of these taxes, however, on the produc­
tion of leases issued by the States in the Outer Continental 
Shelf prior to the passage of the Submerged Land Act and 
ratified by the Outer Continental Shelf Act. To maintain 
the State leases, the holders must pay to the Secretary of 
the Interior a sum of money equal to the amount of the 
severance taxes which would have been payable on such pro­
duction to the State issuing the lease.
Senator Russell B. Long of Louisiana fou^t a long
losing battle to have the State taxing authority extended
out to the edge of the Continental Shelf. In his bitterness
after his proposal was defeated, the Senator said:
. . . But rather than deal fairly with the States, the 
Federal Government has chosen, throu^ the "windfall" 
provision in this bill (S. 1901), to extract the last 
ounce of flesh by adding the amount of the States* tax 
to the royalty to which the Federal Government is.other­
wise entitled under the validated States* l e a s e s .
The majority of the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Com­
mittee maintained that States* lessees in lands seaward of 
State Boundaries should be held to their bargain; otherwise,
&3public Law 212, 03d Cong. (1953), Sec. 6(a)(9).
^^U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs Report No. All. S3d Cong.. 1st Sess. (Wash­
ington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 67.
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they would receive a "windfall” in Federal validation.
No property-taxes are levied by the Federal Govern­
ment in the Outer Continental Shelf. The states are speci­
fically prohibited from extending their taxation laws into 
the area of Federal jurisdiction.Federal leaseholders 
get a definite advantage, as far as taxes are concerned.
The absence of the severance and property taxes paid by 
their opposite numbers on land or in the State-owned off­
shore goes a long way toward making up for the additional 
costs engendered by the greater distance from shore and the 
greater depth of the water.
Authoritv of the Lessor 
Offshore property. Federal or State, is public prop­
erty which should be protected and preserved so that it may
best serve the public interest. One of the objections to 
the Federal Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 was the reservation 
of much authority in the hands of the Secretary of the In­
terior. Obviously, a lease which imposes no restrictions ir 
regard to the development and operation would be more desir­
able to the lessee than one containing limitations in these 
respects. But, necessarily, leases on public lands should 
not be unrestrictive in nature.
To quiet the criticism of "bureaucracy” in Federal
lease administration and expedite operations in the Outer
___________ .^^ P u b l i  C-Law 21%,_Se!CL._Jk-(aJ_C2j_.__________________________
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Continental Shelf, the Interior Department has created an 
autonomous regional office in New Orleans,Administra­
tively, obtaining and maintaining leases in offshore lands 
should be similar under the aegis of Federal or State 
authority.
Protective Covenants 
All standard oil and gas lease contracts contain ex­
press or inplied protective covenants that assign certain 
duties to the lessee. Among them is the provision that re­
quires the lessee to drill and produce such wells as will 
protect the lessor from adverse drainage from other proper­
ties, Since the offshore lands are owned in huge areas by 
one lessor, the necessity of compulsory competitive drilling 
is removed, except where private properties onshore adjoin 
public land offshore, or where the public properties of at 
least two separate governmental units are contiguous. 
Unitization laws would prevent wasteful competition even at 
these points.
Drilling Requirements 
The Federal lease form stipulates as one of the 
obligations of the lessee, that he must undertake "to drill 
and produce such wells as the Secretary may reasonably
Personal letter from H, P, Hochmuth, Bureau of 
Land Management, dated May 12, 1955. All lease files deal­
ing with the. Outer Continental Shelf are located in the New 
-Orleans—OffLca-,----------------------------------- ---------
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require in order that the leased area may be properly and 
timely developed and produced in accordance with good* operatf 
ing practice."^7 The Texas lease form has roughly the same 
provision. The Louisiana lease says nothing about the
dg
matter, but such agreement is implied in the contract. ^
Approval of Assignment
To expedite the assignment of Federal leases, the
Department of the Interior permits leases to be assigned in
whole or part to anyone qualified under the law to take and 
90hold a lease, subject to the administrative approval of 
the Director of the Bureau of Land M a n a g e m e n t I f  the 
assignees are qualified to hold a lease, the instrument of 
transfer must be approved within thirty days after filing.
The Louisiana lease contract states that the rights
B7Bureau of Land Management, Department of the In­
terior, Oil and Gas Lease Form A-1255. Sec. 2(c)(2), In 
many of the Federal leases issued on land, the Secretary of 
the Interior specifically requires that a certain number of 
wells be drilled in accordance with an established schedule. 
These provisions are found in many private leases.
dd
General Land Office of Texas, Oil and Gas Lease 
August 6, 1953, par. 7.
^^Louisiana State Lease Form. Revised October, 194&.
^Opersons qualified to hold a lease must be citizens 
of the United States over twenty-one years of age, associa­
tions of such citizens. States, political subdivisions of a 
State, or private, public, or municipal corporations organ­
ized under Federal or State charter. 43 C.F.R. 201.2.
9I43 C.F.R. 201.60.
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under the lease may be assigned or transferred on approval
92of the State Mineral Board, Texas requires no approval of 
a transfer, but requires that a copy of the assignment be 
filed with the General Land O f f i c e . U n d e r  each of the 
jurisdictions the leasing authorities only desire to know 
who is responsible for the lease.
Regulation Under the Governmental Police Power
The police powers in the Continental Shelf are ex­
ercised by the Federal Government and the States concerned. 
They can help or hinder the efficient and economic develop­
ment of the offshore resources. For full utilization of the 
marginal sea resources, it is essential that each use be 
controlled in a way that will least interfere with the shore 
and offshore for other purposes.
Navagation and Communications
Rigid compliance with directives of the Army Corps
of Engineers and the United States Coast Guard enables a
9Lfairly higjh degree of navigational safety. ^ Radio communi­
cation from drilling platform or ship to shore is controlled
Par. S.
^^Louisiana State Lease Form. Revised October, 194&,
93General Land Office of Texas, Oil and Gas Lease 
Form. August 6, 1953, Par. 13.
9^Structures are not permitted within 2000 feet of 
any navagational channel and warning devices must be placed 
on any structures erected.
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by the Federal Communications Commission.
Public Health and Safety 
Boats used in offshore oil operations must conform 
to Coast Guard regulations on seaworthiness and the presence 
of safety equipment. The Coast Guard is particularly strict 
in the regulation of equipment and mechanisms using 
explosives.
The Federal Government and the States of Texas and 
Louisiana are equally strict in requirements for keeping 
wells under control. Regulations require that wells be 
properly cased and cemented and that adequate well head 
equipment and storm chokes be installed to control the gas
QÇ
pressures,thus averting possible catastrophic damage to 
life and property should blowout and/or fire occur on an 
offshore installation.
Preservation of Fish and Wild Life 
The States have long been concerned about the effect 
of the explosives used in geophysical exploration and the 
pollution from drilling and production operations on aquatic 
life.Louisiana  and Texas have established rules and
9^30 C.F.R. 250.40. Also General Land Office of 
Texas, Rules and Regulations Governing Drilling and Produc­
ing Operations in Coastal Waters, dated November 17, 1951.
^^Continuing studies are being made of ways to pre­
vent damage to marine life. The Department of Oceanography, 
Texas A & M College, has been engaged on this project for 
several years._____________________________________________
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regulations to govern the use of explosives in public waters 
and to prevent pollution of these waters by oil seepage and 
the discharge of drilling chemicals.^7 The Department of 
the Interior has adopted these statutes and regulations of 
the adjoining States for application to the Outer Continenta. 
Shelf, The Geological Survey is authorized to accept the 
assistance of the adjoining States in the enforcement of
these regulations on Federal property.9S
Conservation
Conservation is the prevention of physical and eco­
nomic waste. In onshore petroleum production the "rule of 
capture" had led operators to drill and produce at the maxi­
mum possible rate to forestall drainage of their pool by 
neighboring wells. Such unnecessary drilling and rapid pro­
duction contradicted sound conservational knowledge and 
prevented maximum ultimate recovery. Fortunately the com­
panies of a size necessary to undertake petroleum develop­
ment in the submerged lands are well aware of the economic 
rewards that accrue from following sound conservation
9?General Land Office of Texas, Rules and Regula­
tions Governing Geological. Geophysical and Other Survevs 
and Investigations in Areas within Tidewater Limits within
the Jurisdiction of the State of Texas. November 17, 1953. 
Operations in the Louisiana offshore are governed by the 
Louisiana Department of Wild Life and Fisheries, Rules Gov­
erning Seismic Exploration in the State of Louisiana. Janu­
ary, 1952.
98 18 F . R.  5 6 6 7 . Septem ber 2 3 ,  1 9 5 3 .
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practices. In the words of the president of one of the
largest domestic producing companies:
. . . Broadly speaking, the interests of the lessees /in 
conservatiorv are the same as the interests of the State 
and that as an operator of an oil field the Humble 
Company is more interested in conserving that resource 
and getting the most oil out of the reserve than anybody 
else, because it has its investment there.
Examination of the conservation principles likely to 
be applied in the Continental Shelf area may furnish evi­
dence as to the pattern of development to be expected there.
Well Location and Spacing
Although petroleum engineers do not completely agree 
on how many wells are needed to provide adequate drainage 
for an oil pool,^^® there is substantial agreement that the 
volume of recovery from an oil reservoir is normally less 
dependent on well density than on factors such as the poros­
ity and permeability of the reservoir rock, the viscosity of 
the gas-oil fluid, and the effectiveness of the gas or water 
energy drive. Further, authoritative opinion holds that the 
development of many oil fields on land was economically
^^Testimony of Hines H. Baker, President, Humble Oil 
and Refining Company, before the Senate Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs, Blst Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings on 
S.155 et al. p. ,379.
lOOpor an excellent review of both sides of this con­
tinuing controversy, see the following report: Research and
Coordinating Committee, Interstate Oil Compact Commission, 
Well Spacing (Oklahoma City: Interstate Oil Compact Commis-
sion, 1951).
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wasteful, primarily because of too many w e l l s , A  better 
understanding of the factors affecting recovery and the past 
experience of wasteful drilling may well guide developmental 
patterns in the offshore lands.
Texas has a minimum spacing rule requiring twenty 
acres per well, with special rules for special cases 
Louisiana has plans for varying the spacing distance accord­
ing to the depth of the well.^^^ The Federal Government 
leaves approval of well spacing and well location programs 
to the Geological Survey which will give due consideration 
to the geological and engineering characteristics of the 
f i e l d . T h e  size of the leases, the fact that search for 
oil offshore is directed mainly at salt dome formations 
which usually have little lateral expanse, and the preva­
lence of large companies as offshore operators— these fac­
tors too tend to lessen the likelihood of wasteful well 
drilling in the Continental Shelf area.
Personal letter from William J. Murray, Jr., 
Railroad Commission of Texas, dated July 7, 1954. The East 
Texas field had approximately 25,000 wells drilled. Under 
field rules for the late 1930*s only 13,300 wells would have 
been drilled. Were the same field being developed today, 
6,650 wells would probably suffice to drain the field.
102Ibid.
103gtate of Louisiana Department of Conservation, 
Statewide Order No. 29E (Proposed).
10430 C.F.R. 250.17.
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Restriction of Production to 
the Maximum Efficient Rate
As conservation engineers have become more familiar 
with the relationship between pressure maintenance and 
petroleum recovery, they have developed methods of gauging, 
with reasonable accuracy, the production rate for each pool 
and well that will result in the greatest total recovery. 
This optimum withdrawal factor is known as the "maximum 
efficient rate." This is a technical factor and has nothing 
to do with considerations of market demand and price. Good 
conservation practice and equity call for strict regulation 
of production to this engineering optimum.
The Railroad Commission of Texas determines a MER 
for each well drilled in the State, including the offshore, 
as soon as sufficient reservoir information has been assem­
bled. No well may be produced in excess of the MER, 
although this factor may be changed as^technical conditions 
warrant.105 The Louisiana Department of Conservation does 
not use the MER to allocate production. Louisiana estab­
lishes the allowable production for offshore wells on the 
basis of well depth only.^^^ The United States Geological 
Survey is empowered to determine the potential capacity
^^^Testimony of William J. Murray, Jr., Railroad 
Commission of Texas, Hearings on S. 1901. p. 143.
^^^State of Louisiana, Department of Conservation, 
Order No. 151. September 24, 194#, and Production and Pro­
ration Order No. 7. June 23, 1955.
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(m e r ) and to fix the permissible production for each well
drilled on the Federal offshore lands when such action is
necessary to prevent waste.^^7 While no rigid formula is
used to determine the optimum production rate, the Oil and
Gas Supervisor in charge presumably attempts to apply all
10 Sapplicable engineering factors.
Compulsory Submission of Well Data
A wealth of geological information is turned up by 
the drilling bit, In the absence of rules to the contrary, 
the operator doing the drilling could carry this information 
to his grave, causing subsequent unnecessary drilling to get 
the underground information already discovered but not re­
vealed. Of course, it is only fair that the information so 
revealed be considered confidential until public release 
would not be prejudicial to the interests of the operator 
supplying the information.
Each of the governmental agencies charged with the 
leasing of Gulf of Mexico offshore lands requires that 
driller’s logs and/or electric logs be filed on all discoverer 
wells drilled on their l e a s e s . ^^9 landowners the State
10730 C.F.R. 250.16.
lOSpgrsonal letter from E. ¥, Henderson, Oil and Gas 
Supervisor, Gulf Coast Region, United States Geological Sur­
vey, New Orleans, Louisiana, dated May 6, 1955.
lO^The requirements are found in 30 C.F.R. 250.37(c) 
Texas General Land Office, Oil and Gas Lease Form. August 6, 
IQSl; and Louisiana Department of Conservation. Statewide
Order No. 2 9 - B . F eb ru ary  2 3 ,  1 9 5 5 ,  S e c .  IV .
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and Federal Governments have a direct pecuniary interest in 
collecting all underground information relating to their 
leases. It is unfortunate that Texas and Louisiana do not 
require that well data on wells drilled on private leases be 
submitted for filing in public geological archives, as does 
Oklahoma.
Compulsory Unitization
Nearly all students of petroleum economics agree on 
the desirability of unitization^^*^ but not on the means 
Most believe that some form of compulsion is needed^^ to 
gain the advantages of unitized operations. Chief among 
these are:
1. Economies resulting from the abolition of com­
petitive drilling*
2. Reduction of manpower needs and costs in pro­
ducing the field.
3. Greater production from scientific well spacing 
and better control of reservoir energy.
TinUnitization is the development and operation of 
an entire pool as a single unit. One operator conducts all 
operations as specified in the unit agreement, and costs and 
benefits are allocated among the various interest holders,
^^^Eugene V. Rostow, A National Policy for the Oil 
Industry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948J, p. 51.
^^^In 1945 Oklahoma passed a mild form of compulsory 
unitization. Arkansas followed in 1951. Most observers 
agree on the success of the program thus far.
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The submerged lands are ideally suited for unitized 
development. In most cases there will be only one royalty 
owner to satisfy; with the large leasing blocks and the 
relatively small number of offshore operators, the holdings 
in each pool will not be widely diversified; the higher 
costs per well in offshore drilling offer further incentive 
to reduce the number of wells drilled. Thus far in the sub­
merged land development many of the companies have formed
joint ventures on their own for the purpose of buying and
113developing leases. However, it would be wise to have 
compulsory unitization laws or lease contract agreements to 
eliminate the chance of hold-outs.
The Outer Continental Shelf Act provides for compul­
sory unitization in the submerged lands if the Secretary 
deems unitization necessary in the interest of conserva-
11 Zl
tion. Such agreements may be initiated by lessees or
115they may be required by the Secretary. The regulations 
controlling such agreements are the same as those used on 
land areas owned by the Federal Government
One example is the C.A.T.G. Group, composed of 
the Continental Oil Coup any, Atlantic Refining Company, Tide­
water Associated Oil Company, and Cities (Service) Producing 
Company, This association has participated in many joint 
ventures over a period of several years.
ll^Public Law 212, S3d Cong. (1953), Sec. 5 (a)(1).
C.F.R. 201.10. '
C. F . R.  2 2 6 .
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The States of Louisiana and Texas do not require 
compulsory unitization at this time, either on submerged 
lands owned by the States, upland areas owned by the States, 
or on private lands regulated by the States. These States 
permit and encourage unitization, but do not require it. By 
their failure to pass legislation requiring unitization, 
where circumstances warrant such consolidation, these States 
are denied the use of one of the most valuable weapons 
against physical and economic waste.
Proration
The restriction of petroleum production to the 
estimates of market demand prepared by the Bureau of Mines, 
United States Department of the Interior, is a well estab­
lished exercise of the police power by the member States of 
the Interstate Oil Compact. Proration to market demand has 
no necessary relation to the restriction of production to 
the engineering concept of the maximum efficient rate. As 
a matter of fact, proration often causes individual wells 
to be produced considerably below their most efficient rate, 
or, stated another way, in a technically inefficient manner.
The proration laws were instituted at the request of 
the petroleum industry and, since the limitation of supply 
to demand at the existing market price provides a high 
degree of price stability for the industry, it is believed 
that these laws, as presently constituted, will remain on
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the books until the industry finds it advantageous to have 
them changed or dropped. It is not the purpose of this study 
to pass judgment on the virtue of proration to market demand 
or to weigh its benefits against its shortcomings.
The States of Texas and Louisiana have been members 
in good standing of the Interstate Oil Compact since that 
organization was formed in 1935. Accordingly, through the 
agency of the Railroad Commission of Texas and the Louisiana 
Department of Conservation, they have enforced and will en­
force production allowables for the wells and pools in the 
Gulf of Mexico,
When the Outer Continental Shelf Act was passed, it 
carried the provision that, where they were not inconsistent 
with Federal laws and regulations, the civil and criminal 
laws of each adjacent State were declared to be the law of 
the United States for the subsoil, seabed, and structures 
of the Outer Continental S h e l f , The Act also specificalljr 
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to cooperate with 
the conservation agencies of the adjacent States in the en­
forcement of these laws. Accordingly, the Secretary has 
accepted the production allowables established by the States
of Louisiana and Texas for wells drilled on Federal leases
n n Aseaward of those States,
llfPublic Law 212, S3d Cong, (1953), Sec, 4(a)(2).
H^Personal letter from E, W, Henderson, Gulf Coast 
Oil and Gas Supervisor, United States Geological Survey, New 
^rLeansy-Lrouiisiianar;—dat-ed—May—6^  3^333^
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Summary I
i The Governments owning and administering the sub-
Imerged petroleum lands of the Gulf of Mexico utilize much
I  the same procedures. Lease blocks are offered for sale with; 
i i
;interested parties offering sealed bids open only on the 
} , !
I amount of the cash bonus per acre. Although this is the
jpresent practice, the Federal Government did not follow this;
Iplan until 1953 with the passage of the Outer Continental
I
I Shelf Act. The land area which may be leased varies in size: 
the Federal Government permits a maximum single lease of
5,760 acres off Texas; Louisiana's maximum is 5,000 acres; ;
;
the Texas School Land Board has set maximums of 64O acres 
out to three miles and 1,440 acres beyond that point. How- | 
ever, none of the governments place a limit on the number ofj 
leases that can be purchased.
Included in the bids are provisions for royalty pay-! 
ment, now usually 16 2/3 per cent; for payment of a speci­
fied delay rental, lately $3 per acre for Texas and the 
Federal Government; and for a minimum price on the cash bonus 
per acre. In the sales thus far conducted the governmental 
units have received increasingly larger cash payments per 
acre. The leases have for the most part been only for oil 
and gas; other mineral resources, notably sulphur, require 
separate leasing.
Perhaps the most outstanding difference between
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State and Federal areas lies in the taxes that are imposed; 
in the Outer Continental Shelf area the Federal Government 
imposes neither property nor severance taxes.
Aided by favorable physical and land ownership 
patterns in the offshore, the operators tend to accept de­
velopmental features that have proved advantageous elsewhere. 
These include efficient well spacing, production not in ex-I
cess of the maximum efficiency rate, and voluntary unitiza- I 
! :
Ition. With compulsory unit development the Gulf of Mexico
operations may approach the efficiency reached in the Middle
East and South American oil provinces. i
CHAPTER VII 
PRECEDENTS SET BY THE SUBMERGED LANDS ACT
The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 gave to the littoral 
States title to and control over the belt of marginal sea 
out to the undetermined State boundaries. The failure to 
delineate definitely the extent of the States* ownership 
assured much expensive and unnecessary litigation.^ In fact, 
the boundary problem may retard development of a portion of 
the Continental Shelf.
Congress indisputably had authority to alienate 
these lands but there was little precedent to guide them in 
their decision. No nation had undertaken to solve the many 
new problems encountered in drilling oil wells in the open 
sea. And no matter what decision Congress made in this in­
tricate, highly conplex matter, new precedents would have 
been established— certainly in domestic affairs, perhaps in
^United States Attorney General Herbert Brownell, 
Jr., foreseeing a protracted and useless squabble, asked 
Congress to draw definite boundary lines. Hearings on S. J. 
Rest 13. p. 926. Texas Attorney General Ben Shepperd, after
the Holland Bill was passed, said that it was almost certain 
that Texas would have to go to court to establish its claim 
to three leagues into the Gulf of Mexico. Oil and Gas Jour­
nal. July 19, 1954, p. 75. ■
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international affairs.
From an economic point of view, the legal question 
I of land ownership. Federal, State, or private, is not so
j  important as the effect that the ownership on these differ-
I '
!ent levels will have on the conservation of the land and
water resources and the availability of those resources for 
multiple use. The protection of the resources of man's 
physical environment against waste, including misuse, non­
use and partial use, is now a major problem of civilization. 
If State or private ownership will best accomplish this 
many-faceted goal, resource ownership should be vested in 
State or in private hands. If the complex problems of con­
servation and multiple land use can be solved only by co­
ordinating and centralized control on a regional or national 
level, any policy that could result in the permanent alien­
ation of our public lands should be suspect. Once- the 
Federal public lands pass into other hands, it would be 
difficult if not impossible to reclaim them, however much 
the economic well-being of the nation might be benefitted 
by the recovery of such lands.
International Aspects of the 
Offshore Oil Legislation
The recognition by the Holland Act of State author­
ity beyond the traditional three mile limits of national 
sovereignty placed the United States in an embarrassing
269
position in its relations with foreign nations. Though it 
is in the best economic and military interests of the United 
States to have the sovereignty of other nations restricted 
to three miles from land, we cannot expect to restrain others 
from doing what we do ourselves.
The Development of the Three Mile Concept 
of the Marginal Seas
Debate over the question as to how far the sea can 
be subjected to sovereignty began in the Middle Ages and 
still goes on. Appeals to divine, natural, Roman and "inter­
national" law have been made to support or combat claims of 
particular nations to exclusive sovereignty over greater or 
lesser stretches of ocean. Legal writers have been inspired 
primarily by the material interests of their nations in the 
right to share, control or monopolize commerce and fisheries 
in the various marine areas of the world.^
However, even nations favoring freedom of the seas 
readily admitted that states had some legitimate interest in 
the marginal waters immediately adjoining their shores.
While not unanimously accepted, a norm of three miles, the 
limit of a cannon shot in the early Eighteenth Century, won 
growing support as the outer boundary of sovereignty.^ The
2
P. E. Corbett, Law and Society in the Relation of 
States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Conpany, 1951), p. 120.
5Ibid., p. 122. The first important departure from 
the three-mile rule occurred in 1951 when the International
270
three mile limit became "international law" to the extent 
that the naval powers of the world found it in their inter- 
i  ests to go along with such limitation and enforce it on 
: others.
The Interest of the United States in Preserving 
the Three Mile Sovereignty Concept
The United States Government has consistently sup- |
ported the three mile concept and has vigorously objected to
I
claims of other nations to broader limits,^ This concept of 
the freedom of the seas also applies to the freedom of the 
air spaces above the seas. Any policy change which would | 
place the United States in a position of limiting the free-| 
dom of the high-seas and air-lanes is believed to be detri-| 
mental to the national interests of this country.^ |
I  ■ 
1
National Defense Consideration
The time honored position of the United States Navy 
is that the greater the freedom and range of its warships
Court of Justice ruled ten to two in favor of recognizing 
Norway*s jurisdiction over the marginal sea four miles out 
from a straight line that was drawn from point to point on 
its irregular fjord-cut shore. International Court of 
Justice, United Kingdom v. Norway. December IS, 1951.
Sjhile a steadfast chanpion of the three mile limit 
for territorial waters, the United States has extended its 
own jurisdiction for specific pu^oses beyond this limit in 
many instances, mostly dealing with customs regulation or 
the protection of aquatic animals or fishes.
^Statement of Jack B. Tate, Deputy Legal Advisor, 
Department of State, Hearings on S. J. Res. 13. p. 1053.
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and aircraft, the better protected are the security inter­
ests of the United States.^ It must be noted that the sword 
I cuts both ways, as the fixing of the seaward boundaries of 
I all nations at three miles also determines how near foreign
I  .  I
i warships and aircraft may lawfully approach the shores and i
I !
{harbor installations of the United States. However, as long!
I as the United States remains a strong naval and air power, ! 
the Defense Department believes that it can keep potential | 
enemies well away from the American shores.? The maintenance; 
of such defense zones, of course, would be based upon the 
exercise of power rather than on the workings of inter­
national law, I
Fisheries
The extension of national sovereignty into the high 
seas may also constitute a grave threat to the fishing in- " 
dustry of the United States. American fishing fleets range 
far from domestic waters in search of good fishing grounds.^ 
For generations New England fishermen have made their most 
prolific catches in the waters off Nova Scotia and Newfound­
land. The West Coast tuna fleets in recent years have
Letter of Undersecretary of the Navy Francis P. 
Whitehair to Rep. Celler, appearing in Hearings on S. J. Res.
13. p. 135. This policy showed its advantages in the United
Nations warship patrol of Korea Bay and the Formosa Strait. |
7 !'ibid. I
%he 1951 offshore catch was valued at $345 million.
Hearings on S. J. Res. 13. p . 307.__________________ _______
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secured the greater portion of their yield from the seas j 
contiguous to the Pacific coasts of Central and South '
American Countries, Much of the salmon catch by the Puget 
Sound fishing fleet is made in waters adjacent to the |
Q i
Canadian mainland. Gulf Coast shrimp fishermen have ex- |
panded their operations south along the coasts of Mexico, to;
I  the great discomfort of our Gulf of Mexico n e i g h b o r . ,
jAmerican fishing interests have consistently opposed any I  
} ■ ; 
change in the United States policy that will endanger their
access to these fishing grounds.^
j
The Submerged Lands Act as a Justification
for Foreign Claims |
President Truman in his Proclamation of September, | 
1945, made a careful distinction between the "natural re- !
I
sources of the subsoil and seabed" and the hi^ seas above |
^Statement of W. M. Chapman, U. S. Congress, House, | 
Hearing of the Subcommittee on Fisheries of the House Com- ; 
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. 81st Cong.. 2d Sess.
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 11.
I
Christian Science Monitor. March 5, 1953. In early 
1953, Mexican naval forces, claiming jurisdiction to three 
leagues into the Gulf of Mexico, seized United States shrimp 
boats found fishing in the waters between three statute 
miles and nine nautical miles seaward of various parts of 
Mexico. The United States Department of State promptly pro­
tested the seizure, holding that citizens of the United 
States had a right to fish these waters without molestation 
by the Mexican Government. The matter is still unsettled.
11Statement of John J. Real, Fishermen*s Cooperative 
Association, Hearings on S. J. Res. 13. p. 308.
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the ocean floor. The Submerged Lands Act, in tacitly i 
recognizing the complete sovereignty of Florida and Texas in 
I the Gulf of Mexico out to three leagues, provides justifica- 
I tion for even more extravagant claims by other nations in I 
i their adjacent seas and removes any ground for protest by
j the United States concerning such extension of sovereignty.^!^
i ■ •
I However, in the Outer Continental Shelf Act, Congress care-;
I fully used the wording of the 1945 Proclamation.^^ i
I The Future of Federal Lands
The consensus of opinion on the effect of the off­
shore quitclaim measure was that a precedent had been estab­
lished that would aid the claims of other States to the | 
minerals, timber, and grassland resources of the public |
domain. One Senatorial supporter of the quitclaim remarked;!
I
”. . . The underlying principles and conditions involved in ;
i
the tidelands issue are identical to those involved in sub- | 
surface rights in the public lands. . . This stand wa§
^^Presidential Proclamation No', 2667, September 28,
1945.
l^Letter of Thruston B. Morton, Assistant Secretary 
of State, to Senator Jackson, dated March 6, 1953, Hearings 
on s. J. Res'. 13. p . 1088. At the time the Act was passed, 
the United States was protesting a Soviet claim of 12 miles 
out in the Bering Sea as well as Mexico*s claim. Washington
Post. March 14, 1953. |
^^Fublic Law 212, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., Sec. 3(a)
and (b).
1
Statement of Lester C. Hunt, Senator from Wyoming,!
Hearings on S. J. Res. 13. p. 874. !
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I also affirmed by Senator Butler, chairman of the Senate j
I  i
iInterior and Insular Affairs Committee: ". . . When the
i  '  '
Itidelands question is settled, there are plans for the in-
i ;
; troduction of a bill which will make the same theory appli- i 
i  .  I
I cable to the public lands now held by the Federal Government:
I  within the States
I ;
I Even opponents of the quitclaim measure agreed that :
i
the Act would set such a precedent: ". \ . Quitclaimism, ;
whereby the United States would be persuaded to renounce 
blindly to States sovereignty over millions of acres of sea­
ward lands, would lead to the ultimate destruction of all 
Federal conservation, public land, and public power 
policies. . . ."17 This trend is climaxed in the statement 
by Secretary of the Interior McKay to the Western Governors* 
Conference that the main objective of the Administration’s 
public land policy was to accomplish the transfer of the 
public domain to private ownership.
The United States still possesses 460 million acres 
of unreserved and unappropriated public land, 170 million 
acres in the fourteen public land states and 290 million 
acres in A l a s k a . 19 Any estimate of the value of these lands
l^Congressionai Record. March 30, 1953, p. 2600.
17Statement of Representative Peter W. Rodino, Jr., 
Congressional Digest. December, 1953, p . 297.
l% e w  York Times. November 3, 1953, 1, 25.
19 ___   Den art men-h-ofL-Interior- Years_of_Progres_s_J.94.5-__
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would be in tens of billions of d o l l a r s ,20 with changing j 
conditions and technological progress increasing the value ! 
in the future. Would it be in the national interest to
' I
dispose of these lands? I
I
Many students of the problem agree that Federal j 
ownership is not the ideal solution. Still, local pressures! 
for quick development of the forest and grazing lands would | 
be almost impossible for the States to resist; ultimate re- ! 
suits of over-grazing and overcutting might be soil erosion/ 
downstream flooding, and siltation.2^ That such conditions 
are not figments of imagination may be seen by examination 
of the conditions that led to the Taylor Grazing Act of
1934:
. ’. . On the western slope of Colorado and in pearby
States I saw waste, competition, overuse, and abuse of
valuable range lands and watersheds. '. . . Farms and 
ranches everywhere in the range country were suffering. 
. . .  Valuable irrigation projects stood in danger of
1952. p. S9. In 1950 the Federal public domain had 
457,600,000 acres in Continental U. S. and 465,000,000 in 
Alaska. Hearings on S. J. Res’. 13. p. #73.
^^One anti-quitclaim source valued the coal and oil
shale deposits in the public lands at #980 billion. At a 
royalty of ten per cent and after the deduction of 37i per 
cent that goes to the State in which the resource is pro­
duced in lieu of taxes, over $61 billion would accrue to the
Federal Government from coal and oil shale alone. "The Off­
shore Oil Bill— a Trillion Dollar Principle," New Republic. 
April 13, 1953, p. 7. See also former Secretary of Interior 
Chapman*s estimates of more than a trillion and a half
dollars. Hearings on S. J. ReS. 13. p. 976.
21personal conversation of author with Senator Paul 
Douglas, May lè, 1953.
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! ultimate deterioration.^2 |
One editor, syn^athetic to the idea of State or ' 
private control of present Federal land, nonetheless re- i 
marked; ". . . I have observed that selfish interests are | 
able to make a greater impression on state governments and i 
agencies than on Federal / o n e s / \  
From such evidence it is difficult not to conclude 
that transfer of the public domain under the precedent set i 
by the Submerged Lands Act would result in greater national i 
harm than immediate local benefit.
I
Mineral Rights |
Attenpts to wrest ownership and control for the
States of all mineral rights in the Federal public domain
were revived in 1953 by the Hunt Bill^^ and the Malone Amend
ment to the Holland Bill.25 Although the bill failed to
pass and the Malone amendment failed to get out of committee
26there was considerable support for the principle-.
22Remarks by Congressman Taylor, staunch States* 
rights advocate. Congressional Record. 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 
(1940-1941), LXXVI (Appendix), p. 419^.
^^George L. Petersen, editor of Minneapolis Star, 
quoted in "Natural Resources— Whose Responsibility," Field 
and Stream. June, 1954, p* 10$.
^^S. 107, S3d Cong., 1st Sess.
^%earings on S. J. Res. 13. p . 909-10.
^^The Malone Amendment was defeated in Committee by 
only three votes. Washington Evening Star, May 5k 1953.
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Grazing Lands
Under the Taylor Grazing Act, permits are issued for 
iten year terms, renewable if the Department of the Interior 
I believes grazing is not damaging the land. Meanwhile the 
I government aids the permit holder in numerous ways .^? In 
11953, at the instigation of a small group of the larger
i '
I livestock operators, legislation was introduced that would
i od I
1 give the permittees a vested right to these leased lands. !
I Under the proposal, grazing permits could have been bought
and sold and grazing regulations would have been formulated
by stockmen*s committees, I
29 IRepresentative D * Ewart argued that a tenant is not
likely to improve a property if he does not have the assur-|
I
ance of tenure and some degree of control over the land ,
30 ■use'. Opponents of the D*Ewart bill pointed out that the i
!----------------------------------------------------------- I
i  2 7  I
'The government prevents trespass, reseeds denuded j
I areas, controls noxious weeds, and provides fire protection^
 ^ I
R, 4023, introduced by Representative D*Ewart | 
(Rep,) of Montana, and S, 1491, introduced by Senator Barretjb 
(Rep,) of Nebraska, These were identical bills,
29lt is of interest to note that D * Ewart, in
October, 1955, was appointed as Assistant Secretary of the 
Interior, in charge of public lands, national parks and 
Indian affairs. The appointment as guardian of the public 
lands of the man best known to the nation for his attenpt tc 
turn control of these very lands over to the cattlemen was 
condemned by the opposition press as a case of setting the 
fox to watch the chickens. "Giveaway McKay Hires a Helper," 
Democratic Digest. November, 1955, p'. #5.
^^Representative Wesley A, D*Ewart, Congressional 
Digest. December, 1953, p . 29&,
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primary objective of Federal ownership and control of the 
Western lands would be defeated by the legislation. The 
i stockmen could overgraze with inpunity to the detriment of
I •O’]
jthe entire Western economy.^ The proposal was defeated.
I
! The Future of Federal Proprietary Activities
! ■ ! 
j  In addition to the attempted alienation of the sur-|
I face and mineral rights in public lands, there has been a
I concerted drive by interests hostile to Federal proprietary
I
activities to accomplish disposal of Federally owned power 
generation and transmission facilities and sites, synthetic 
rubber and petroleum plants, ana other assets. Proposals 
have ranged from exchanging Government bonds "for stock in 
new companies to spring from presently Government-owned 
plants,"^ to the transfer of such Federal activities and 
facilities to State or local governmental units.^3
We will not review here the many individual pro­
posals designed to halt the proprietary activities of the
^Robert W. Sawyer, Congressional Digest. December, 
1953, p. 299. Mr. Sawyer is the spokesman for the American 
Forestry Association.
^^Proposal by Charles E. Wilson, President, General 
Electric Coup any, quoted in The Economist. April 11, 1953, 
p . 87.
^^The multi-pronged attack on governmental enter­
prise is adequately presented in the first Hoover Report. 
U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of 
the Government, Final Report to the Congress (Washington; 
iLoxe-EniiLent_Erinting_0ffina,^19491-»-£ââ§im..__---------------
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Federal Government They deserve mention only because 
they spring from the same community of thought that was 
responsible for the Submerged Lands Act,
Summary i
I
The extension of full sovereignty beyond three miles' 
into the Gulf of Mexico by Texas and Florida has made it dif-
t I
ficult for the United States Department of State to oppose I 
the claims of other countries to areas more than three miles! 
from their shores. The military and commercial interests of 
the United States would be served best by a retention of the 
traditional "freedom of the seas" beyond three miles.
Support of the quitclaim measure by Congressmen from 
inland States was based on their expectation that the prece­
dent set by such legislative action would apply to the whole 
public domain. The entire question of Federal control and 
administration of grazing and mineral lands and reclamation 
areas seems to be on the brink of re-examination if not of 
repeal.
Both domestically and internationally the action 
taken in the Submerged Lands Act may have bred more problems 
than it solved*.
O j
^Among these are the withdrawal of the Federal Gov­
ernment from the development of the Snake River along the 
Idaho-Oregon border in favor of the Idaho Power Coup any 
(Business Week. August 13, 1955, p. 2&), the sale of twenty- 
five of the twenty-seven government owned synthetic rubber 
plants to private industry (Ibid,, May 7, 1955, p. 1&4), and 
the shutting, down of the Bureau of Mines pilot plants engage 
in research on synthetic petroleum (Congressional Record. 
4^ ay-7— 195-3T-P— ------------ - - ------------
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary
The controversy over ownership of the marginal sea 
lands was but one phase of the continuing struggle regarding 
the activities of the central government in the nation*s 
economy. State ownership advocates contended that familiar­
ity with local conditions, plus experience in leasing and 
regulation, meant greater efficiency and economy under State 
procedures. Proponents of Federal ownership argued that 
uniform administration by one agency less susceptible to 
local pressures insured the greater protection of the public 
welfare. Sincere, intelligent men were found on each side.
Prior to 193# leasing of offshore areas was a State 
function; in numerous instances the Federal government 
secured leases in such areas from the States. In that year, 
however. Secretary Ickes cast doubt on the legitimacy of 
State ownership by his refusal to deny applications for 
Federal leases on these lands. His point of view was later 
vindicated in three separate Supreme Court decisions which 
denied State ownership of the offshore lands and upheld the
2Ô0
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"paramount rights" of the Federal government in such areas. ; 
Yet, the Federal government had no statute under which it 
! could operate the submerged lands, and Congress was not dis-
i  I
iposed to remedy this deficiency. Twice President Truman 
I  I
I vetoed bills which would have quitclaimed the disputed lands!
I :
I to the coastal States.
I This legislative-executive stalemate was broken by
I  the election of General Eisenhower in 1952. Assured of |
I Presidential support. Congress successfully passed the Sub­
merged Lands Act in May 1953, and the Outer Continental 
Shelf Act in August 1953 • The former made provision for : 
unobstructed State ownership within "historic State bound­
aries"; the latter affirmed Federal ownership from State 
boundaries to the edge of the Continental Shelf. The
i
Supreme Court upheld the Submerged Lands Act by stating that; 
the power to dispose of property belonging to the United 
States "is vested in Congress without limitation." Although 
State ownership supporters hailed the victory as irrevocable^ 
there are signs that the controversy is not completely 
settled.
For one thing a later Congress might repeal the Sub­
merged Lands Act. In view of the claims advanced by certain 
groups in inland States for ownership of Federal lands in 
their respective States, leaders of the Federal ownership 
faction could possibly rally enough support to abrogate the 
precedent set by the Act. Too, impetus from the State
2Ô2
I Department because it is embarrassed in international nego- | 
tiations by our overriding of the traditional three-mile '
limit might lead to revision of the Submerged Lands Act.
Both repeal and revision have been subjects of bills at . I
i
least once since the passage of the Act. |
During the long political controversy, estimates of I 
the value of the resources in the marginal sea area were dis­
torted, often for partisan purposes. Divergent estimates | 
ranged from zero to one trillion dollars. Most were based
on one of four resource appraisals made by competent geolo­
gists, The variations can be explained by a lack of uni- |
formity (1) in delimiting geographical areas, (2) in select-;
ing what, resources would be included, and (3) in setting a 
standard money value per unit. Two further causes for the 
variations are (4) that the meaning of the term "reserve" 
ranged between the extremes of ultimate reserves and proved 
reserves, and (5) that the valuation varied from the gross 
value of resources in place to the net value after costs of 
production.
The geological experts agreed that the bed of the 
Gulf Coast marginal sea was potentially promising in oil, 
gas and sulphur, comparing favorably with adjacent onshore 
strips, A reasonable measure of value, using minimum ex­
pectations which are based on current prices, indicates that 
the entire Continental Shelf area seaward of Texas and Louis 
iana would bring a return to the owning governments of
2Ô3
approximately $7.9 billion. For the State-owied areas in |
this region, the return would be approximately $0.9 billion.
The resources of this almost virgin territory are of 
no practical value unless they can be economically extracted; 
at least one developmental cost is reported to be signifi- j 
cantly less than that on land. The costs of marine seismic i 
survey, the principal method used, are only $0 to 75 per 
cent as much per profile as comparable land survey. The ' 
possible saving on lease acquisition costs is unknown, 
primarily because land leases may include hidden costs, such 
as those for title clarification and defense of damage claims 
Since the offshore lessee can secure relatively large lease 
tracts free from these additional costs, it is possible that
I
lease costs offshore may be appreciably less than those on | 
land.
The cost of drilling an offshore well under present 
technology may be but slightly more than the cost of com­
parable onshore drilling, or it may be as much as five times 
more. Factors causing the variation in cost are depth of 
the water, method of drilling used, depth of the well, and 
number of wells drilled from each location. There is evi­
dence also that the production costs per well are higher. 
However, the significant figure which determines whether the 
offshore oil can be economically produced is not the cost 
per well but the cost per barrel of oil or per 1,000 cubic 
feet of gas. Unfortunately, satisfactory data are not______
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available on the costs per 'unit of production, either off­
shore or onshore.
Institutional patterns of oil production afford 
certain economies peculiar to the offshore development, | 
economies which probably offset the higher cost per well. I
I
Normally the lease blocks in the offshore are relatively | 
large with no limit on contiguous purchases, and because of | 
single ownership of the entire area there should be little
I
necessity for competitive offset drilling, a major bane of  ^
onshore producers. Fewer wells per field should be needed
1
and these can be spaced as dictated by conditions of optimum
j
production efficiency. The acknowledged h i ^  cost of plat­
forms is offset by directional drilling in which several 
wells can be drilled from one platform, or by the use of 
mobile units in which no drilling platform is needed.
Offshore operations have the same risks as those on­
shore, plus some that are unique. In both places the opera­
tor runs about equal chances of drilling dry holes, or ex­
periencing a blow-out or fire. The consequences of the 
latter two onshore and offshore may not be equal. Offshore, 
however, the operator has to contend with the action of 
sometimes over-violent waves and wind, the hazards of col­
lision with for-or storm-bound vessels, and the possibili­
ties of wartime attack on his vulnerable installations. The 
device of casualty insurance, private or public, the latter 
-covering-war-damage-,—is-available-or—probably—will—be------
2ë5
available to offset these unique marine perils'. Furthermorej, 
drilling experience onshore and offshore reveals a pattern ' 
of success in both exploratory and developmental ventures, | 
the number of successful wells being proportional to the I 
number drilled'. !
Authorities generally agree that offshore petroleum |
!
will find a market. The expected growth in domestic popula-j 
tion accompanied by the probable increased utilization of I 
the internal combustion engine and the probable continuing 
upsurge in the natural gas and petro-chemical industries 
indicate an ever-increasing demand. It is not known how j 
much of this increased demand will be filled by iiqported oil; 
and nuclear energy, -Many experts maintain that foreign oil 
and nuclear energy will supplement rather than displace 
domestic petroleum. Barring any radical changes, the work­
ings of the Interstate Oil Contact Commission will provide a 
high measure of price stability for the petroleum industry, 
offshore as well as onshore. The State of Louisiana has 
allowed greater daily production per well offshore than on­
shore; Texas treats each case on its merits in separate hear 
ings, and it is believed they often give the same special 
dispensation. Under present regulations the special allow­
ables set by the States extend into the Federal area.
The lease blocks in the offshore have been of much 
greater size than the average tracts on land. Louisiana 
lease blocks are of 5,000 acres: those in Texas territory
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are of 64O acres inside the 3-mile limit and 1,440 acres 
beyond this point; Federal blocks are of 5,760 acres: in
none of these jurisdictions is there any limit to the number 
of blocks owned by a lessee. This last provision, as it 
applies to Federal areas, is in answer to one of the major 
objections against Federal leasing practices under the 
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Under that act the government 
was more fearful of monopoly than eager for the most effi­
cient, economical development.
In the various sales made by the States and the Fed­
eral Government since 1953, the general price trend has beenj 
upward. The sealed bids offered to the lessor by various 
interested parties have brought the cash bonus bids from 
less than $25 per acre in the late 1940*s and early 1950*s 
to more than $300 per acre in Federal lands and to more thanj 
$600 per acre in one Louisiana sale. At the same time, 
delay rentals have begun to assume the fixed figure of $3 
per acre and royalty payments have increased from 12 1/2 to 
16 2/3 per cent.
The income to the governmental landlords is increase^ 
beyond these payments by their taxing power. Although there 
is no severance tax as yet in the Outer Continental Shelf 
area, the States collect that type of tax in their respective 
areas. On both State and Federal lands the income tax pro­
visions prevail, but as on land, the combination of the 
depletion allowance and the right to charge intangible_____
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drilling and development costs to current e^ q)ense gives a j
significant tax advantage to the petroleum producer. !
Since the offshore oil lands in question have only I
j
three owners, protective covenants, which cause much waste- j
j
ful competitive drilling onshore, are of minor importance. I
Well aware of this waste, the large oil companies will |
voluntarily space their wells according to the best avail­
able engineering planning and produce no more than the 
maximum efficient rates. In fact if self-interest does not 
motivate such practices, the governmental owners can compel 
well spacing. Indeed the U‘. S, Geological Survey has the 
power to force unitization in the outer Shelf. Thus far, 
Texas and Louisiana do not have compulsory unitization 
statutes.
The overall effects of the Submerged Lands Act are 
not limited to the nominally disputed lands’. It is believed 
by the State Department that the Act has ramifications that 
will work to the detriment of the United States in maintain­
ing freedom of the seas, a heretofore cardinal policy of the 
State and Defense Departments. States* rights proponents 
and special interest factions have used the Act as a stepping 
stone in their bid for the relinquishment of Federal control 
of public lands and Federal proprietary activities.
Conclusions
It seems likely that the warnings offered by the
zêê
State Department and by various Congressmen about the dan- j 
gerous precedents inherent in the Submerged Lands Act may |
I
have merit* This Act, which recognized the sovereignty of | 
Texas and Florida to lands beyond the traditional three- i 
mile limit, offers possible warrant for other nations to 
assert sovereignty over the high seas contiguous to their 
coast. The gains made by the Gulf States may eventually 
cost the nation dearly in loss of military and commercial 
mobility. Had the Submerged Lands Act clearly limited the ! 
Gulf States to the subsoil and subsurface of the Continental 
Shelf beyond three miles, as was done in the Outer Continen­
tal Shelf Act, the State Department would not face the 
dilemma it now does'.
On the domestic scene. Congress may use the Submerged 
Lands Act as the precedent for disposition of inland unre­
served Federal lands and other Federal assets. Certain 
legislators from the inland States supported the Holland 
Bill because they wanted such a precedent; without this sup­
port and the approval of the President, it is highly im­
probable that the Coastal States could have secured the pas­
sage of the quitclaim.
Although the dollar value estimates of the resources 
of the marginal sea lands were bandied about carelessly for 
political purposes, each estimate was founded on an expert 
appraisal of the physical quantities of the anticipated 
resource recovery. In their own context the geological
239
estimates seem reasonable; when used out of context as the ] 
bases for dollar valuation, they brought forth strange con- I
I
elusions'. From an examination of what appear to be the most 
reasonable technical estimates, it is concluded that many 
billions of dollars will accrue to the governmental owners 
of the submerged lands.
For a diversified operator with a good backlog of 
experience and capital, offshore petroleum operations pose | 
no particularly hazardous ventures. Most of the peculiar 
physical risks are converted to annual fixed costs by cas­
ualty insurance; the likely wartime risks would undoubtedly ; 
be covered by Federal assumption of damage losses. Because I 
of the "laws" of probability, the diversified operator can 
predict with reasonable certainty the number of wells that | 
will prove dry holes. While any individual well is a risk, | 
an extensive drilling program will not be a risk for com­
panies large enough to do business offshore. Further, the 
ability to expense developmental costs and the depletion 
allowance go far to make up for the losses incurred in 
drilling dry holes.
From a study of the offshore lease sales conducted 
thus far, it can be noted in general that the smaller the 
total area offered in each sale, the higher the average cash 
bonus bid per acre. With the limited number of oil com­
panies engaged in offshore activities, the offering of too 
much land at one time has resulted in less competition for
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each lease. i
It has also been noted that the various leasing
I governments follow each other's lead on many successful in-
I '
novations that tend to increase the return to the lessor. 
When the 16 2/3 per cent royalty fee instituted by the Fed­
eral Government proved feasible with no visible reduction in 
cash bonus payments, Texas and Louisiana were quick to fol­
low. The Federal Government has adopted the States' highly ; 
successful leasing procedure in which the royalty is fixed 
and sealed bids are accepted for cash bonus payment. These 
bonus payments have a stipulated minimum; $15 per acre by 
the Federal Government, $5 by Texas and Louisiana. It is ;
I
believed that the higher minimum price is not high enough, |
that $15 per acre is insufficient to impede speculative |
leasing and that a $50 cash bonus would do much to prevent 
speculation without driving off serious bidders. |
Of features which have proved worthwhile although |
not yet adopted by all three governments, three deserve 
special mention. First, in order to increase the probable 
return from resources in its area and to remove the existing 
inequity between State-owned and Federally-owned lands, it 
might be advisable for the Federal Government to levy a 
severance tax in the Outer Continental Shelf. Second, since 
production not in excess of the MER brings the greatest 
possible return from a well, Louisiana ou^t to follow the 
lead of Texas and the Federal Government and prorate______
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production per well by this standard. Third, a system of |
compulsory unitization is needed. At first glance that pro-
ip osal seems superfluous. Since the oil companies have long 
I !
clamored for larger lease blocks which could be more economy
ically developed than smaller ones, and since most comp et ent!
petroleum engineers agree on the greater efficiency of
unitized production, it seems likely that the offshore
operators will want to adopt voluntary unitization for off-I
shore development. However, there are certain lively areas
where disagreement may arise. The boundaries between State :
and State, or Federal and State, offer one such type area;
i
another is the possible conflict between onshore and off- | 
shore development.
An oil field is not circumscribed either by arbitrary 
property lines or by the shore line itself. For optimum 
production and efficiency an oil field should be developed 
as a unit. Even if the offshore operators desire unit de­
velopment, the provisions in the protective covenants that 
require competitive offset drilling onshore defeat effi­
ciency. Seemingly the only way to overcome conflicts of 
this nature is by a State compulsory unitization statute.
Offshore operators seem to agree that the average 
cost per well offshore at present is more than the cost on­
shore. However, reliance upon such gross figures tends to 
obscure the fact that the cost per well is not necessarily 
the most significant factor. QtMr_f_aot_o.iis„su.ch_.as________
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geophysical costs, lease costs and the proper placing of I 
each well so as to minimize the number of wells needed to 
I drain a reservoir, may be more important from a cost per 
I barrel standpoint. The institutional pattern in the off- 
I shore lends itself to maximum efficiency in well spacing, soj 
I that five wells offshore may do the work of fifteen onshore,
I !
I  If this were so, and assuming all other costs to be equal,
j
I  the drilling cost per well offshore could be three times as | 
much as onshore and still have the same cost per barrel. 
Experience has shown significant differences in geophysical 
exploration costs in favor of the offshore operator; lease 
costs may also be less. In this virgin territory, explora­
tory operations conducted thus far have had an unusually hi^ 
degree of success.
Although exact statistical data are lacking on the 
cost per barrel both onshore and offshore, the inference 
seems sound that the cost must be at least approximately the 
same in both places. Support is given this inference by the 
willingness of oilmen to engage in Gulf Coast marine opera­
tions. Their eagerness is shown by the surprisingly high 
cash bonus payments in the offshore sales of 1953 and 1954.
No attenpt has been made in this study to decide the 
justice of the quitclaim to the States of the submerged 
lands within State boundaries. Regardless of which level of 
government owns and administers offshore land, the same 
private companies will conduct the production operations.
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The overall availability of petroleum wilüT not be appreciably 
affected by the ownership pattern.
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